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This study attempts to assess the dynamics of
British policy towards the Chinese community in Malaya
during a period of thirteen years which witnessed the
Japanese Occupation of Malaya, the reestablishment of
British colonial rule, and the efforts towards self-
government. A key factor in the British policy towards
the Chinese community is based on an awareness of the
community's potentiality to become a " Fifth Column",
threatening the security of British Malaya. The problem
facing the colonial authorities, therefore, was how to
neutralize this potential "Fifth Columnt!. Influenced by
the contemporary situation, the British eventually
adopted a policy of socio-political reorganization of the
Chinese community as a means of solving the problem.
During the period of this study British policy towards
the Chinese political role covers four stages: first, the
pre-war period with the so-called "pro-Malay policy";
second, the 1942-1947 period with the new Chinese policy
and the Malayan Union scheme; third, the period of
Federation and the revival of a pro-Malay policy; and
finally, the Malayanization of the Chinese aiming at
iii
building a united Malayan nation. Simultaneously with
this stage, was the British undertaking of
decolonization.
In retrospect, the study in the main confirms the
success of British policy towards the Malayan Chinese
particularly in cultivating a sense of Malayan national
consciousness. At least the majority of the Chinese in
Malaya willingly chose this land as their home.
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Introduction
This work is an attempt to assess the dynamics of
British policy towards Chinese politics in Malaya. It
focuses on the period from 1942-1955 which witnessed the
Japanese occupation of Malaya, the re-establishment of
British colonial rule, and the moves towards self -
government. British policy towards the Chinese community
changed dramatically at the outbreak of the Second World
War with the introduction -of the document entitled,
"Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives-- Chinese Policy" and
the Malayan Union proposals which replaced the British
so-called pro-Malay and anti-Chinese policy of the pre-war
period. However, this new policy was suddenly changed in
1948 with the introduction of the Federal policy which
almost revived the pre-war policy towards the Chinese
community.	 At the end of 1948 the British started to
rethink their position and developed a "Malayanisation of
the Chinese" policy. 	 This was re-emphasized in 1952 with
the development of the theme of building a united Malayan
nation. 1955 was the critical year in the evolution of
British policy, since this was the year that they decided
to end their rule in Malaya.
Many books have been written which are indirectly
related to British policy and Chinese politics in Malaya.
In 1967 James Allen wrote his pioneering monograph, Ih
2Malayan Union. 1	It is a study of the rise and the fall
of the Malayan Union. The author sets himself to answer
two principal questions: "Why was it attempted and why did
it fail so quickly?" Even though the book "presented the
lengthiest and most sophisticated analysis of the Malayan
Union," it suffered from a deficiency of data. 2 Allen's
work was mainly based on interviews and published
materials including journals and books. He was not able
to investigate the relevant official records such as CO
273/667, CO 825/42, CO 865/14. CO 717/152, FO 371/41625
and EMA/AIJM/239 which were then not yet open for public
scrutiny. Therefore, it was not possible for the author
to present an entirely satisfactory explanation as to what
led the Colonial Office to introduce and then to drop the
Union policy. Some of his arguments are not convincing
as he was not able to support them with sufficient data.
For instance, he points out that one of the reasons which
induced the Colonial Office to introduce the Malayan Union
policy was the "anti-Malay atmosphere" prevailing at the
time, along with the growth of "a more genuine admiration
for the Chinese," who bore the brunt of the Japanese
occupation. 3 He added that Whitehall felt that the
predominantly Chinese • Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army
(MPAJA) and its civilian supporters deserved some
recognition and some share of the political cake after the
re-establishment of colonial rule in Malaya. Howewer,
Allen fails to provide any data or specific sources to
support this hypothesis.
3Allen's arguments were disputed by Moh3med Noordin
Sopiee, who published From Malayan Union to Singapore
Separation in 1974. According to Mohamed Noordin, there
is little in the Colonial Office records "to indicate that
there was a significant desire to punish the Malays or
that strong anti-Malay feelings significantly affected
political decision-making." 4 Mohamed Noordin was of the
opinion that the indirect role of the United States played
an important part in the formulation of the Malayan Union
policy. 5 He added that the British commitment to the
ideal of decolonization also contributed to the
formulation of the Union policy.
Unlike Allen, Mohamed Noordin was able to rely on a
wider variety of sources-- including some confidential
files, particularly Cabinet papers-- in the Public Record
Office in London, and others in the National Archives in
Kuala Lumpur. However, the work also faced a deficiency
of data, as some of the relevant confidential files on
this subject were opened one year after it was published.
Thus, according to Albert Lau, Noordin failed "to offer a
satisfactory account of official decisions at the
departmental level 	 from which the Malayan Union
originated. ,,G
Mohamed Noordin's work, which is an overall study of
political unification in the Malaysia region, gives some
coverage of Chinese political activities such as the
4Penang Secession Movement of 1948-1949, but fails to
assess the impact of the Penang Secession Movement on the
constitutional development of Malaya. Judging from the
available information, this event in fact induced the
British government to bring Singapore closer to Malaya,
which in the long term contributed to the formation of
Malaysia. Mohamed Noordins's coverage of British policy
towards Chinese politics in the period 1948 to 1955 does
not fulfill all our expectations, particularly since more
and more confidential files have become available.
Another major study on the same ground is British
policy and Malay politics during the Malayan Union
Experiment 1942-1948 by A. J. Stockwell. 7 As the title
suggests it focuses on the development of Malay politics,
and has limited coverage of Chinese politics. 	 In chapter
II, the author traces and discusses the emergence of a new
British policy from 1942 to 1945. According to Albert
Lau, Stockwell was "able to document, with greater
precision, the key stages in the evolution of the Union
scheme as well as presenting the first documented study of
the MacMichael mission." 8 Like Mohamed Noordin,
Stockwell found little evidence which indicated that
Chinese politics had played a key role in inducing the
Colonial Office to introduce the Union policy. 	 However,
he does mention that the Malayan Planning Unit appointed
Victor Purcell to deal with Chinese matters. 9	Indirectly
he opened new ground for further research.
5Stockwell's work, which was published in 1979, "was
understandably more extensively researched than either"
James Allen or Mohamed Noordin Sopiee) 0
 The book is
heavily footnoted and makes use of almost every source
available-- including CO 825, CO 273, CO 717, Co 865, Cab
65/41, 49 and 53, Cab 66/60 and 55, Cab 96/5, Cab 98/41,
the Malayan Security Service Files, Political Intelligence
Journals, British Military Administration Files and some
private papers. As his focus of research was on Malay
politics, Stockwell did not investigate the work of Victor
Purcell and the inter-departmental committee which was
formed in December 1943, to formulate a key directive on
Chinese policy.	 As a consequence A. J. Stockwell did not
pursue James Allen's speculations on this subject.
Nine years after the publication of Stockwell's book
many more writers started to undertake research in this
field, on the basis of tackling a wider scope and more
diverse literature. 	 In 1988 Heng Pek Koon published
Chinese Politics in Malaysia, followed by Richard Stubbs,
Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare The Malayan
Emergency l948-1, in 1989.12 The following year C.F.
Yong & R.B. McKenna published The Kuomintan g Movement in
British Malaya l9l2194913 and then, Albert Lau's The
Malayan Union Controvers y, 1942-1948, was published in
1991 . 14	-
6Heng Pek Koon's work is the first book-length study
of the Malayan (later Malaysian) Chinese Association (MCA)
in the period 1945-1955, which according to the author
"witnessed the emergence of the Chinese as an integral
component within the political community of Malaya."15
Heng's study reveals that the MCA brokered the growth of a
Malayan-centered conservative Chinese political culture
and, "in its finest hours," "played an innovative and
pivotal role in the independence movement, galvanizing and
articulating the aspirations of the Chinese community, as
well as effectively representing Chinese concerns vis-a-
vis the British Administration and Malay powers that
be. ,,16
The real strength, which is also the real weakness of
the author, is her sources. On the one hand she was very
lucky to be allowed to investigate MCA records from 1949-
1986 at the MCA Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and was also
able to interview some prominent leaders of the party.
However, on the other hand, she was unable to investigate
a variety of other sources, including certain files in the
Public Record Office and the Malaysian National Archives,
and private papers such as the Gerald Templer, H.B. Ball
(the Legal Advisor of the MCA) and H.S. Lee Papers. As a
result the author emphasises and discusses at great
length the role of MCA in the process of the
"indigenization" of Chinese politics and gives only small
coverage to the role of the colonial government, which in
7actual fact forced the Chinese to turn inward or to
"Malayanize", in order to be able to enjoy citizenship and
other political rights in Malaya. There are also some
gaps in her arguments relating to the origins of the MCA
and the tJMNO-MCA Alliance. Heng Pek Koon was not aware
that Tan Cheng Lock had already made a proposal to form
the MCA in December 1948, as she was unable to investigate
the Malcolm MacDonald Papers. 	 Her explanations of the
origins of the UMNO-MCA Alliance were based mainly on
logic, speculation and assumption. 17 She also did not
interview H.B. Ball ; former Legal Adviser of the MCA, who
could have provided some vital information regarding the
origins of the Alliance. Some of her statements such as:
"Rejecting Tan Cheng Lock's decision to support the IMP in
the election, the Selangor MCA leadership searched for an
alternative strategy which would enable the MCA to field
its candidate on a communal ticket but •within an inter-
ethnic framework," are not supported by any specific
source. 18 Likewise the author is unable to explain
certain events, such as "why Tan Cheng Lock continued to
support the IMP after he made his commitment to tJMNO",
which indicates a deficiency in documentation.19
Therefore further research needed to be done or more
documentation was necessary to clarify the origins of the
UMNO-MCA Alliance and the attitude of Tan Cheng Lock
towards the IMP and tJMNO.
8Richard Stubb's book aimed "to place the 'shooting
war' between the Malayan Government and the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) within the broader context of
social, political and economic aspects of life in
Malaya." 20
 It made a survey of the full scope of the
Government's "hearts and minds" strategy and the impact of
both Government and MCP strategies on administration,
security, and political, economic and social policies.22
His findings and analyses confirm the contribution made by
his predecessors such as Anthony Short in The Communist
Insurrection in Malaya, 1948_1960,23 complement	 Cheah
Boon Kheng's Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and
Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation
1941-1946 24
To cover such "a wide-ranging review of the events of
the Emergency," Richard Stubbs mainly used a wide variety
of confidential files in the Public Record Office and the
Malaysian National Archives, mainly CO537, C0717 and
CO1022 files. He missed some important files in the
series CO273, COBG5, WO203, CO1O3O and also the older file
FO371/1l6941 which could have provided some additional
data on this subject. The author also failed to consult
certain EMA files in the Malaysian National Archives and
some private papers such as the Malcolm MacDonald and
General Gerald Templer Papers.
9Even though Richard Stubb's book offers a
comprehensive explanation of various aspects of the
Emergency, it also has some shortcomings. chapter 8,
"The Final Year", 27 was somewhat of a disappointment as
there is in it hardly any new information about the Baling
talks of 1955.	 1955 was in fact a crucial year in the
development of British policy and the process of the
decolonisation of Malaya. He missed a chance to
investigate certain files particularly F0371/116941 and
C0l030/31, which could have provided useful information,
adding to our understanding of the British response to the
Communists' peace offensive.
Richard Stubbs also gives little coverage of some of
the Government's efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of
the people such as the development of a Malayan-centered
Chinese political party and the Community Liaison
Committee or the movement for inter-communal co-operation.
Like Heng Pek Koon, he was unable to provide enough data
to clarify the origins of the tTMNO-MCA Alliance. 27 He
suggests that CJMNO and the MCA joined forces to counter
the electoral threat of Onn's IMP, and because of personal
anirnosty towards Onn. 28	But he is unable to provide any
evidence to support this statement.
C.F. Yang & R. B. McKenna's work focuses on a
different angle of Chinese politics and in a different
period.	 It is concerned with the Chinese-based political
10
movement-- the Kuomintang-- in the period 1912 to 1949.
According to the authors it is a study set tlagainst the
background of British Colonial rule, the changing
political circumstances and fortunes in China and the
rising and waning of Malayan nationalism from 1894.1129
Six of the eight chapters focus on the leadership,
organisation and ideology of the Kuomintan g in the pre-
World War Two period.
Generally this book is well researched and well
written and is heavily noted. The authors made use of a
wider variety of sources such as offical records in the
CO, WO and FO series in the Public Record Office, and also
materials in the National Library of Singapore, private
papers and other unpublished and published material both
in English and Chinese. However, the authors missed a
chance to investigate certain files which are relevant to
the subject, such as F0371/41625 and CAB1O1 in the Public
Record Office, and the EMA files in the Malaysian National
Archives.	 As a consequence the authors did not attempt
to study the evolution of British policy towards the
Kuomintang during the period 1942 to 1945. The authors
seem not to have been aware of the existence of the
document entitled "Malaya, Long Term Policy Directives --
Chinese Policy" which was formulated by the British as a
result of British (through Force 136) cooperation with the
11
Kuomintang and the MCP during the war. 	 Therefore these
matters remain to be redressed.
The arrival of Albert Lau's book is a most welcome
addition to the study of British policy and Chinese
politics.	 The author presented a more comprehensive
study of Britsh constitutional policy towards both Malaya
and Singapore in the period 1942 to 1948. He emphasized
two fundamental aspects of British policy: the "Union" and
Il citizenship !t issues. 3 ° This book definitely provides us
with a more comprehensive analysis and is enlightening on
the Malayan Union and the development of British policy
until 1948.
The author had a great advantage compared with his
predecessors in this field, since almost all the relevant
confidential files had been opened in the Public Record
Office and the Malaysian National Archives. 	 Albert Lau
also was able to investigate almost all MBA files and
certain private papers such as the Nik Mohammed Kamil
Papers which are no longer available for public scrutiny
because of the implementation of the Malaysian Official
Secrets Act at the end of the 1980's.
Albert Lau made some fascinating discoveries relating
to British policy towards the Chinese community during the
Japanese occupation of Ma1aya. 3 - He also discusses the
probable influence of political, moral and military
12
factors on the Colonial Office's thinking about its post-
war Chinese policy. 32 He made use of CAB1O1 files as his
main source to support and justify his hypothesis and
interpretation. However, without further research in
this area scholars may not be entirely convinced by his
conclusions as the author has failed to indicate whether
the Colonial Officers had any knowledge of the work of
British Force 136 and its relationship with the MCP in
Malaya before they formulated their policy towards the
Chinese community.
Documents of particular significance for the subject
of British policy towards the Chinese polity have not been
given sufficient emphasis, such as the private papers of
people such as Malcolm MacDonald, General Templer, H.S.
Lee and H.B. Ball. There is also some old material which
has still been left uninvestigated, such as FO371/4l625,
and there are new files to be investigated such C01030 and
F0371/116941. Because of these documents, new information
has been obtained, and a different perspective on British
policy towards the Chinese has been gained, particularly
the fact that previous books have under-emphasised the
influence on British policy of the development	 of a
Chinese polity in Malaya.
This thesis seeks to assess the dynamics of British
policy towards the Chinese community between 1942 and
13
1955. A key factor in British policy towards the Chinese
community was their belief that this community had the
potential to become a "Fifth Column", to serve their
motherland, China, or another foreign power, notably
Communist Russia. Thus the Chinese created the so-called
"Chinese problem" for the British in Malaya, including
Singapore.	 The strength of this community lay not only
in its size but in its economic power vis-a-vis the Malays
or bumiputra. The problem for the Colonial or local
authorities was how to deal with and render this potential
"Fifth Column" innocuous.
British policy towards the Chinese community changed
dramatically between 1942 and 1955. The change took place
in four phases: first, the pre-war period with the so-
called "pro-Malay policy"; second, the 1942-1947 period
with the new liberal Chinese policy and the Malayan Union
scheme: third, the period of early Federal policy which
reflected almost a revival of the pre-war policy; and
finally the "Malayanization of the Chinese" policy aiming
at building a united Malayan nation. Simultaneously with
this stage, Britain finally committed itself to early
decolonisation.
The study is also intended to complement the earlier
works covering the same ground and to fill the documentary
gaps in this period's history, and thereby gain a new and
14
fresh perspective on the complex relationship between
British policy and Chinese Politics in Malaya.
It is the writer's contention that the relations
between British policy and Chinese politics were shaped by
the actions and responses of both sides. Between 1942 and
1946 the initiative towards a more liberal attitude
towards Chinese politics was largely taken by the British
without any prompting or much pressure from the Chinese.
The abandonment of the Chinese policy based on the long
term policy directives and the Malayan Union proposals and
the implementation of the federal policy, while largely a
response to strong Malay opposition, was made easier by a
lack of reaction from the majority of the Chinese and the
increased radicalism of the MCP. The British could still
initiate a policy which affected the Chinese without
giving weight to Chinese opinion. However, the
introduction of the Malayanization of the Chinese policy
was undoubtedly a British response to the political
activities of the Chinese which went beyond an act of
accomodation. It was a policy adopted to safeguard the
security of the British position in Malaya and to enable
the transfer of sovereignty to take place peacefully.
15
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CHAPTER 1
The Emergence of Political Consciousness and
Nationalism Among the Chinese, 1894-1941
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the
development of Chinese political consciousness and
activities in Malaya by focussing on three main
tendencies: firstly, "Overseas Chinese" nationalism which
was wedded to the Kuomintang and China; secondly, the
Communist movement, which was dominated by Chinese, and
whose activities included the promotion of Chinese
nationalism, in addition to anti-imperialist and anti-
British movements; and thirdly, the Straits Chinese, as
represented by the Straits Chinese British Association
and the Straits Chinese newspapers which were written in
the Baba Peranakan-Malay language and were locally
oriented)-
Chinese political activities created the so-
called "Chinese problem" for the colonial government. The
Kuomintang 's activities were considered a foreign
interference in Chinese affairs in Malaya; there was also
the fact that the Communist movements, which were the
most radical groups in the Chinese community, promoted
and incited social unrest and discontent among the
workers. 2 Also there were the Straits Chinese demands for
participation in the administration and government of
18
Malaya, which had given rise to great concern among
the Malay Sultans and the traditional Malay community.
Generally the colonial government held the view that the
Chinese community had the potential to be a "Fifth
Column" which would serve the motherland, China, or other
foreign powers and destroy British supremacy in Malaya.
In these circumstances, the aims of British
policy were to suppress the Kuomintang and the
Communists, except for those who showed themselves to be
moderates; and to ignore the demands of the Straits
Chinese and take a strong and inflexible pro-Malay line,
such as a decentralization policy, prolonging the
exclusion of non-Malays from administration and any areas
of policy-making. In other words the British wanted the
Chinese community to be loyal and apolitical.
Part I
Overseas Chinese Nationalism and the Development
of the Kuomintang
The origin of Overseas Chinese nationalism can
be traced to the political development of China at the
end of the nineteenth century. In the first 5mb-Japanese
War (1894-1895) , China was defeated and was forced to
sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 which ceded the
island of Formosa to Japan.	 These events caused
19
bitterness and a sense of humiliation 	 among the
Overseas Chinese, who had always regarded Japan as a
j (dwarf) . In 1897, eighteen patriotic Chinese from
Malacca set up a group called "The Eighteen Saviours"
whose objective was to save China from destruction.4
After the emergence of the Reform Movement led
by Kang Yu Wei (1856-1927) the Overseas Chinese were
introduced to the idea of reform. Some educated Chinese
in Singapore such as Khoo Seok Wan set up a Chinese
newspaper, Thien Nan Shin Pau to spread reformist
principles among Overseas Chinese. 5 Dr. Lim Boon Keng, an
English educated Straits Chinese, was also attracted to
the idea of reform. He, and other Straits Chinese, set
up the Straits Chinese Magazine to spread reformist ideas
to the Straits Chinese community. He also revived the
Chinese newspaper, Sing P0 under the new name of Jin Shin
Pau, which became an organ for reformist groups. 6 For
the same purpose, he formed the Chinese Philanthropic
Society.
On 2 February 1900 Kang Yu Wei visited
Singapore and set up a branch of the Emperor Protection
Party with Khoo Seok Wan as its Chairman. The Reform
Movement and their leader promoted political
consciousness among the Overseas Chinese in Malaya
through Chinese education.	 With their encouragement,
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eight Chinese modern schools were established in Malaya
from 1904-1907. The Reform Movement took steps to raise
funds from the Overseas Chinese in order to prepare for
revolt in China against the dowager Empress. The purpose
of the revolt was to restore Emperor Kuang-hsu to the
Chinese throne. However, the revolt, which was launched
in August 1900, failed, and the local reformist
supporters began to disassociate themselves from the
Reform Movement. Subsequently the Reform Movement lost
its main purpose when Emperor Kuang-hsu died in 1908.
The revolutionary movement, under the
leadership of Sun Yat Sen, saw the Overseas Chinese as a
potential force for nationalist revolution in China. In
order to get support from the Overseas Chinese, Sun Yat
Sen visited Singapore in July 1900. He did not get a good
response from the Overseas Chinese for the
revolutionaries' cause. However, his colleague, Yu Lieh,
who visited Malaya in the following year, was able to
gain some support. He laid the foundations for the
revolutionary movement by setting up the social-
educational "Central Harmony Club" or Chun g Ho-tang in
Kuala Lumpur, with branches in Singapore, Ipoh and
Penang7 . These branches, together with clubs and reading
rooms became a propaganda machine to fan anti-Manchu
sentiment among the Overseas Chinese. The revolutionary
movement also used various secret societies in Malaya to
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instil propaganda among	 the lower classes of the
Overseas Chinese.
A branch of the Tung Meng Hui, or Alliance
League, were formed in Singapore in April 1906, and it
became the headquarters for the Southeast Asian branch of
Tung Meng ffjj. But in 1910 it was moved to Penang and
also reorganised under the new name, Chung hua Ko-min-
tang or "Chinese Revolutionary Party." Sun Yat Sen
planned a series of revolts against the Manchu Government
in China. The Overseas Chinese played their role •as fund
raisers for the revolutionary cause and some of them even
returned to participate in the revolt.
The Manchus were overthrown after the Wuchang
uprising in October 1911. China became a republic on the
1 January 1912, and Sun Yat Sen was inaugurated as
provisional president in Nangking, the new capital.
However, four months later he yielded the presidency to
Yuan Shih K'ai, with the hope of maintaining peace and
unity in China.8
After the national revolution, the Tun g Meng
jj was merged with other smaller parties and reorganized
as the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party . Unlike the Tung
Meng Hul, the Kuomintan g was not a revolutionary
organization, but a parliamentary political party.
Various branches of the Kuomintan g were formed, including
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some abroad. A branch was formed in Singapore under the
name of "The Singapore Communication Lodge of the KMT"
and was registered under the Societies Ordinance in
l913. Among the founding members were Straits Chinese
such as Dr. Lim Boon Keng and Tan Chay Yan from Malacca.
This lodge was closed in 1914 when to the Registrar of
Societies pressurized the Lodge to disclose the names and
addresses of members) 0 However, other branches in
Malaya continued to operate. Later, all the branches went
underground and were declared non-existent by a Gazette
Notification of 1922.	 -
In 1913, the Kuomintang in China was banned by
Yuan Shih K'ai's government. Sun Yat Sen and a group of
Chinese leaders, who were opposed to Yuan Shih K'ai fled
to Japan. In Japan he decided to found a new party, the
Chinese Revolutionary Party (CRP) , to replace the
Kuomintang . He directed the branches of the Kuomintang
abroad, including those in Malaya, to be redesigned and
reorganized as the branch offices of the CRP in order to
prepare for the "Third Revolution."
In Malaya some branches of the KMT were
dissolved to form branches of CRP and were operated
secretly, as in China. But some other branches of the
KMT refused to be dissolved and carried out operations
under the banner of the old KMT. 11 As in China, the KMT
23
branches were under pressure from the authorities. The
colonial government attempted to maintain good relations
with Yuan Shih K'ai's government, which was recognized by
the British government in London. The British were in
favour of a unified and centralized China which could
protect British interests in that country. Thus, the
local government in Malaya took steps to suppress the
local branches of KMT. Between 1913 and 1919, the KMT
and CRP suffered a decline in China and in Malaya as
well 12
The death of Yuan Shih K'ai in 1916 and the
development of Chinese nationalism as a consequence of
the May Fourth Incident provided the opportunity for Sun
Yat Sen to build his power base in China. 13
 He with the
aid of southern military governors set up a "rump
parliament" in late July 1917.14 On 2 September the
Military Government was inaugurated and Sun Yat Sen was
elected as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. On 10
October 1919, he reorganized the CRP and converted it
into the Chung-hua Kuomintang (in a shortened form it was
cailled the Kuomintang (KMT), same as former Kuomintang),
in preparation for final struggle against the Northern
warlords 15
The May Fourth Incident intensified nationalism
among Overseas Chinese in Malaya)- 6
 The Chinese in
Singapore and Penang were furious with the Paris Peace
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Conference decisions concerning China and the attitudes
of the Peking government. An organization called the
Patriotic League (Ai-kuo t'un g -meng ) urged Overseas
Chinese to boycott Japanese goods. On 19 •June, 1919,
anti-Japanese activities in Singapore caused a major
disturbance. In one incident police and anti-Japanese
demonstrators clashed: two people were killed and three
wounded. The government declared Martial Law the
following day. Subsequently 131 arrests were made by the
police and three people were killed and eight injured.
In Penang, anti-Japanese activities also created a
disturbance: three	 people were killed and three
injured. Towards July, anti-Japanese activities had
declined but the Overseas Chinese continued to
harbour a strong resentment towards the Japanese. 17 This
marked the beginning of Chinese radical nationalism in
Malaya.
KMT activities took a new turn in 1924, after
the KMT in China cooperated with the CCP under a United
Front (1924-1927) 18 In China, the United Front
promoted anti-warlordism and anti-imperialism for the
unification of China. In Malaya, Communists were allowed
to join the KMT. This turned the organization into a
radical movement with the adoption of anti-imperialist
nationalism. The colonial government feared the radical
groups would infiltrate Chinese trade unions and
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encourage subversive activities. 19 The government was
also taking steps to stop the influx of anti-British,
anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist literature. The
police raided Chinese night schools to suppress
Communist activities.
Overseas Chinese nationalism reached its peak
during the Second Sino-Japanese War. They formed the
Malayan Overseas Chinese National Salvation Movement
(MOCNSM) for the purpose of collecting funds for Chinese
relief. According to Stephen Leong, "so intense and
widespread were the nationalist activities of the Malayan
Chinese, the achievement of the Malayan Overseas Chinese
Nationalist Salvation Movement (MOCNSM) as the
Nationalist Movement of 1937-1941 far exceeded those of
earlier periods of nationalist activities." 20 Not only
the Overseas Chinese in Malaya, but Chinese communities
throughout Southeast Asia, united to promote support for
China. The Federation of China Relief Funds of the South
East was formed under Malayan Chinese leadership with the
objective of giving maximum support to the motherland. By
December 1941, the MOCNSM came to an end as Japanese
forces invaded and occupied Malaya.
Before World War Two (1941-1945) , it was
apparent that the Kuomintang was playing a significant
role, both in the promotion of Chinese political
consciousness and the activities of the Overseas Chinese
1ujLurc
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in Malaya. It nurtured and developed patriotism and
nationalism among the Overseas Chinese and it served
as an important coordination and propaganda agent in
allying the Overseas Chinese to the motherland's cause.
Part II
The Emergence of the Communist Movement
According to Gene Z. Hanrahan, the first actual
Communist activities in Malaya were carried out by
Alimin, an Indonesian revolutionary. 21 Alimin stopped by
in Singapore in early spring 1924 while en route to the
Pan-Pacific Conference which was taking place in Canton.
Tan Malaka, chief Comintern representative for all
southeast Asia held the view that the Malays were not
interested in any political work and that, ". . . .the only
hope lay with the Chinese." 22 He persuaded Chinese
Communists, to undertake the infiltration of left-wing
groups in Singapore. The CCP did send an agent Fu Tu-
ching, to liaise with the Chinese in Malaya, and with
Indonesian revolutionaries.
It is most probable that Communism had been
introduced into Singapore or Malaya long before Alimin
arrived. The Overseas Chinese anti-Japanese activities
after the 4 May Incident of 1919, probably had links
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with the activities of Bolshevik agitators. According to
C. J. Christie, it is likely that Bolshevik agitators had
infiltrated the student and labour organizations in China
and caused the demonstrations and riots during the 4 May
Incident of 1919.23 It was followed by demonstrations
and disturbances in Malaya in June 1919.
The first Communist organization which promoted
Communist ideology and anti-imperialist nationalism in
Malaya was known as the "main school." Its activities
centred on the Hailam community (the immigrant Chinese
from Hainan Island) which formed the lowest class in
Overseas Chinese society in Malaya. According to
Victor Purcell, "they were the first to take a left line
in politics, partly, perhaps, to increase their prestige
with other Chinese by drawing attention to themselves."24
The "main school", under the direction of the Chinese
Communist Party, operated through various night schools,
labour unions and the left wing of KMT.25
In March 1927 the "main school" was responsible
for causing a civil disturbance which was known as the
"K'reta Ayer Incident" in Singapore. 26 This incident
happened when the Chinese community staged a mammoth
memorial service to mark the second anniversary of the
death of Sun Yat Sen, the founder of the Chinese
Republic. In order to enhance anti-British sentiment
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among the Chinese, the Communists organized a
demonstration in front of the police station at K'reta
Ayer. Police who attempted to quieten the crowd were
attacked. According to Stephen Leong, "the K'reta Ayer
Incident, and its aftermath, represented the most active
and fruitful phase of Communist mobilization of Overseas
Chinese nationalism in Malaya during the period 1922-
1937. ,,27
The British government took stern measures to
curb the activities of the Communist movement, by the
enactment of the Immigration Restriction Ordinance in the
Straits Settlements in 1928. The law empowered the
governor to regulate or prohibit immigration for the
purpose of performing domestic or manual labour. 28 The
primary object of the ordinance was to regulate Chinese
immigration as the result of K'reta Ayer Incident.
In 1927, following the split between the
Kuomintang and the Communists in China, the left-wing of
the KMT broke away from the Kuomintang in Malaya. Several
Chinese Communist agents arrived in Malaya under the
instruction of the Comintern to form a regular Communist
organization in Malaya. 29 The "main school" was replaced
by the Nanyang Communist Party in March 1928. In August
1928, the Nanyang Communist Party, together with the
General Labour Union, the Communist Youth and the Nanyang
anti-Imperialist League, attempted to organise a mass
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rally in Singapore to commemorate the Tsinan Affair and
encourage the Chinese to fight against Japanese
imperialism in China. 30 But the majority of the Chinese
did not respond to the Communist call for anti-Japanese
nationalism. The Chinese community was afraid that they
would face consequences similar to those the K'reta Ayer
incident caused. As a result they preferred a peaceful
approach.
After 1929, the Communist movement in Malaya
did not play any active role in promoting Overseas
Chinese nationalism. 31 The Communists made an attempt
to change the direction of their struggle and to expand
their base to include Malays and Indians in the country
and therefore become a non-communal organization. A
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was formed in Kuala Pilah
Negeri Sembilan in April 1930. The MCP adopted a twelve-
point programme in September 1932; this included the aim
of overthrowing the Colonial government and the setting
up of a Malayan Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic.32
The Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in
Shanghai gave a new directive to the MCP to concentrate
its efforts on fomenting labour strikes, mass
demonstrations, sabotage of transportation and the
British naval installations at Singapore, boycotts
against taxation and so forth. In September 1936, the
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Communists influenced the pineapple workers in Singapore
to strike.33
In early 1937, a series of strikes occurred
in rubber estates, including Bolton and Wardiburn, near
Kuala Lumpur. The most significant strike instigated by
the MCP was in the Malayan Collieries at Batu Arang,
Selangor between 23-27 March, 1937. The Communist-led
miners took full possession of the mine and attempted to
set up a Soviet Government. 34
 The British authorities
needed to use the police to break up the strike which
resulted in armed clashes. One worker was killed, two
others were wounded and 116 strikers were detained by
the police.35
With the outbreak of war in 1939, the MCP
brought itself into line with the policy of the Chinese
Communist Party which co-operated with the National
Government of China in fighting against the Japanese
forces. 36
 In the middle of September 1940, the MCP
received orders from the Hong Kong Branch of the Chinese
Communist Party to cease all anti-British activity and to
offer no opposition ". . .to any campaign initiated by the
Chinese community in Malaya to aid the British war
effort. . . . 37 It should be noted that the Nazis launched
their attacks against the Soviet Union in June 1941.
Consequently, the Soviet Union or Communist international
movement also ordered the MCP to cease any act of
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hostility and to aid Great Britain in their efforts to
the fight Japanese forces. Russia itself received aid
from Britain in the war against the Nazis. This external
situation influenced the MCP to reaffirm its moderate
line and avoid causing any friction with the colonial
government in Malaya.
As early as the summer of 1941, six months
before the Japanese attack on Malaya, the MCP made a
series of exploratory proposals to the British, offering
cooperation and assistance in the event of the war. The
British at this early date, however, refused to
compromise with illegal parties. But as the battle front
moved nearer to Singapore, the hard-pressed British had
to modify their attitude towards the Communists and other
Chinese bodies. Governor Shenton Thomas invited the
Chinese leaders to have a meeting with him at Government
House to mobilize Chinese resources in helping to defend
Singapore. 38 On 15 December, the British confirmed
their good intentions by releasing all leftist political
persons from confinement.
On 30 December 1941, the Singapore Chinese
Mobilisation Council was founded, with Tan Kah Kee as
chairman. 39 Twenty-one officers were elected, including
representives from the Kuomintan g , Communist and Straits
Chinese born leaders.	 They formed the Chinese
volunteers known as DALFORCE to fight against the
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invading forces of the Japanese army.40
The British government also created a Special
Training School (1O1STS), a guerrilla and sabotage
school, with Major Chapman as Deputy Commander. The MCP
agreed to supply a number of young Chinese as trainees
for this school. 41 Later, the graduates of 1O1STS formed
the hard core of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
(MPAJA) during the Japanese occupation in Malaya.
Part III
The Growth of the Straits Chinese Political Consciousness
At the end of the nineteenth century, a group
of English educated Straits Chinese emerged from local
and overseas educational institutions. Among them were
Dr. Lim Boon Keng, Song Ong Slang and Dr. Wu Lian Teh.
They were educated in British universities and when they
returned to Malaya, they published various newspapers and
magazines and formed various social and cultural
organizations which reflected their intention of
spreading reformist ideas in educational, social and
cultural fields. Their activities reflected the growth of
social and political consciousness among the Straits
Chinese 42
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It was apparent that the political thinking of
the Straits Chinese was divided into two main strands
during this period. The first strand of thinking was to
strengthen the community by reorientation towards China
and the introduction of pure Chinese cultural elements
into this society. But at the same time these people
maintained the status of the Straits Chinese as British
subjects and continued to show loyalty to the colonial
government. In other words,they advocated a dual role and
the maintaining of dual loyalties and therefore developed
an identity full of ambiguity.
The second strand of thinking which the
majority of the Straits Chinese society held, was the
promotion of Straits Chinese status and identity as
British subjects through English education and
westernization. As far as they were concerned, they
belonged to Malaya and vice-versa. This attitude was
manifested strongly in Straits Chinese newspapers such as
the Bintang
 Timor (3 July 1834- 2 July 1895) Kabar Slalu
(5 January- 6 May 1924), Kabar Uchapan Baru (4 February
1926- 15 January 1931), Bintang Pranakan (December 1930-
April 1931) and Sri Pranakan (April 1932- June 1932) .'
Song Ong Siang published the first Straits
Chinese newspaper, Bintang Timor ,which means "Eastern
Star" with the objective of promoting social and
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political awareness among the Straits Chinese. Song,
unlike Lim Boon Keng, never took a part in any activities
which concerned the Chinese motherland. Bintang Timor
always tried to appeal to the Straits Chinese and other
local-born peoples to wake up and enlighten themselves.
This intention was reflected in two verses of poetry
which urged:
Matahari chondong zohrah beridar
Cahyanya letnpah sluroh bandar
Merika yang lalai dibri sedar
Menegar berbagai warta dan kabar.44
[The sun is setting,
Venus ascends and her
light spreads over every city.
The sleeper must awaken,
and listen to all that is happening.]
To promote their interests in various fields,
the Straits Chinese organized an association which
served as a pressure group. The Straits Chinese British
Association (SCBA) was formed by Song Ong Siang, Lim Boon
Keng and others on 17 August 1900 in Singapore. Some of
the objectives of this organization were:
(a) To promote among the members an intelligent
interest in the affairs of the British Empire
and to encourage and maintain their loyalty
as subjects of the Queen;
(b) To offer facilities for the discussion of all
questions relating to the social, intellectual
and moral welfare of the Chinese British subjects
in the Colony; and
(c) To take any requisite lawful step for the defence
of the rights and privileges of British
Subj ects
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The Singapore SCBA initially attracted 800
members. Tan Jiak Kim was appointed as President and Song
Ong Slang as Honorary Secretary-General. The British
government chose SCBA leaders to serve as Chinese
unofficial members in the legislative body of the Straits
Settlements, but they served in the capacity of general
Chinese spokesmen, not as representatives of the Straits
Chinese.
After the formation of the Singapore SCBA,
another branch was set up in Malacca in October 1900. The
SCEA (Malacca) succeeded in enrolling 200 members, but
this branch was closed in 1904 because of a lack of
interest among members. In Penang, according to Diana
Ooi, "The Northern Colony remained obdurate and it was
not until twenty years later that an SCEA was eventually
founded there. ,,46
The SCEA liked to give the impression that they
were loyal subjects of the Government and Britain. Their
pro-British outlook met with a good response from the
British government. The British authorities were clearly
and positively in favour of it and also strongly
supported the Malayan-born Chinese who were English-
educated and who had become professionals. These were
groomed and nurtured to serve as spokesmen for the whole
Chinese community. 47 Unofficial Chinese members in the
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Straits Settlement Legislative Council and the Federal
Council in the Federal Malay States were Straits Chinese
or Malayan born Chinese. Many SCBA leaders, such as Tan
Jiak Kim, served as unofficial members in the Straits
Settlements Legislative Council: he served between
1889-1891 and 1902-1915. Also in the Council were Seah
Liang Seah, (1883-1890 and 1894-1895), Dr. Lirn Boon Keng
(1898-1901 and 1915-1920) and Song Ong Siang (1925-1927)
During the 1920s, the acting Colonial Secretary
introduced a proposal in the Legislative Council to
appoint a select committee to study the need for council
reform. This event led to a great increase in the level
of political activity among the Straits Chinese. Lim
Boon Keng, unofficial Chinese member in the Legislative
Council welcomed the government proposal for council
reform. He said:
The question of reform is in the air
and the Government may be heartily
congratulated that it has not waited
for the public to clamour for it. The
people of this colony are well known
for being very long suffering and
patient, and (it is) just as well that
the Government has come forward to
offer them the reform, which in other
colonies has already been initiated.48
The Government appointed a Select Committee
whose members were chosen from the Legislative Council,
including Lim Boon Keng. This committee invited the
public to submit to it any proposals or opinions on
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council reform. Malacca had set up its SCEA again in
1916. In the Straits Settlements, only Penang did not
have any association to represent the Straits Chinese.
On 16 November 1920, 25 Straits Chinese in
Penang organized a meeting in the Chinese Town hall to
discuss forming an SCEA for Penang. 49 At last, the
SCBA(Penang) was set up in that month. Lim Eow Thoon, a
former Municipal Commissioner was elected as President
and Lim Seng Hooi as Honorary Secretary, but it was too
late for the SCBA to submit a memorandum for the Select
Committee. Instead, as individuals the Straits Chinese
leaders from Penang, including Lim Ching Ean and Heah Joo
Seng, submitted their own memoranda to the Select
Committee. Further memoranda were sent from the Singapore
SCBA and Malacca SCEA and others.
The Select Committee made a report in early
1921 which recognized that:
the instinct of loyalty to a
motherland (the Straits Settlements) has
been confined to the Malays, the
Eurasians and a growing body of
Straits-born Chinese. But in numbers
and in wealth these classes represent
at present but a small proportion of
the population.5°
This report also proposed the enlargement of
the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements by
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increasing the number of unofficial members until they
formed a majority. It proposed that the number of
official members including the Governor, should increase
to thirteen, and unofficial members to fourteen, as a
first step towards extending the representative character
of the council. The colonial government did not implement
fully these recommendations. The numbers of the
Legislative Council were increased to twenty-seven:
thirteen unofficial and fourteen official members,
including the Governor himself.
The majority of the members, official or
unofficial, were European. It meant that the Asian
contingent, including the Chinese, were unable to
determine the Council's decisions. Thus, the Straits
Chinese would not be able to play an important role in
this body.
With the enlargement of the Straits Settlements
Legislative Council, new members, including Tan Cheng
Lock from Malacca, were appointed. 5 - Tan Cheng Lock was
the most outspoken critic of British policies and played
a crucial role in promoting Malayan national
consciousness among the Straits Chinese and the Chinese
community in general.
Tan Cheng Lock, like other Straits Chinese
leaders, was frustrated by the attitudes and policies of
39
the British, which excluded this community from
responsible posts in the the civil service 52 . After he
joined the Straits Settlements Legislative Council, he
continued the battle for better treatment of the Straits
Chinese and other British subjects. He asked the
government to open up the civil service to Asiatic
communities. Song Ong Siang, who replaced Lee Chuan Guan
in representing the Chinese community in Singapore in the
Straits Settlements Legislative Council, shared the same
view regarding Council reform and the issue of the civil
service. But Tan was a more outspoken critic of
government policies. According to K. G. Tregonning,
Tan's criticism of the government in his first speech
was "unprecedented in the annals of the Legislative
Council." 53 Tan Cheng Lock's viewpoint was also far in
advance of other Straits Chinese leaders. For instance,
he raised the "Colour Bar" issue, whereby Asians were
discriminated against and Europeans favoured, in
government services. Tan Cheng Lock also proposed in the
Legislative Council on 1 November 1926, that the ultimate
political goal should be a united self-governing British
Malaya with a Federal Government and Parliament for the
whole country. 54 He said, 1 .1 [Tan Cheng Lock] think
it is high time that we commenced to take action towards
forging the surest and strongest link of that united
Malaya by fostering and creating a true Malayan spirit
and consciousness amongst its people to the complete
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elimination of racial or communal feeling." 55 He added
that they should aim at building up a Malayan community
with a Malayan consciousness closely united with the
British Empire.
In the early 1930s, Straits Chinese political
consciousness intensified due to certain factors, such as
the Depression and the revival of political issues which
threatened the future of this community, On 11 October
1930 Wan Boon Seng and other Straits Chinese set up
Bintanci Pranakan to serve the interests of their
community. This newspaper claimed it was "the only
Straits born Chinese Romanised Malay Weekly Journal in
British Malaya." 56 The objectives of Bintanct Pranakan
were to promote a sense of unity among the Peranakan
(Straits Chinese) and to show and maintain their loyalty
to the Government and to work for the advancement of the
Straits Chinese community.
In an editorial dated 20 December 1930, Bintancr
Pranakan explained the aim of its publisher in setting up
this newspaper. It wrote:
Sbab ml Bintang Pranakan punya
publisher Baba-Baba Peranakan jadi itu
sebab dengan sbrapa boleh kita mau
majukan pasal Pranakan Tionghua.57
[Because this Bintang Pranakan belongs
to a Straits Chinese publisher, it
should promote the Straits Chinese
cause.]
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and urged:
Disini tempulah yang lain-lain Pranakan
Tionghua mesti kluarkan plohnya dan
kasi tau sama orang-orang dunia yang
Pranakan Tionghua juga tau pasal
council Reform and voting.
[At this moment the Straits Chinese
must work hard to inform the people of
the world that they also understand the
subject of council reform and voting.]
In its editorial, dated 14 March 1931, it
continued to express its loyalty to the government.
According to the editorial:
Kita kluarkan mi surat kabar
sa'minggu satu kali maksud kita yang
pertama-tamanya mau hormatkan, dirikan
dan membalaskan trima kaseh kepada
Bendera Inggeris yang sudah arnat banyak
kepenatan dan kasi chukup perlajaran,
kesenangan dan keuntongan kepada sklian
Pranakan di [seluruh] British Malaya...
[Jika kita rakyat British yang
sejati] . . . kita mesti unjokkan kita
punya hati chinta kepada ka-Raja-an
Inggeris.
[We publish this newspaper once a week
(with) our objective being to respect,
to uphold, and to say thank you to the
English flag which works really hard
and gives protection, education and
prosperity to all Straits Chinese in
the whole of British Malaya. As we are
really British subjects , ... we must
show our love to the English [sic]
government.]
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In 1931 the SCEAs of Penang, Singapore and
Malacca cooperated and submitted a joint memorandum to
the colonial government on the question of council
reform. This memorandum declared:
The political consciousness of the
Straits-born Chinese is a sign of
healthy growth and their aspiration
ought to be guided along constitutional
lines for the promotion of the
community. Your petitioners humbly pray
that your excellency may be moved by a
feeling of magnanimity to concede to the
Straits born Chinese a greater measure
through their respective Associations in
each of the settlements, the privilege
to elect their own representatives on
the Legislative Council in addition to
the three nominated Chinese members
nominated by Government at present.60
This memorandum was signed by the presidents of
the SCEAs; Lim Han Hoe (Singapore) , Heah Joo Seang
(Penang) and Tan Cheng Lock (Malacca). They demanded an
increase in the numbers of the Straits Settlements
Legislative Council to six members from each settlement.
They hoped the government would allow them to choose
their own representatives in the council. They also
appealed to the government both to increase the number of
unofficial members until they formed a majority in the
council, and to nominate a Chinese member to the
Executive Council.
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Instead of yielding to the demands of the
Straits Chinese community, the colonial government
reemphasized a strong "pro-Malay policy" which was
reflected in the decentralization policy carried out
under Clementi during the 1930s. Under the
decentralization scheme, the powers of the Malay Sultans,
Residents • and State Councils were increased by the
loosening of the Federation structure. The Straits
Chinese leaders were convinced that this policy itself
was the product of a pro-Malay attitude and that it very
definitely served the Malay cause. However, the Straits
Chinese conflict with the British authorities regarding
the decentralization policy did not go further than
words. The most obvious reason was because it was almost
exclusively the business class of the Straits Chinese who
opposed government policies. They could not fail to
recognize that any radical overturn in the country would
hurt their interests. 62 Disillusioned with British
policy, the Straits Chinese became politically inactive
in the middle of 1930s.
During the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-
1941), the Straits Chinese emerged from isolation to take
part in fund-raising activities for the China Relief
Fund. Some Straits Chinese made it clear that their
activities were not politically motivated. Chu Kei Hai,
the Vice President of the SCEA of Singapore said that:
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Some people have tried to make it an
excuse that because they are British
citizens they are not allowed to
contribute to the China Relief Fund...
this is a mistake which requires
correction. After all, anybody who
contributes to a fund like this is only
performing an act of humanity.63
Dr. Lim Boon Keng, former president of the
Singapore SCBA, formed the Straits Chinese China Relief
Fund Committee of Singapore which affiliated with the
SCRFC. 64 Lim Boon Keng became its chairman, Mrs. Lee
Choon Guan became vice-chairman and other Straits Chinese
leaders such as Tay Lian Teck, the president of the
Singapore SCEA and T. W. Ong (who after World War II
became president of the Singapore SCBA) were appointed as
committee members. This was the first purely Straits
Chinese organization to take part in activities
concerning China. Some writers consider the involvement
of the Straits Chinese organization in SCRFC activities
as a mark of solidarity between China-born and the
Straits-born communities in Singapore between 1938 and
1941 . 65
 During the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the
Straits Chinese collaborated with and supported the
British government in fighting against the invaders.
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Part IV
British Policy and Reaction to Chinese Politics
The aim of the British in establishing
political control in Malaya was to create political
stability and form a western type of administration in
order to promote economic development. This could be
achieved by encouraging investment from British or
foreign capital, and using foreign labour and exploiting
local natural resources. The Chinese were not only
tolerated but encouraged by the British colonial
government to participate in the economic development of
Malaya. But the British were not willing to share their
power with the Chinese or any other immigrant
communities. 66
 Naturally, its policy was aimed at
protecting its power from any ideological or political
Itsubversjonit from the Chinese community, 67
 some of
suspected of creating disorder and intending to overthrow
the government.
Before the Second World War, Malaya was not a
homogeneous political entity. British Malaya, which
emerged after 1914, was separated into three categories
of political units. 68 First, there were the Straits
Settlements of Malacca, Singapore and Penang which
comprised a Crown Colony and were ruled directly by the
British government. 	 In the second category, were the
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Federated Malay States of Perak, Pahang, Selangor and
Negeri Sembilan which were ruled as a unity. The third
category, the Unfederated Malay States of Kelantan,
Trengganu, Kedah, Johore and Perlis were states which
were ruled and administered separately with varying
degrees of indirectness.
British control over the Malay states was
based on treaties with the Malay Sultans who were
recognized as independent sovereigns. British officials
who governed the Malay States in the name of the Malay
Sultans were obliged to protect those states and
preserve them primarily as states for the Malays. The
Chinese were considered as foreigners although some of
them were locally born or had become permanently
domiciled in these regions. As foreigners, the Chinese
did not have any political rights whatsoever and were
excluded from public service. According to W.R. Roff,
this policy gave some advantage to the British; first,
the Malay states remained constitutionally and
juridically autonomous "Malay Monarchies." 69 Any attempt
to change the status of Chinese or Indians by granting
citizenship or other rights in these states would arouse
considerable Malay opposition. Secondly, "the British
role in Malaya as arbitrator and adjudicator within the
plural society was to a large extent dependent upon
preserving	 the	 distinctions	 between	 separate
communities." 70 These distinctions were based on criteria
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of economic function, ethnic origin, and cultural
similarity or dissimilarity. Thirdly, "the series of
popular stereotypes of 'unassimilable' Chinese which
portrayed them as irrevocably wedded to homeland,
uninterested in government provided they were able to
make money, and preferring to educate themselves in their
own fashion, made it possible to avoid expensive and
troublesome responsibility for integrating even the
locally born and domiciled Asians with a larger Malayan
society. ,,71
In the Straits Settlements, which constituted a
Crown colony, the status of the Chinese had two
divisions. Those locally born or naturalized were
recognized as British subjects. The immigrant Chinese
were considered aliens. As the Straits Chinese were
locally born in the Settlements, they enjoyed certain
rights. These included being able to hold positions in
the administration and the political organizations of the
Straits Settlements.
Any demands from the Chinese to increase the
number of their representatives in the Legislative
Council of Straits settlements were rejected by the
British government. Any demands for the inclusion of
other races, except the Malays, into the public
services of the FMS and TJFMS were not only ignored, but
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actually caused annoyance to British officials. For
instance, in 1937, the High Commissioner, Sir Shenton
Thomas, rejected a request for the non-Malays
	 to be
included in the public services with the remark:
This is the sixth country in which I
have served, and I do not know of any
country in which what I might call a
foreigner-that is to say, a native not a
native of the country or an English
Englishman-has ever been appointed to an
administrative post and I consider that
I shall be right in saying now that I
would support no such proposal here.72
Yea Kim Wah, in his study on the
Decentralization controversy under Guillemard, suggested
that this policy was pursued as a response to the growth
of political activities among the Chinese in Malaya.73
According to him, in his work on "Guillemard's planning
for the Decentralization of the FMS", Guillemard, the
High Commissioner, declined to consult the two Chinese
unofficial members, Choo Kia Peng and Wang Yick Thong,
"largely out of personal distrust and partly because he
felt that political issues concerned only the British and
the Malays." 74 " However, when the Chinese unofficial
members protested at not being consulted, Guillemard gave
as his excuse, "that his failure to consult them was due
to a mere oversight on his part." 75 . Actually he
resented "the growing political ambition of the Malayan
Chinese to run the country themselves," 76
 and in his
view, "this was something to be strongly resisted." Some
49
members of the Colonial Office shared this view. One of
them said, tI political questions such as
decentralization only concerned the British and the
Malays and that any Chinese attempt to exert control over
Malaya should be nipped in the bud at once."77
The British officers on the spot abhorred the
political activities carried out by the K4T branches
under orders from a "foreign country." The colonial
government feared the creation of a highly organized
imperium in inrnerio by China in Malaya, especially as
the Kuomintang was suspected of regarding Indo-China,
Hong Kong and even Malaya itself as terra irredenta of
China. 78 The KMT government in China always considered
the Chinese in Malaya or other regions as their subjects,
based on the principle of lus sanguinis which implied
that they had a right to interfere in local Chinese
affairs in Malaya.
After the Japanese attacked Malaya and the
battle front moved nearer to Singapore at the end of
1941, the British government needed the support of the
Chinese community. As has been shown above the Governor
of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner of the
FMS had appealed to the Chinese community Chinese to
cooperate and assist the government in its war effort.79
This was the first time in the history of British Malaya
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that the colonial government had both dealt and
cooperated with the illegal KMT and MCP. These actions
indicated the dramatic shift in the British government's
attitude towards the Chinese community. The British
government continued to deal with, and almost totally
depend upon, the active support of the Chinese community
in military operations during the Japanese occupation of
Malaya.
Conclusion
The British government disliked any form of
Chinese political activity in Malaya, except the
expression of loyalty to the British crown. The colonial
government was untouched by the moderate demands of the
Straits Chinese and continued to pursue its so-called
1'pro-Malay" policy. They regarded KMT and Communist
activities as a serious threat to their position in
Malaya. They feared that the Chinese government or other
powers intended to destroy British supremacy in this
region by using the Chinese community as a 'tFifth
Column." Therefore, the British suppressed the Kuomintanci
and the Communists.
Developments during the end of 1941 brought
together the Straits Chinese, the Kuomintang and the
Communists to support and collaborate with the British
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government in fighting against the Japanese forces. It
was illogical to ignore the claims of the Straits Chinese
or to curb the Kuomintang and the Communists, who were
collaborating with them but who still might pose a
threat for future British administrations. In the new
circumstances the British government needed to rethink
its policy towards the Chinese community.
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CHAPTER II
Malayan Chinese Politics During the
War, 1942-1945
This chapter focusses on the Japanese Military
Administration's policy towards the Chinese community
and Chinese political activities during the War. Under
the repressive policy of the Military Administration,
Chinese political activities based on Chinese nationalism
ceased almost completely and the link with the
motherland, China, was broken.
The Straits Chinese and the Overseas Chinese co-
operated	 with the Japanese Administration after the
Japanese launched a brutal purge against anti-
Japanese elements or "hostile Chinese." They were forced
to form a single Chinese organization, known as the
Overseas Chinese Association. The OCAs carried out
activities in line with the Japanese Military
Administration's directions, as raising $50,000,000 from
the Chinese community for the Japanese as a gift of
atonement. As the Japanese treated the Chinese as 	 a
single community, the split between the Straits Chinese
and the Overseas Chinese,	 or the various Chinese
communities, was almost submerged during the war. The
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pre-war Chinese organizations such as the Chinese
Chambers of Commerce, regional associations and trade
guilds ceased to exist. However, the Malayan Communist
Party continued to exist by going underground. The MCP
launched the Resistance Movement to continue the fighting
against the Japanese. This organization became popular as
a result of Japanese cruelty to the Malayan Chinese.
During the war, the Communist or Chinese-led Malayan
People's Anti-Japanese Army was the only viable and
effective resistance movement. The MCP and the MPAJA
worked closely with the British Force 13G in order to
fight against the Japanese forces.
Some prominent Chinese fled to India before the
Japanese occupied Malaya. Under the leadership of Tan
Cheng Lock, they formed the Overseas Chinese Association.
Their activities were mainly concerned with
constitutional matters for the future of Malaya. Tan
Cheng Lock made a demand to the British government for a
greater role for the Chinese in the proposed
constitutional development of post-war Malaya.
Part I
Japanese Policy and Chinese Response
On 8 December 1941 the Japanese forces began
their attack on Malaya. One division of the 25th Army
landed at Kota Eharu in the Malay State of Kelantan and
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another division landed at Songkhla in southeast
Thailand. After sixty-nine days, the British troops were
defeated. The initial response among the Malayan people
was divided. According to Yoji Akashi:
Stunned but cheerful Malays and Indians
greeted General Yamashita's conquering
army as it entered the city [of
Singapore] . For a great majority of the
Chinese, however, an air of uncertainty
hung heavily upon them because they had
been active, voluntarily or
involuntarily in the anti-Japanese
movement for many years and a good
number of them even fought with the
British in the last ditch battle that
ended in their defeat.1
Under the Japanese Occupation, the name of Malaya
was changed to Malai and Singapore to Syonan-to.
Initially Malaya and Sumatra were ruled by the military
government department ( qunseibu) of the Twenty-fifth Army
of the Japanese forces which invaded these regions.
According to Yoji Akashi, qunseibu was reoganised by
Watanabe Wature and called a "Malay Military
Administration" or Gunsei Kanbu or "Watanabe Gunsei"2
(April 1942 to March 1943) . For the Chinese community the
establishment of the "Watanabe Gunsei " marked the
beginning of the most traumatic period in their history
in Malaya, because the Japanese military had a previously
formulated policy of severe punishment for them as a
consequence of their anti-Japanese activities in the
past.3
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Soon after the occupation of Singapore, the
Kempeta± or military police went into the Chinese
communities. They rounded up and sometimes killed
dissidents. Some people were picked up simply for being
Chinese. 4 At first Major General Manaki, the head of
the Military Government ( gunsei) intervened to stop
indiscriminate mass arrests of the Chinese. However, he
was informed that the military police were acting on
General Yamashita's directive. General Yamashita actually
gave the order via Lt. General Suzuki Sosaku to Kawamura
Saburo, commander of the Syonan garrison army, to wipe
out the Overseas Chinese anti-Japanese elements in
Singapore over three days, from 21 to 23 February
1942. Kawamura subsequently relayed the order to Oishi,
Ichigawa and Miyamoto who were heads of the three
Military Police Corps. According to Yoji Akashi, his
decision was made purely on military grounds, and not
out of hatred. 5 He ordered the mopping-up operation of
Sook Ching or purification by elimination. This was
based on three considerations: first, the Japanese
military faced the problem of maintaining security with
an under-resourced army; second, they wanted to establish
security as quickly as possible,and third, they feared
the resistance would annihilate the small Japanese
6
garrison as had happened in China. Yamashita's order was
given with this instruction to carry it out in
accordance with his letter. To the soldiers this meant
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u summary execution" and they proceeded to carry out the
massacre of the Chinese by rounding them up "for
inspection and identification" 7 . The primary targets of
this operation were: persons who had been active in the
China Relief Fund or who had given most generously to
this fund, adherents of Tan Kah Kee, the leader of the
Nanyang National Salvation Movement, school masters,
teachers, and lawyers, Hainanese who, according to the
Japanese, were Communists, China-born Chinese who came to
Malaya after the 5mb-Japanese wars, men with tattoo
marks, who, according to , the Japanese, were all members
of secret societies, persons who fought for the British
as volunteers against the Japanese, government servants
and men who were likely to have pro-British sympathies,
such as Justices of the Peace, members of the Legislative
Council, and persons who possessed arms and tried to
disturb public safety.8
This process began on 21 February 1942. Under
the mopping-up operation, the Japanese military police
set up five large "concentration camps" in the city of
Singapore. 9 The Chinese were forced to assemble at these
camps. On 3 March, 1942, 70,699 Chinese were detained,
including such prominent Chinese leaders such as Lim
Boon Keng, Lim Chong Pang, the head of the Singapore
Kuomintang , and Wong Gim Geok, alias Loi Tek, the
Secretary General of the MCP. The Japanese also carried
out the same operation on the mainland. Many Chinese
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were detained and killed indiscrimately. The most often
quoted figures vary from 6,000 to 40,000 Chinese)° The
Sook Ching massacres created terror in the Chinese
community throughout Malaya. According to the former
General Manaki, " Sook Chin g was the biggest blot in the
Japanese Administration in Malaya."11
Collaborators
Some of the Chinese leaders were used as tools
for social control by the Military Administration. Forty
of the most prominent Chinese in Singapore were
instructed to form an Overseas Chinese Association for
the purpose of cooperating with the authority. 12 A first
meeting was held on 2 March 1942 in Singapore and the
various Chinese communities elected their own
representatives to this body. Dr. Lim Boon Keng was
elected as chairman. During the meeting ,representatives
of various Chinese communities were elected. Among them
were : Dr. Lim Boon Keng and Tan Hoon Siang of the Staits
Chinese, Lim Seow Cheong of the Hainanese community, Yeo
Chang Boon of the Teochew community, S. Q. Wong and Dr.
Loh Seng Tak of the Cantonese community, and Yang Sing
Hua of the San Kiang community. They were required to be
present at the Association every day and carry out any
order by the Japanese Military Administration. It should
be noted that Dr. Lim Boon Keng who was a Straits Chinese
63
assumed the presidency of the Overseas Chinese
Association (OCA) •13 Thus, it seemed that the OCA was
under the leadership of the Straits Chinese. The Japanese
Military Administration had assumed that this community
possessed much wealth and property and could become the
prime object of extortion. 14 But in fact this community
owned less than the Japanese expected. Thus, at a later
stage the leaders of other Chinese communities were
forced to assume the leadership of the OCA. Ng Twee Kim,
a Formosan and a supernumerary officer of the Japanese
army was stationed at the Association to instruct and
liaise with the immigrant Chinese.
At first the Association was instructed to
advise the Chinese community to give up any tools or
weapons to the Association headquarters and also to
destroy anything that was detrimental to the Japanese
Military Administration. The leaders of the Association
were harrassed and intimidated by the Japanese officials
on many occasions. In an attempt to please the Japanese
authorities, Loo Tien Poh as the chief spokesman of the
Association expressed their desire to give cash
contributions. 15 Takase, the Japanese officer in charge
of Chinese affairs, took this opportunity to make an
exorbitant demand for	 $50,000,000 to $60,000,000. He
said that, as the Chinese contributed millions of
dollars to Chiang Kal-Shek, rendered services to the
British and threatened the lives of loyal Japanese, they
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should contribute that amount in penance for their
crime. Actually the idea of raising $50,000,000 came from
Watanabe himself because the Southern Expeditionary Army
(SEA) Command had ordered him to raise money locally to
pay for military administrative expenses. As a result of
fear and intimidation, the Chinese proceeded to raise the
sum of $50,000,000 "in very short order."16
Shortly afterward the Japanese ordered the
Chinese community to form an Overseas Chinese
association in "Syonan-to" (Singapore) which adopted the
official name of "Syonan-to
	
Overseas Chinese General
11
Union" (SOCGU) . The 21 representatives from various
communities such as the Straits born Chinese, Cantonese,
Hokkien, Teochew and other communities were elected to
the Council of Management. 18
 Dr. Lim Boon Keng was
elected as the president and S.Q. Wong, a Cantonese, as
the vice-president. State Overseas Chinese Associations
were formed in mainland Malaya as ordered by Takase.
Later, on 6 June, the Malayan Overseas Chinese General
Association was established as a central organisation for
the various States Associations. Dr. Lim Boon Keng was
elected as the president of the Malayan Overseas Chinese
Association and Heah Joo Siang, another Straits Chinese,
the president of the Penang State Association, and Wong
Thit San, the president of the Selangor State
Association, were vice-presidents.
	 Every state branch,
G5
including yonan-to, was responsible for the collection
of a certain amount, which was set for every state. The
states with the greatest and wealthiest Chinese
populations were given the largest targets. The target
for every state was as follows:
"Singapore (Syonan- to)
Selangor
Perak
Penang
Malacca
Negeri Sembilan
Kedah
Pahang
Ke 1 ant an
Terangganu
Penis
$10,000,000
$10,000,000
$ 8,500,000
$ 7,000,000
$ 5,500,000
$ 2,000,000
$	 800,000
$	 500,000
$	 300,000
$	 200,000
$	 200,000. ,,19
The Chinese community faced great difficulty in
raising the amount which was demanded by the Military
Administration. When the deadline passed, the Chinese
Association had just been able to collect $28,000,000, a
shortfall of $22,000,000.	 When the Japanese realized
that it	 was impossible . fot the Chinese to raise
$50,000,000, they were forced to take a loan from the
Yokohama Specie Bank. The Chinese leaders presented a
letter to General Yamashita on 25 June 1942, along with
the gift of $50,000,000. The letter, to His Majesty, the
Emperor of Japan was full of praise, obeisance and
repentance for past crimes against the Japanese. 20 Part
of its content was as follows:
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Your Excellency,
During the last few hundred years,the
evil and vicious policies adopted by
Britain and America towards the various
races in East Asia were aimed only at
bringing prosperity to their own
[countries] .Being unaware of their true
intentions we have long become their
tools and had frequently brought harm
to the Great Japanese Empire... During
these few years of the Holy War, we
have been frequently instigated by the
evil British and Americans to harm and
impair the Great Japanese Empire.
Although we know now that we have done
wrong, we do not know how to pay for
our crime. Considering our actions
against the Imperial Army, we do
rightly deserve the same punishment as
meted out to the British and the
American •	 21
However, the $50,000,000 gift of atonement 	 failed to
change the anti-Chinese policy of the Japanese Military
Administration.	 General Yamashita warned the Chinese
community that the gift had "in no way redeemed the
previous act of the Malayan Chinese in having supported
Britain and Chunking." 22 Japan continued to pursue its
policy of treating the Chinese as "milk cows" throughout
the period of their rule in Malaya.
During this most turbulent period, the Chinese
accommodated Japanese wishes in order to survive. The
main activities of the Overseas Chinese Associations were
in line with the
	 Japanese needs or directives as
follows: to collect and present "gifts" or "donations",
to the Japanese Military Administration; to obtain
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necessary labour for the reconstruction of Singapore; to
register all Chinese working people; to open a home
for the unemployable or disabled; to organise
agricultural settlements; to encourage factories to
provide substitute commodities for daily use; and to
foster the spirit of thrift among the Chinese which
contributed towards a savings drive.23
The OCA also carried out assigments such as
leading the people in the celebration of the birthday of
the Japanese	 Emperor,	 conducting Japanese language
classes, and selling Syonan lottery tickets. 	 The
Overseas Chinese Associations were also instructed to
launch	 the	 aircraft offering movement" to collect
funds from the Chinese community for the purchase of war
planes for the Japanese Imperial forces.24 This
instruction was meant as a form of punishment, as the
Chinese had donated an aircraft to China in the past.25
The Japanese ordered the OCAs to raise a sum of
$100,000 as a donation to purchase an aircraft. The
OCAs asked every major Chinese group to raise the above
sum. Each community was set to raise certain amounts as
follows:
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Hokkien community 	 : $ 40,800
Cantonese community	 : $ 15,300
Teochew community	 : $17,850
Straits-born Chinese community : $ 8,500
Hakka community	 : $ 7,650
Sam Kiang community	 : $ 5,100
Hainanese community	 : $ 5,10026
On the 31 May 1943 the Japanese govenment decided
to give the indigenous people of the southern region,
including Malaya, the right to participate in local
political affairs. 27
 At first the hard line group
opposed any suggestion of giving the Chinese
opportunities to participate	 in local politics.
However,	 on 26 June, it was decided that	 Chinese
political participation would be determined by the speed
of progress of the political participation of the
indigenous peoples, including Malays, and other races
such as Indians and Eurasians.
On 2 October 1943 the Military Administration
announced that advisory councils would be established in
each province, state or municipality which would enable
the people of Malaya to participate in the administration
of their country. 28 The mayor or governor of the states
would select the representatives for the States or
Regional Advisory Councils. But the Military
Administration would approve and appoint them. The mayor
or governor would call a meeting whenever necessary. The
Council could raise any subject for discussion without
restriction.
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When the Councils and the Singapore Special
Municipality Consultative Board were established,
prominent Chinese were appointed as members. Among them
were Lim Chong Pang for the Singapore Special
Municipality Consultative Board, Choo Kia Peng, former
member of Federal Council (1923-26), Yong Shook Lin,
member of the Federal Council in 1941, and Wong Tat San
and Goh Hock Huat for the Selangor Advisory Council. The
Chinese members' role in the councils was limited to
the praising of the Japanese Authorities. In one article
in the Shonan-Shimbun, Lim Chong Pang said that the
Chinese were proud that they had contributed in no
small part to the attainment of normal conditions in
Malaya "by giving all-out cooperation to the Military
Administration." 29
 It should be noted that, it was
impossible for the Chinese to be critical when the Sook
Ching Operation was still lingering in their mind.
According to Cheah Boon Kheng, Chinese cooperation with
the Japanese acted as a "shield" for the protection of
the prewar leaders and their supporters. 30 However, the
Malayan Chinese resistance movements regarded those
Chinese leaders of the Overseas Chinese Association
merely as collaborators and enemies.
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Part II
Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japanese Military Rule,
1942 -1945
The Japanese policy of repression, such as the
mopping up operation and the extortion of $50,000,000,
turned some of the Chinese towards the Anti-Japanese
resistance movements. The Chinese-led resistance
movements centred on two groups of guerrilla forces: the
Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) which was
dominated by the Malayan Communist Party and the Overseas
Chinese Anti-Japanese Army (OCAJA), which was organized
by the members of Kuomintang . The British Force 136,
which also organised the Malay guerrillas or Wataniah,
provided arms, money, supplies and training facilities
for the Chinese resistance movements during the early
months of 1944, when the Allied powers began to act upon
their plan to re-occupy Malaya.31
The MPAJA was organised from the remnants of the
communist graduates of 101 Special Training School(STS)
and other local recruits in Selangor, Negeri Senibilan and
Johore. In the initial stages it was made up of four
independent regiments. From 1 December 1942 to early
August 1945, four more regiments were added to enable
this movement to operate throughout Malaya. The Central
Military Committee of the MCP, which was formed in June
or July 1942, acted as Supreme Command of the MPAJA.
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The MPAJA was the strongest and most effective
guerrilla force during the period of Japanese occupation.
Its most active regiment was the Fourth Independent
Regiment, which took part in more than 20 skirmishes,
killing some 600 Japanese military personnel.32
Throughout this period, the MPAJA claimed to have
eliminated 5,500 Japanese officers and men and about
2,500 tltraitorsit which included the leaders and members
of the Overseas Chinese Associations. The MPAJA itself
suffered a total loss of 1,000 personnel who died in
action, fell sick or were missing. However, Japanese
records indicate that they themselves lost 600 and the
local police 2,000, while inflicting 2,900 casualties on
the MPAJA. A senior Force 136 officer regarded
	 the
Japanese figures as fairly accurate.33
The MPAJA also formed the Malayan People's Anti-
Japanese Union (MPAJU) to provide the guerrillas with
food, clothing, fighting material and information. The
MPAJtJ launched their recuiting drive among all people,
regardless of race, class, or religion, who opposed the
Japanese Military Administration. However, their efforts
gained limited success among the Malays and this
organization was dominated by the Chinese. 34 The Malays,
who were treated more favourably than the Chinese, did
not really oppose the Japanese Military Administration.
Meanwhile the Malays disliked the MPAJA and the MPAJU,
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which were dominated by the Chinese Communists, and the
membership of both organizations was overwhelmingly
Chinese.
Force 136
Force 136 was an Allied organization which had
been formed in July 1942 to contact, supply and direct
guerrilla activities in an attempt to cripple the
Japanese in certain parts of Southeast Asia. A section
was formed to deal with Malaya through cooperation
between British officials in India and China. The Chinese
government agreed to provide agents who were sent to
India to be trained as military intelligence and tele-
communications personnel. 35 Britain was responsible for
providing the cost of the project and the training
facilities. The British party was led by Colonel Basil
Goodfellow, Capt. John Davis and Capt. R. N. Broome, all
from the Malayan Branch of the British Ministry of
Economic Warfare. Colonel Lim Boon Seng, a KMT member
who fled from Malaya was assigned as the Regional Chief
(Chinese) of Force 136 which was based in India. The
recruits mostly came from the 2,000 Chinese seamen who
were stranded in India after the outbreak of the war.36
They were trained in certain centres in India and Ceylon.
The first batch of the Force 136 led by Lt.
Colonel J .L. Davis, with some Chinese agents or
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guerrilla fighters, left Ceylon by submarine and landed
in Perak on May l943. The second batch of the Force
136 personnel, led by Lt. Colonel R. N. Broome (S.O.E.
Chinese affairs), left Ceylon in 24 July 1943 and landed
in Perak. The Chinese agents followed later and landed in
November 1943. Other batches of Forces 136 personnel
were also sent to Malaya by submarine. However, a few of
them were sent by plane and parachute into the jungle of
Malaya.
The Force 136 personnel, or KMT agents, made
contact with Chin Peng, representative of the Perak MPAJA
headquarters in 30 September 1943. On 1 January 1944, the
MCP, MPAJtJ, and MPAJA, represented by Chang Hung @ Loi
Tek (who went under eight other names including
Mr.Wright) and Chin Peng, mt the three British officers
of Force 136, the representatives of Lord Louis
Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commande, South-East
Asia. 38 They were Davis, Broome and Major Spencer
Chapman who had been left in Malaya after the fall of
Singapore.
The MPAJA agreed to cooperate with, and accept
orders from the British Army during the War with Japan,
and during the British Military Administration of Malaya.
In return, the British would provide money for the MPAJA
and arm the guerrillas. On 31 December 1943 the Anglo-
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MCP Agreement was signed on papers from an exercise
book 9
 According to Spencer Chapman both side agreed not
to discuss any matter regarding Britain's post war
policy.40
 Many writers have accepted this view
According to C. Cruickshank , for example, at "no point
did the guerrilla leaders suggest they expected political
concessions in return for their co-operation. ,,42
However, it is now evident that this is not an accurate
statement of what happened in the years 1944 - 1945. The
present writer has indicated elsewhere that the MCP
expected political concessions -particularly for the
Chinese community. Force 136 was allowed to inform the
guerrilla leaders about Britain's future plans for
Malaya-particularly in connection with the position of
the Chinese. J. J. Paskin of the Eastern Department of
the Colonial Office admitted in 1946, that the
formulation of Britian's Chinese (post war) policy took
into consideration the agreement between the Communists
and the representatives of Supreme Allied Commander of
Southeast Asia 3
 Communist documents also indicate that
the British made a "promise" related to the post-war
policy of Great Britain.44
Based on this agreement, the MCP placed the
MPAJA under the supervision of the Supreme Allied
Commander, South-East Asia or its representative, Force
136. The Communists made an arrangement to let Force 136
staff into the MPAJA camps except at the MPAJA Central
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Headquarters in Perak. The MCP were determined to
preserve some secrecy with regard to hiding places and
composition of its staff, as a guard against any
retaliation by the British in the event of an outbreak of
hostilities with the British after the War. tip to 13
August 1945, there were at least 80 senior and
subordinate officers of Force 136 liaising and working
with the MPAJA and other resistance movements. 45 Force
136 intended to supply between 3,500 to 4,765 arms,
e.g. bombs, grenades, carbines, stenguns, and brenguns to
the guerrilla movements. 46 However, as the Japanese
surrender was	 unexpected, the British just supplied
2,000 weapons.
The other resistance movement which was led by
the Chinese was the KMT guerrillas under the command of
Lee Fong Thai. Their total strength was 400 personnel and
their operations were limited to the Malayan-Thai border.
At first it was active in Perak around February 1942.
Then its headquarters moved to Gua Musang in Kelantan. It
should be noted that the village of Pulai in Gua Musang
is a major Chinese settlement in Kelantan. The Overseas
Chinese Anti-Japanese Army did not make any attempt to
contact the KMT Government; however they were loyal to
Chungking. On 8 February 1942, they joined forces with
the Hung-men Guerrilla Force which consisted of elements
of the Tien-ti Huay, or secret societies. Lt. Colonel
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Dobree, a British army officer who was parachuted into
Perak, made contact with the 17th Platoon of the OCAJA
in Grik in 16 December 1944. Force 136 did not provide
any weapons for these guerrillas. 	 However, it did
receive $20,000 (in Japanese military currency) for
buying provisions
In late April 1944 the Japanese force discovered
the existence of a Malay guerrilla force, which was
formed by Lieut. Colonel Dobree. They attacked and
destroyed this guerilla group. At the same time they also
attacked and destroyed the OCAJA. As a result the OCAJA
failed to remain a viable and effective force.
Tan Cheng Lock and the Malayan Chinese in India
Some of the Chinese community leaders, mostly
from Malacca and Singapore, fled to India before the
Japanese occupied the whole country. Among them were
Tan Cheng Lock and his son, a company director. They
continued to participate in political activities which
concerned Malaya. Tan Cheng Lock presided over a meeting
of prominent Chinese there and launched the Overseas
Chinese Association. The members were mostly from Malaya,
Burma and the other east Asia territories under Japanese
occupation. 48
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The objects of the Overseas Chinese Association
in India were to promote and to protect the economic and
political interests of the Overseas Chinese in India, and
also to assist the efforts of the United Nations in
regaining lost territories in Asia and to cooperate in
the war effort of China. 49 The Association appointed 26
Chinese, mostly merchants and professionals, as officers
and committee members. Tan Cheng Lock was elected as
president with Tan Chin Tuan, a rich Singaporean banker
as vice-president. Tan Siew Sin held the post of
Honorary Secretary and Treasurer of the Association. lJr.
K. W. Tan, Barrister-at-law, Foo Meow Chin, proprietary
tin-miner and landowner, Ng Sen Choy, merchant, C. H.
Koh, Barrister-at-law, Loke Wan Tho, land proprietor and
capitalist,	 and others were committee members.
According to Tan Cheng Lock, when	 they returned to
Malaya after the war, they would form the "Malayan
Chinese Association" devoted to Malayan interests. 50 He
himself devoted his time to preparing a memorandum
connected with certain matters on the future of Malaya.
Tan Cheng Lock also worked closely with the
Colonial Office, or other British who had a keen interest
in Malayan Affairs. For instance, he met N. J. B. Sabine,
the Public Relations Officer of the Colonial Office at
the end of September 1943, and he provided some
information on Malaya under Japanese rule to the
Colonial Office through J. L. Milne. Tan Cheng Lock also
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wrote to Col. Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, to inform him about the activities of the
Chinese and the OCA. 51
 W. B. L. Monson, on behalf of
Oliver Stanley, informed Tan Cheng Lock that the
Secretary of State hoped that at a later stage it would
be possible to establish some closer liaison between
Malayan residents living overseas (India) and those
responsible for the formulation of future policy for
Malaya. 52 He informed Tan Cheng Lock that the memorandum
on the future of Malaya (which was written by Tan Cheng
Lock), had been read with very great interest, and "the
views expressed therein will be of great assistance to
all concerned in the consideration of future policy."53
In his memorandum, Tan Cheng Lock demanded that,
ltthe people of Malaya should, after the War, be given a
measure of self-government, which they are capable of
exercising, and in the shortest possible time be granted,
by planned and regular stages, full responsible
government under the Crown and as a unit of the British
Commonwealth and Empire in all matters of internal and
civil administration, and then march on progressively
towards full freedom. . . ." 54
He made a proposal that British Malaya should be
united under one government. He preferred a centralized
government of United Malaya, and considered, that "the
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postwar period should provide a golden opportunity to
bring [this] about."55
Tan Cheng Lock also gave a suggestion to the
British government to solve the difficult and complex
problem created by the Chinese community in Malaya. In
his view, if the China-born were given a fair deal in the
future of Malaya they would regard themselves "... in
course of time as Malayans first and Chinese secondly, as
long as they make Malaya their home. According to
him, one of the best ways of treating the Chinese, was to
give them an opportunity to acquire the right of Malayan
citizenship in order to enable them to identify
themselves completely with the interests of the land of
their adoption.
Tan Cheng Lock wrote this memorandum on behalf on
the Overseas Chinese Association. However, 	 the idea
reflected the	 Malayan Chinese	 view. From this
memorandum it appeared that the " China-born Chinese" as
well as the Straits Chinese had started to regard
themselves as Malayan Chinese, having a permanent
interest in that country. However, the OCA did not
represent all the Chinese from Malaya who fled to India.
The Association just attracted around 300 Chinese who
became its members. The activities of this organization
were limited.
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There were some Chinese leaders who fled to
India but did not join the OCA or put themselves under
the leadership of Tan Cheng Lock. One of them was
Lim Bo Seng, Straits-born Chinese, educated in the
English medium. He led a group of seventeen survivors of
DALFORCE to India. He worked closely with British Force
136. His first assignment with Force 136 was to recruit
Straits-born Chinese as radio operators and interpreters.
Force 136 used them as key liaison personnel between the
British Officers and the Communists in Malaya. As the
present writer has indicated elsewhere, Colonel Lim Bc
Seng was appointed as the Regional Chief of the (Chinese)
Force 136. He was sent to Malaya and was killed by
Japanese forces, while he carried out his duty as a
member of Force 136. He was considered by the British,
as well as, the Chinese, as a patriot.58
Conclusion
War had broken the links between the Chinese in
Malaya and mainland China. According to Stephen Leong,
the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) , . . . abruptly
transferred national sentiments for China into an urgent
quest for self-survival" 59 and loyalty to China as a
nation was superseded by loyalty to the basic unit, the
family.
81
The Japanese Military Administration launched a
brutal purge against anti-Japanese elements, and caused
the death of several thousand Chinese. The extortion of a
"gift" of antonement of $50,000,000 caused great
hardship to the community, particularly the Straits
Chinese. Almost all Chinese organizations such as the
SCBA5, the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, regional
associations and trade guilds ceased to exist. The split
among the Overseas Chinese and the Straits Chinese was
almost submerged as the Japanese forced them to organize
a single Chinese organization, the OCAs.
The Japanese also unified the Overseas Chinese
and the Straits Chinese in other ways. China-oriented
education was not allowed and Chinese education in the
Chinese language was limited. The Japanese did not
allow the use of English as a medium of instruction in
any schools. Thus the Straits Chinese and Overseas
Chinese sent their children to the same type of schools
which promoted loyalty to the Japanese Emperor and the
Great East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere. The Chinese were
forced to express loyalty to Japan. Thus it was absurd
to expect them to express loyalty to Britain or China
after an end of the War.
Those Chinese who were not willing to co-operate
with the Japanese Military Administration, joined the
Anti-Japanese resistance movements, such as the MPAJA and
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OCAJA. These organizations, especially the Communist-
dominated MPAJA, worked closely with Force 136, in
preparation for the Allied troops to re-occupy Malaya.
The prominent Chinese who fled to India also worked
closely with the British government, such as providing
information regarding Malaya under the Japanese
occupation. As the present writer has indicated Tan
Cheng Lock the President of the OCA in India submitted a
memorandum to the Colonial Office regarding the
constitutional issues pertaining to Chinese interests in
post-war Malaya. These developments would 	 change
Britain's attitude towards the Chinese community.
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CHAPTER 111
The Problems of the War and the Formulation
of Britain's New Chinese Policy, 1942- 1945
As a consequence of the war, the relationship
between the British and the Chinese community had changed
dramatically. Throughout the period of the Japanese
occupation, Britain worked closely with the illegal
Chinese political organisations in its preparation to
fight against the Japanese forces and reoccupy Malaya.
During this period, the British government began to
rethink and formulate a new policy towards Malaya and the
Chinese community. For Malaya in general, a Malayan Union
was formulated and for the Chinese community, a document
entitle "Malaya, Long Term policy Directives-- Chinese
Policy" was drafted which reflected a change of policy
and attitude towards them)
The new policy proposed the creation of a
constitutional union of Malaya and a common Malayan
citizenship. According to A.J. Stockwell, the "Malayan
Union was a response to following circumstances: (i) the
administrative problems of the peninsula which before the
war had been divided into the Straits Settlements, and
the Federated and Unfederated Malay States, (ii) the
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prospect of economic rehabilitation after the war when
Britain would depend more than ever before upon the
dollar-earning tin mines and rubber estates, (iii) the
need to assure the world, or at the USA, of British
progressivism by laying the foundations for a future
self-governing nation." 2
 In addition to Stockwell's three
points, there might be two more reasons or circumstances
which influenced the British government in formulating
its post-war policy towards Malaya: first, the question
of the London funds of the Malay Sultans and second, the
Chinese factor.3
British Attitudes Towards Chinese Problem.
During the Second World War, British planners in
London who played an important role in formulation of
Britain's new policy towards Malaya were not pro-Malay
and had little affection for the Malay Sultans. Gent, the
Head of the •Eastern Department of the Colonial Office,
had noticed with dismay the difficulties faced by British
officials in Malaya in their dealings with the Malay
Sultans during the pre-war years. 4 For instance, Sir
Shenton Thomas, the Governor of the Straits Settlements
and High Commissioner of the Malay States tried to
persuade the Malay Sultans to be flexible on the question
of opening the civil service to the non-Malay
communities. 5
 However, it was to no avail.
	 Gent was
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irritated with the pre-war policy which "represents the
traditional apprehensions of the Malay Sultans." 6 To him
the policy of ignoring the claims and demands of the
Chinese and Indians in Malaya was a "barren policy."7
British officials, including the military, were
disillusioned with the Malay Sultans who continued to
collaborate with the Japanese administration. P. A. B.
McKerron, Political Secretary to the Civil and Military
Governor in the Council of the British Dominion of
Ceylon, and E. V. G. Day, the Deputy Political Secretary,
labelled the Malay Sultans as "Japanese puppets." In
their memorandum on 'A Note on Some of The Matters To Be
Considered Before Our Return To Malaya,' 8 they asked the
British government "to indicate for the Military
Commander, the policy and attitude which he is to adopt
towards the Rulers on the immediate reoccupation of their
States and towards persons who have allowed themselves to
be used as Japanese puppets." 9 Both of them later joined
the Colonial Office, and Mackerron played an active role
in the formulation of the Malayan Union scheme and the
Chinese policy. The military view on the Malay Sultans,
as represented by Louis Mountbatten, was hostile. In his
letter to Major General Ralph Hone, dated 14 February
1944, he wrote:
I am not in favour of reinstating the
Sultans even as constitutional rulers,
and certainly not as autocratic rulers
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The Japanese have kept them in
position, and it is inconceivable that
most of them have not been actively
collaborating with the Japanese, even
though the clever ones, like Johore,
may when the time comes embarrass us by
turning round and siding actively with
the victorious British armies .In any
case, their prestige cannot fail to
have been seriousl1 impaired by the
Japanese occupation. 0
Some of the planners were not only disillusioned with the
Sultans and the Malay community but also with the former
British officials who were pro-Malay. Among them was
Victor Purcell, the Director of Information and the Chief
Adviser for Chinese Affairs for the proposed government
in Malaya. He criticised the old Malayan civil servants
"for being largely out of touch and sympathy with the
Chinese." 11 He made the remark:
The 'Old Stagers' [Old M.C.S.] might
glory in their 'pro-Malay' bias, but
the Malay Cadets [Malayan Civil
Services] of the M[alayan] P[lanning]
U[nit] deplore this over-weighting on
the Malay side.12
Along with the growing disillusionment over the
Malays, new circumstances arose which changed British
attitudes and policy towards the Chinese community in
Malaya. 13 In January 1942, the Chinese community-- the
Straits Chinese, the Communists and the Kuomintan g --
fully gave their support and cooperation to the British
government in fighting against the Japanese forces which
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had already invaded the Northern part of the Malayan
penisula. This new situation fostered the growth of
admiration among the British officials for the Chinese.
At first, the Malayan Communist Party's offer of
cooperation was rejected by the British government
because they did not recognize this organisation. It was
not only illegal but had also given much trouble in the
past. But when the Japanese forces began to invade Malaya
in December 1941, the British changed their mind and
agreed to accept the Communist offer of cooperation. On
3 January 1942, the Governor of the Straits Settlements
and High Commissioner of the FMS, Sir Shenton Thomas,
reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord
Moyne, about these new developments. Sir Shenton Thomas
said:
• . for the first time in history the
Chinese representatives of all parties,
including Straits born, Kuo Mm Tang,
Communist, etc., came to me to say that
€hè defeat of Japan is now their only
interest, and placed themselves unre-
servedly at amy disposal.14
On 14 January, the Secretary of State gave
orders to the Governor as follows:
In the present situation particular
importance must be attached to the
fullest use being made of services of
the Chinese community in Malaya to
defeat the Japanese invasion. . . the
toughest Chinese elements which have
given us so much trouble in the past in
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Malaya are likely to be amongst the
most useful for the immediate purpose.
I appreciate that this change of
attitude may present difficulties for
your officers in many directions and
particularly to the Secretary of
Chinese Affairs, whose duties hitherto
must necessarily have brought him and
his Department into conflict with those
elements. • .
The Secretary of State had assumed that the
Governor had given clear and definite instructions to
all concerned in order that the requirements of the new
situation could be fully understood and acted upon. He
also emphatically agreed with the Governor's view that,
"post war repercussions do not concern us [British] in
this emergency. ,,16
The	 British released the Communists who had
been jailed, and trained the local people to fight
against the Japanese in Singapore. The Communists and the
Kuomintang worked together and formed the Chinese
Mobilization Council which consisted of twenty members,
ten from each of the two parties. This was presided over
by Tan Kah Kee. A sub-committee was formed called the
Defence Corps Committee or Volunteer Corps (DALFORCE), to
defend Singapore from Japanese invaders. They put up a
strong resistance against the Japanese forces and fought
on until capitulation.
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During the Japanese occupation of Malaya, once
again the British considered the Chinese community as
their friends and supporters willing and capable of
opposing Japanese forces and helping to prepare for their
return. The British gave full support to the formation of
the guerilla forces of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese
Army which operated in occupied territory. For the
Communists, support for the British came not so much from
a love of the British as from extreme hatred of the
Japanese. The British, however, assumed the Communists
had changed. 17 They hoped the Communists had become
their true supporters.
They hoped to utilise these resistance forces.
The present writer will indicate elsewhere that the
the considered them as part of their troops. As the
resistance forces consisted of mainly Chinese, the
British government needed to change its policy towards
the Chinese community in Malaya. According to Victor
Purcell as the Adviser on Chinese Affairs:
In the past it was possible to say
that a large proportion of the Chinese
in Malaya were not political minded- -
that they 'did not mind who held the
cow so long as they milked it'. We
shall not be able to say this in the
future. There is evidence that the
anti-Japanese guerErlilla army in
Malaya, mostly Chinese, is nearly
40,000 strong, and largely communist in
outlook.... Will it not be remembered
that the recognition of the Chinese
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Mobilisation Committee during the
invasion was the virtual recognition of
the Kuomintang and the Chinese
[Malayan] Communist Party ....During
the progress of the [British] Military
operations for th reconquest of Malaya
it is likely that large areas of the
country will be controlled by the
guer[r]illa forces. Are we to expect
that we can establish an administration
or a Chinese Affairs organization
unrelated to the existence of this
[guerrilla] army and without
recognition of any claims it will have
to make?18
During World War II, British military officials
worked closely with the Chinese resistance forces. Major
Chapman was left with the resistance forces when British
troops withdrew from Malaya)- 9
 Then, at the end of 1943,
John Davis, ex-Malayan Police and Richard Broome of the
Chinese Secretariat entered Malaya by submarine, to
negotiate with the resistance forces for their
cooperation and to coordinate guerrilla activities with
the secret British guerrilla unit otherwise known as
Force 136.
In January 1944, Col. J. Davis, as the Supreme
Allied Commander's chief representative in Malaya, made
an agreement with Loi Tek and Chin Peng, representatives
of the Joint Committee of the Anti-Japanese Forces and
the Anti Japanese Union, to co-operate fully for
purposes of defeating the Japanese. The present writer
has indicated elsewhere that the British representatives
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agreed to supply arms, finance, training and medical
facilities.
According to Chapman, they agreed at the
beginning that no questions of post-war policy were to be
discussed and that their (British) whole mission was
military. 20
 But Communist records which were revealed
in November 1945, indicated that the British government
had given some promises to them. The MCP proclaimed on
the anniversary of the Russian Revolution that, "we still
believe in the good things which the British government
has promised us."21
Whether they had made a promise or not, Britain's
post-war policy was guided by a number of considerations.
The achievements of the Resistance Forces during the
period of Japanese occupation and the agreement made by
the Supreme Allied Commander with the Anti-Japanese Army
which was under the control of the Communist Anti:
Japanese Union were factors which the British took into
account in their planning for the constitutional
development of Malaya.22
Later, when R.H. de S. Onreat, a police adviser
under the British Military Administration in Malaya,
complained about British policy towards the Chinese, J.J.
Paskin explained to him that it had been felt in the
Colonial Office that when their Chinese directives were
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being formulated, it was absolutely impossible for them
to ignore:
(a) the change of attitude towards the
Chinese Communists which took place in
Singapore in the days before the
[British] surrender.
(b) the fact that not only then, but later
throughout the period of the Japanese
occupation, the Chinese communists were
vi.rtually the only elements in the
local population which had actively
resisted the Japanese. •
Some previous writers believed that it was
impossible for the agreement (between the British
government and the Communists) to have influenced its
policy for the future of Malaya. According to F.S.V.
Donnison, "in point of fact, the British government's
proposals for the constitutional future of Malaya were
conceived long before the conclusion of this agreement
and were in no sense caused by undertakings entered into
with the Chinese Communists." 24 Also according to
Donnison, it was not possible to get any news of the
signing of this agreement out of Malaya until more than
a year later. He added,that 1944 had passed without
contact between the British Force 136 officials in Malaya
and the British government.25
But the accuracy of the facts mentioned above can
be doubted. Firstly, the British government or the
Colonial Office had just began to formulate their Chinese
97
policy and citizenship proposals in early 1944. The
Colonial Office made its final revision of, t1 Long Term
Policy Directives-- Chinese Policy" on 5 May 1944.26 This
meant there was enough time for the Colonial Office to
consider the agreement when they formulated their Chinese
Policy. Secondly, it was not true that news of the
signing of that agreement could not have reached beyond
Malaya. Major F.Spencer Chapman said that these messages
(about the agreement) reached Colombo (British Military
Headquarters) in January 1944.27 A conference of British
officials which was held in New Delhi on 11 January 1944
was told about "certain Allied work which was already
being undertaken within Malaya largely through the
instrumentality of the Chinese in that country."28
In fact a directive on Chinese policy was
formulated for Force 136 as guidance. With this, Force
136 would be able to reassure the ".. .Chinese as to their
future position in Malaya in order to retain their co-
operation and encourage them to further activities."29
During the British Military Administration the substance
of this directive was communicated to the MPAJA leaders
in the course of the negotiations for the disbanding of
this organization. According to Ralph Hone," The
undertaking given to the M.P.A.J.A. was based on the
directive (and not vice-versa) and was, of course, given
by the G.O.C. under S.A.C's authority without any further
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reference back to London." 30 Based on this evidence it
was probable that British policy, particularly towards
Chinese community was formulated, partly in response to
the agreement between Forces 136 and the Communist
dominated MPAJA.
Besides the Communists, there were some other
groups such as the Straits Chinese and the Kuomintang,
which influenced the Colonial Office's policy towards the
Chinese in Malaya. Prominent Straits Chinese such as Tan
Cheng Lock always made demands for a stronger Chinese
role in the future constitutional set-up of Malaya
than was provided for in the Malay States of the past.
Tan Cheng Lock, as President of the Overseas Chinese
Association, (a small group of Malayan Chinese in India),
submitted the "Memorandum on the Future of Malaya" to the
Colonial Office at the end of 1943.31 In his letter of
16 February 1944, to Tan Cheng Lock, W.B.L. Monson, on
behalf of the Colonial Office, said, that the memorandum
"had been read with very great interest." 32 According
to Ralph Hone "the Colonial Office was leaning towards
some change of policy in regard to . . . "the Straits
Chinese and local born Chinese." 33 He himself agreed with
this view and considered that there was" no justification
for any specially favoured treatment. . ." for the "birds
of passage" or Overseas Chinese. 34 However, after
consideration of other factors, the alien Chinese also
were to be given an opportunity to acquire the rights of
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Malayan citizenship by naturalisation and would enjoy
equal rights under Malayan Union citizenship.
Among all Chinese political organisations or
groups, the Kuomintang was the strongest element which
induced the British government to change its policy
towards the Chinese community. 35 This was because the
Kuomintang was the party that controlled the government
in China. As a consequence of the war, the British
government wanted to maintain good relations with China.
The British had assumed that after the war, China would
emerge with a strong government under the Kuomintan g and
would be one of major powers of the Allied nations and
have a close relationship with Britain. It could be
assumed that the Kuomintang would pressurize the British
government to lift the ban on Kuomintan g branches in
Malaya. According to J. J. Paskin: "It was therefore
considered that, as a matter of policy, it would be
better to forestall demands (which in the circumstances
envisaged in the post war world would be irresistible)
for the repeal of the Malayan Legislation, by ourselves
taking the initiative and replacing that legislation by
enactments on the lines of the one which was then in
operation in Hong Kong." 36 However, if the Kuomintang was
legalized, the Chinese government would have ample
opportunities for interference in the country's internal
affairs.
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The Colonial Office needed to find a formula
which on one hand would legalize the Kuomintang and on
the other hand discourage the Chinese in Malaya from
being involved with this organization. One way was
to offer local citizenship to this community in the
hope that they would transfer their loyalty to Malaya
and cut their ties with their motherland.37
The hostile Japanese policy towards the
Chinese, along with their "pro-Malay policy", directly or
indirectly changed the British attitude and perception
towards both communities. It was pointed out to
Whitehall that the Chinese were bearing the brunt of the
Japanese occupation and had been executed en masse
after the fall of Singapore. The officials who read the
accounts of Japanese atrocities toward the Chinese "were
in almost stunned silence." 38 It was the Chinese who
were more friendly to the British and the Chinese
attitude towards the Japanese was very hostile. It was
pointed out that one reason why the British defence
collapsed rapidly was because a Malay "Fifth Column"
was active in collaborating with the Japanese forces as
guides and intrepreters.39 The Malays of the
Kesatuan Melayu Muda had actually been working for
Fuliwara Kikan the Japanese Military intelligence agency
under Maj. Fujiwara Iwaichi which was based in Bangkok.4°
As a result of these events the British officials became
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more sympathetic to and worked largely with, the Chinese
in their war effort to reclaim Malaya from enemy
occupation.
Part III
The Formulation of Chinese Policy
The Colonial Office began to formulate a general
policy directive for the Civil Affairs Administration
under the British Military Administration in mid 1943. At
the same time they also began to study Chinese problems.
A meeting was held in Gent's room on 17 June 1943, and
the Colonial Office staff including Gent, Paskin and
McKerron decided to take steps to collect a number of
suitable Malayan officers to study the future from the
Chinese angle. They would also act as advisors on all
matters pertaining to the Chinese to the planning staff,
and eventually to military and civil affairs officers
when the British eventually re-occupied Malaya. 41
 They
also agreed that it would also be the duty of this
special unit to keep in close touch with the Foreign
Office about the development of the Chinese government's
policy towards the Chinese in the South Seas.
On the question of Chinese problems, McKerron
suggested to the Colonial Office that they secure the
services of, Victor W. Purcell, H. G. Moles, and J.
Barry, a former member of the Malayan Police Service. In
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his opinion, Purcell's services would be particularly
useful to advise on the very important matter of
publicity for the Malayan Chinese because he was engaged
at that time on duties of that nature in Australia. He
also suggested that those officers would have to be
attached to the Colonial Office and paid from the
Malayan fund because the War Office would never agree at
that stage to provide posts on the civil affairs
establishment for them.
McKerron raised the question of Chinese labour,
and in his view, the Chinese Protectorate would cease to
exist after the British returned to Malaya and its
function would be taken over by the police and a new
Labour Department which would deal with labour of all
kinds and for all races. Gent agreed with McKerron's view
that the Chinese and Indian labour issue would be one of
the most tricky for Malayan policy in future years. In
his opinion, both communities "will probably have at
their beck and call the services and the support of their
respective ebullient nationalist governments." 42
 But he
felt it was premature to decide to deal with labour
problems before they had competent officers on Chinese
and Indian affairs. He agreed with McKerron's suggestion
of getting the services of Victor Purcell, H. G. Moles
and J. Barry. On 26 June 1943 he ordered Paskin to try
to bring back those officers to London. 43 In August
1943, Gent and other colonial officials also decided to
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bring back other officers such as Day, Newboult, Hay,
Lowinger and William to join the Malayan Planning Unit
which was attached to the War Office.44
On 27 and 28 September 1943 Colonial officials,
including Gent, Paskin and Monson held a discussion
regarding the relationship between the future government
of Malaya with China and the Chinese problem as a
consequence of the war. 45
 They felt it was necessary to
send an officer to make personal contacts with Chungking
as they needed to know Chinese government policy towards
the Overseas Chinese community. The pre-war government in
Malaya was not able to maintain a closer relationship
with the government in China, as the Kuomintan g always
interfered in the affairs of Chinese in Malaya, which
was not in the interest of local government. It feared
the government in China would use the Chinese in Malaya
as a "Fifth Column." Thus, the pre-War government
adopted a policy of repression of Kuomintan g activities.
But the Kuomintang goverment protested to Britain and
as a consequence both Britain and the Kuomintang
government solved the conflict based on the 1931 Lampson-
Wang Agreement. The Chinese authorities pledged not to
establish an official party in Malaya and also not to
allow the activities of its members to interfere with the
domestic affairs of the Chinese community in the country.
The local government would not object to any Chinese in
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this country being a direct member of the Kuomintang of
China but they were not allowed to form a branch in
Malaya. However the Lampson-Wang Agreement did not
satisfy the Kuomintan g of China and this party made an
attempt to form illegal branches in Malaya and continued
to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Chinese
community in the country. At the outbreak of the war the
Kuomintang of China asked the British government to allow
this organization to form branches in Malaya. But Sir
Shenton Thomas, the Governor of the Straits Settlements
strongly opposed any attempt to change policy towards the
Kuomintang . In his despatch of 19 June 1941 to the
Colonial Office, he said as follows:
To enable an alien government to gain
control of the preponderant element of
the population would be to subject this
government to an external pressure
which might have most unhappy political
and social consequences, expose it to
sharp criticism by the Rulers as an
unfaithful trustee,and open a door to
indiscipline and disloyalty on the part
of large sections of the [Chinese]
community, who are taught by these
organisations to owe their allegiance
elsewhere.
Colonial Officials found out that the British
were no longer able to follow the pre-war policy
regarding the relationship with the Kuomintang government
in China as a consequence of the war. It had been argued
that,"further stages of the war against Japan may well be
influenced by the maintenance of good relations with the
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Chinese in respect of Malayan affairs." 47 Furthermore the
Kuomintang and Communists were likely to play a prominent
part in helping the British in any campaign to drive the
Japanese out from Malaya. The Colonial officials felt
that, "in these circumstances, it seems impossible to
revive, immediately, on return to Malaya the pre-war
embargoes on the parties, even if that course were
thought to be desirable." 48 The colonial officials could
not find the best method to deal with the Chinese
problem. They decided to consult with the Foreign Office
and other British officers.
On 29 September Paskin told Ashley Clarke of the
F.O. that the Colonial Office would like to arrange an
informal discussion between various departments of the
MPU and among those who would attend was Purcell. 49 They
also hoped Esler ]Jening (a Foreign Office official and
the Chief Political Adviser to South-East Asian Command),
who was still in Britain, would attend. The subject of
discussion was about Chinese matters and the attitude to
be adopted regarding Chinese political organisations in
post-war Malaya. The need for such a discussion became
more urgent, as at the end of October 1943, the Malayan
Planning Unit informed the Colonial Office that they had
already felt the need for policy directives, including
one on the Chinese. Ralph Hone, informed Gent that it
would be primarily for the Colonial Office to decide what
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directives should be prepared. He assumed that Gent would
also be agreeable to receive opinions from the Malayan
Planning Unit officials on certain subjects, both during
the planning stage and after they reached Malaya. 5 ° He
added, though the formulation of policy directives was
the responsibility of the Colonial Office, he had no
doubt that Gent would be willing to allow members of his
staff to consult with the Colonial Office while the
directives were being actually formulated. It was
obviously an advantage to allow the people who would have
to carry out the approved policy to have some hand in
defining it. He urged Gent to set up an inter-
departmental committee to study some of the political
questions, for example, the Chinese matter.51
On 1 November 1943, a meeting was held and
attended by Colonial Office and Foreign Office officials
including as A. Blackburn, Ashley Clarke, Gent, Paskin,
Purcell and Monson to discuss the Chinese problem and
the question of the relationship between Britain and the
future government in Malaya with the Kuomintang
government in China. 52
 Blackburn of the Foreign Office
held the view that the Chinese government should be
treated as "on a basis of full equality." 53 He recognized
that, politically, relations between Britain and
	 the
Chinese government	 were bound to be a matter of
considerable difficulty for the future government in
Malaya. But he said	 it	 was desirable that "the
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reestablishment of British authority in Malaya should be
accompanied by, at any rate, a show of treatment of the
Chinese government... [as equal] with other powers" and
by making it clear to the Chinese government that the
British government would be prepared to consider their
legitimate interests in Malaya but "without admitting any
right by them to interfere with the internal
administration of the country." 54 The Foreign Office
and the Colonial Office shared the same view regarding
the attitude to be adopted to the Kuomintan g in Malaya.
It had been argued that, it "would be desirable to treat
the party in Malaya on a basis of legality." 55 Therefore
they strongly supported ". . .the suggestion that any
future Malayan legislation should follow the lines of the
Hong Kong Society's Ordinance which placed on the local
government the onus of declaring a society unlawful."
Victor Purcell also supported this proposal. He pointed
out that "the proposed change might not mean very much
but it would have a definite psychological value in
regard to our relations with the Chinese Government."56
In December 1943, the Colonial Office sought an
opinion from Sir Horace Seymour, the British ambassador
in Chungking and also Netherlands diplomats in London
regarding the Chinese government's intention towards the
Overseas Chinese. Horace Seymour told the Colonial
Office that he was not aware of any particular view held
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by Chinese authorities towards Malaya, but he had the
definite impression that Chungking control of Overseas
Chinese would be intensified after the war and that the
Chinese would look to have freer opportunities for
immigration into Malaya than they had had before the
war. 57 Teixeira de Mattos, the Minister of Netherland's
embassy in London, told the Foreign Office that, based
on a report received from the Netherlands ambassador in
Chungking, the Chinese government would mount claims
• .to economic freedom and privileges almost giving the
Chinese	 an	 ex-territorial	 position	 in	 the
territories. • that were occupied by the Japanese. He
pointed out that the overseas Chinese would, "through
their affiliation with the Kuomintang be made an
instrument for Chinese penetration." 59 Teixeira pointed
out that Chinese secret agents had been sent to the
Japanese occupied territories to form "a nucleus for
future operation." 6 ° He suggested that there was one way
"to counter the dangers in question, a clear prohibition
of political organisations in foreign territory might be
inserted in the Peace treaties concluded with Germany and
with Japan."	 He added that " most countries would
4
regard such conditions as natural and necessary, and a
precedent would be set up by which Chinese designs could
possibly be countered." 62 The British government also
recognized "Chinese imperialistic designs" and "the
dangers and the difficulty which [they] might have in
keeping these designs in check in Burma and Malaya" after
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they returned to both territories.63
From June to December 1943, the Colonial Office
still could not find a formula to deal with the Chinese
problem in the future Malaya. It faced a great dilemma.
On one hand it had been argued that Britain and the
future government in Malaya needed to maintain a good
relationship and cooperation with China and the
Chinese, the Kuomintang and the Communists in Malaya, to
drive the Japanese out of these territories. On the other
hand the Chinese community had the potential to become a
!u Fifth Column" in Chinese imperialistic designs on
Malaya. In pre-war days, this could be dealt with by a
policy of repression. But in these new circumstances
repression was not the answer. In January 1944 Ralph Hone
went to New Delhi to look for a possible solution to the
Chinese problem.64
On 11 January 1944, a conference was held in New
Delhi to discuss the subject of Chinese affairs in
Malaya. It was attended by Ralph Hone, the
C.C.A.O. (Malaya), M. E. Dening, the Chief Political
Adviser to S.A.C., Sir Horace Seymour, Air Marshall Sir
Philip Joubert, the Deputy Chief of Staff (in charge of
information and civil affairs), Colonel E. J. Gibbons,
the Chief Civil Affairs Security Officer, and John
Keswik, Political Liaison Officer, S.E.A. Ralph Hone told
the meeting about a discussion held at the Colonial
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Office on 1 November 1943 at which a suggestion was made
on the possiblity of sending a Malayan government officer
to Chungking to explore the trend of Chinese opinion
regarding the overseas Chinese in Malaya. 65
 Seymour
agreed to the suggestion of sending V. Purcell to China
for this purpose. Hone asked the conference what the
Chinese wanted in Malaya. Seymour's reply was that he
did not think that "opinion in China was very
crystallized on this subject but the general trend was
that Overseas Chinese should not be subject to
disabilities in trade and politics from which other races
did not suffer." 66 Hone told the meeting that, in the
past, all Chinese in the Federated Malay States and
Unfederated Malay States had been treated as foreigners.
He mentioned that there were two categories of Chinese in
Malaya: those bred and born in the country who adopted
Malaya as their home, and "birds of passage" who
departed with their gains and contributed very little to
the well-being of the country. 67 Hone told the meeting
that the Colonial Office "was leaning towards some change
of policy in regard" to the Chinese who were born and
bred in Malaya. 68 Seymour pointed out that "a change of
policy with regard to Malayan born Chinese would go some
way to meet Chinese ambitions but would not fully satisfy
them", as "the Chinese claim an interest in all Chinese,
whether Malayan born or not." 69
 He pointed out that the
Chinese "were trying to have the best of both worlds."
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Dening told the meeting that he, as a political
adviser to SEAC, needed to has a directive on Chinese
policy at an early date. He explained to the meeting that
"certain Allied work was already being undertaken within
Malaya, largely through the instrumentality of the
Chinese [the Communist dominated Malayan People Anti-
Japanese Army] in the country." 7 ° He added that, "there
might well soon be a request from the Officer in charge
of these operations [Force 136] for permission to say
something to Chinese [Communists] as to their future
position in Malaya in order to retain their co-operation
and encourage them to further activities." 71 Thus Dening
felt that some directive, if only of an interim nature,
should be issued as early as possible. He also told the
meeting that "the necessity for guidance will continue
equally after military operations have taken place." It
should be noted that evidence from this conference
indicates the formulation of a Chinese directive which
had a direct connection with the works that had been
carried out by Force 136.72 It should be noted also that
the officers of the Malayan section of Force 136 had made
direct contact with Gent and other colonial officials
regarding British post-war policy in Malaya.
In the meantime an inter-departmental or working
committee convened its first meeting on 17 December 1943
to prepare a directive 	 on Chinese	 policy.73	 This
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committee consisted of J. J. Paskin and W. L. Monson from
the Colonial Office and Victor Purcell, E. V. Day and A.
T. Newboult from the MPU branch of the War Office. The
subject discussed at the meeting was to what extent the
Chinese community, and other communities as well could be
associated with the machinery of government. The meeting
decided to open a new file dealing with "Malayan
citizenship" and recognized the need for a series of
directives including a discussion on Chinese policy. In
January 1944 the working committee was able to submit a
draft directive on Malayan policy and a general view of
its policy towards the Chinese to the Foreign Office.74
One of the comments made by the Foreign Office on
Colonial Office Malayan policy was that it was "to
satisfy the Chinese." 75 J. J. Paskin denied this.
According to Paskin, the idea which concerned the
Colonial Office was that of absorbing the Chinese, who
had roots in the country into a common citizenship, for
the benefit of Malaya as a whole.76
Paskin told Gater that he was present at a
meeting between Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent
Under Secretary at the Foreign Office and Netherlands'
minister at Chungking. The latter urged that they (the
British and Dutch) should coordinate a policy against the
plan of the government in China to strengthen the
position of the Overseas Chinese in Malaya and the
Netherlands East Indies. 77	They believed the Chinese
113
government had an ultimate long-range objective in
acquiring a substantial measure of control in the
affairs of all countries in Southeast Asia through the
Overseas Chinese.
Paskin suggested to them that one possible means
to counter these designs would to be win local Chinese
loyalty from China to their country of domicile. 78 Paskin
mentioned that the ambassador had little faith in the
effectiveness of that, on the grounds that the "Chinese
will always be Chinese" but he agreed that it was worth
trying. '
V. Purcell was given the task of reviewing "Long
Term Policy Directives: Chinese Policy" (first draft)
before it was submitted to the Chief Planner of Civil
Affairs of the Malayan Planning Unit and to the British
Cabinet. 80 He gave his comments in March 1944. He and
the interdepartmental committee drew up a several drafts
of a directive on Chinese policy before it could reach a
final conclusion. The main difference between the first
and the second draft was regarding the Chinese
participation in political parties. Part 3 of the first
draft stated:
Chinese persons whether citizens of the
Malayan Union or not will be free to be
members of the Kuomintang in Malaya
provided that the society is a lawful
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society in Malaya, and provided that it
does not signify in the case of
citizens of the Malayan Union, any
political allegiance to any Government
other than the Malayan Union.81
In the second draft this reference to the
Kuomintang was dropped. It was replaced by the reference
that, "Chinese citizens of the Malayan Union will be free
to be members of any society in China provided that such
society is not an unlawful society according to Malayan
law." 82 In the third draft the reference to "politics"
and "in China" was dropped as it would appear that
Malayan citizens of other races would not be free to be a
member of any society. It should be pointed out that the
MCP could not be regarded as a Chinese society in legal
terms as its constitution allowed people from non-
Chinese races to become a member of this organization.
There was certainly a specific incident that
influenced the Colonial Office to leave out any reference
to the Kuomintang . The Supreme Allied Commander for
south- east Asia made an agreement with the resistance
groups which mainly contained Communists elements in
Malaya. As the present writer has indicated, the
conference in New Delhi was told about the Allied work
with the Chinese resistance forces in Malaya. It was not
possible for the Colonial Office to favour the
Kuomintang and ignore the other Chinese organizations
which also cooperated with the British government
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during the war. By dropping the reference to the
Kuomintang , it was possible for the Chinese in Malaya to
become members of other organizations. This was also
modified to make it easier for the Malayan Communist
Party to become a legal organization. Under the final
revised Chinese policy, "the legislation in the Malayan
Union governing the registration of societies should be
amended so as to remove the requirement that a society
must apply to be accepted for registration before it
could be a lawful society, and the responsibility instead
should be placed on the governor in Council for declaring
any existing society to be an unlawful one.ttB3 This
meant the British government recognized the Malayan
Communist Party and Kuomintang which in the past were
considered as illegal organisations, so a legal problem
would not arise if the British government were to make
a deal with the Communists and the Kuomintan g when they
returned to Malaya later. Although the final draft of the
directive on Chinese policy was not explicit on this
matter, examination of the discussions between officials
of the C.O., F.O. and the staff of SEAC suggest beyond
doubt that Chinese policy was formulated by British in
order to deal with the MCP and the Kuomintang and the
Chinese community in general.
In the history of the Chinese in Malaya, the new
Chinese policy and citizenship proposals under the
Malayan Union scheme were the best offer they ever had
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from the British government. The Chinese community would
be allowed two choices. They could became Malayan
citizens or remain as aliens with the freedom to
participate in any kind of political party, either
foreign or China-based or local based political party.
The pre-war policy which subjected Chinese to various
disabilities and prosecution would be lifted. In other
words there would be no more cases of repression. The
first part of the Chinese Policy stated:
Persons of Chinese race in the Malayan
Union will either be possessed of
Malayan Union citizenship as defined in
the directive on the creation of the
such citizenship or will be aliens in
the country.84
The citizenship directive made it much easier for
the Chinese in Malaya or Singapore to become Malayan
Union citizens. As Malayan Union citizens, they would
be, in all respects, possessed of rights and privileges
of any other section, save only that concerned with the
policy of Malay land reservation. To prevent the Chinese
from being discriminated against on racial grounds,
Victor Purcell suggested "that all newly appointed cadets
[in Malayan Civil Services] should be required to learn
both Chinese and Malay". 85
 According to Purcell, the
Malayan Civil Services was largely out of touch and
sympathy with the Chinese.86
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For the first time, the new British policy would
offer the Chinese, and Indians as well, an opportunity
to enter the public services of a future Malaya. In the
pre-war Malay States, not even one Chinese or Indian ever
had a hope of becoming a Malayan Civil Service officer.
Furthermore there would be no discrimination of race in
the salary scheme of the future public services of the
Malayan Union. Officers whose permanent homes were not in
Malaya would receive pensionable expatriation allowances
at rates approved by the Secretary of State, in addition
to the basic Malayan scale.
In the	 commercial and economic field, the
Chinese were already in a dominant position. To be fair,
the Colonial Office therefore needed to consider the
interests and position of the Malay Community. So in the
directives to the Chief Planners of Civil Affairs, the
instruction was
that the participation in the
government by all the communities in
future Malaya is to promote.. . subject
to a special recognition of the
political economic and social interests
of the Malay race.87
Towards the middle of August 1944, it became
clear that the immediate aims of Malayan Union policy and
the Directive on Chinese Policy were to induce the
Chinese community, particularly the Communist-dominated
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resistance forces to co-operate and work closely with
Force 136. S.E. Taylor wrote to Gent, that SOE or Force
136 had already been in touch with resistance groups in
Malaya. 88 They asked about certain questions regarding
the British post-war policy which they should know in
order to give reasonably concrete answers to the
resistance forces. According to him the questions which
the SOE would like to be able to answer were:
(1) What form of citizenship if any will be
available
a. To those born in Malaya, and
b. Those who have been domiciled there
for a given period?
(2) Will organisations and societies which
were considered to be illegal before
the war continue to be so considered?
(3) From the point of view of civil rights
and opportunities will such Chinese as
• may qualify for citizenship under 1
above be subject to discrimination?89
According to Gent the best answers that they could
give about the future of the Malayan Chinese were
as follows:
(1) . . . it is the intention of His
Majesty's Government to promote a
greater degree of unification of all
Malaya and its peoples, and equality of
those who have made Malaya their home.
Whatever any person's racial extraction
may be one of the processes by which
it is hoped to achieve this purpose is
by creating Malaya Citizenship. It is
proposed that such citizenship should
be acquired by persons in Malaya and by
persons who have been ordinarily
resident there for very many years.
(2) On the question of societies and
organisations which were considered
illegal before the war, ... it is our
intention to change the emphasis in
119
future by fresh legislation so that a
society or organisation will not be
considered illegal unless declared so
to be.
(3) Chinese who possess Malayan Citizenship
referred to (1) above will have the
right and privileges of any other
Malayan citizens. There will be no
discrimination on racial grounds except
that of the policy of Malay land
reservations.
According to J. J. 	 Paskin,	 although SOE was
authorised to give assurances to the resistance forces
they (the officers of the Colonial Office ) "... have no
knowledge . . . that any of these assurances were in fact
ever given to the M.P.A.J.A." 91 He pointed out that, in
a memorandum dated 15 August 1945, "On the Resistance
Forces in Malaya on the eve of Japanese capitulation",
Innes Tremlett, the SOE officer, had explained that,
"the M.P.A.J.A. leaders were reluctant to come out into
the open, in association with the Force agents, because
of the possible desire of their leaders to retain their
anonymity	 for	 subversive	 a.ction	 after	 the
reoccupation." 92 Tremlett added that this was because
of the general policy of the Colonial Office to make no
statements: they had never been able to tell its leaders
that they would not be treated as outlaws. According to
Paskin, from this writing it would "appear that little
was said to the leaders of the guerrilla forces in Malaya
during the war as to ... {Britain's ] post-war policy."93
However,	 after the war,	 the British Military
Administration used the Directive on Chinese Policy as a
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bargaining counter during the negotiation with the MPAJA
leaders for the disbandment of this organization.94
After more than one year of keeping their Malayan policy
secret the Colonial Office decided to publicize it in
September 1945. It appeared that the immediate purpose of
the Malayan policy was to extract support and cooperation
from the resistance movements, including the Communist
and Kuomintang for the British forces in Malaya. Admiral
Mountbatten had long pressed for a measure of publicity
of the Malayan policy so that his power to utilise
resistance forces thereby would be greatly increased.95
It is possible that the policy-makers in the Colonial
Office knew something of the aims and aspirations of the
resistance forces. The Colonial Office received two
telegrams from Dening pointing out that the MCP have set
before themselves a goal which in many respects was
consistent with the directive on Chinese policy. One of
the officers of the Colonial Office wrote:
There was the extreme relevance of our
[the British Government's] future
Malayan policy to the aim and
aspirations of the most politically
difficult body of Chinese [the
Communists] in Malaya, and the great
advantages which we will secure in
dealing with that body if our policy
can be made known to them.96
But the Communist "stole their thunder"
	
by
publicizing their policy before the British government
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was able to act. This policy was far more radical than
the British government's offers. One of the aims of the
MCP was to "establish a democratic Government in Malaya
with an electorate drawn from races of each State and the
anti-Japanese army." 97 Thus compared to Communist policy,
the proposed Malayan policy lacked any real progressive
and democratic elements. Instead of being a preparation
for self-government, the Malayan Union became a crown
colony.
Conclusion
It is apparent that Britain's Chinese policy was
not only intended to secure the immediate aim of
extracting the support and cooperation of the
resistance movements, but also to solve Chinese problems
in the long term. The long term aim of the Chinese
policy was to promote the process of the Malayanisation
of the Chinese community. This aim was in line with the
general policy of the British government within the
British Commonwealth of Nations. It has been argued that
to achieve these objectives, it was deemed necessary for
the British government to deprive the Malay Sultans of
sovereignty.
The Colonial Office had the impression that the
Sultans would not agree to the implementation of the
Chinese policy or the creation of a common citizenship
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for all people in Malaya regardless of race and the
formation of a unified Malaya. According to Gent,".. .we
cannot expect the Malay rulers to be other than reluctant
to give an inch to any future constitutional arrangement
which will be intended to absorb locally domiciled
Chinese or Indians on a political and economic level in
the country with the Malays." 98 He added, "Nor can they
be expected to be attracted by our idea of a greater
unification of Malaya." The rulers, in Gent's view,
"are very state-minded and not only the tJnfederated
States rulers but also the F.M.S rulers consistently
favour political decentralization." 99
 As the present
writer has indicated in the Appendix A, it was also
necessary for the British government to deprive the the
Malay Sultans of their sovereignty, in order to solve the
question of the various Malayan funds	 and other
problems .00
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CHAPTER 1V
British Military Administration and
the Malayan Union Experiment, 1945-1947
From the end of the war to the establishment of
civil government in Malaya (August 1945-April 1946),
political activity among the Chinese community was
dominated by the MCP and radical movements. The leaders
of the pre-war Chinese community, which consisted mainly
of merchants or business leaders and English-educated
professionals, almost entirely lost their leadership in
the Chinese community. They, as the leaders of the
Chinese community which had carried out an appeasement
policy with regard to the Japanese Military
Administration through participation, in the Overseas
Chinese Associations and in the advisory councils, were
regarded as collaborators or traitors. Their financial
position had also been crippled by the Japanese. For a
temporary period, these groups no longer held high
social status and influence among the Chinese. Their
political role in the Chinese community was taken over
by a group of Chinese leaders who belonged to the
resistance movements, such as the MPAJA and MPAJtJ. These
groups were controlled by the MCP. As the War came to an
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end these groups acquired high social prestige and had
great influence among the Chinese community as
liberators. Their prestige was enhanced by the Allied
powers, who recognized them as part of Southeast Asian
Command's troops.
Part I
Lord Louis Mountbatten and the
Chinese Resistance Movements
The unexpected surrender of the Japanese on 14
August 1945 left a political vacuum in Malaya for a few
weeks. Some factions of the MPAJA attempted to take over
power in certain areas vacated by the Japanese forces.
However the MPAJA and the MCP leaders decided to co-
operate with the returning British and adopt a
constitutional line of struggle. The MCP drew up an
eight point programme and adopted the slogans: to "uphold
the democratic league of China, the Soviet Union,
Britain, and America", to welcome "Great Britain to
administer Malaya", and all races should unite" to
establish a democratic Malaya." 1 The MCP and the MPAJU
made a joint statement that:
• . we trust that a righteous and just
policy will be executed by the British
Military Administration in future in
order to bestow on us happiness and
freedom. As Great Britain is a
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righteous nation we believe we shall be
granted proper rights and given the
opportunity to offer our cooperation to
the British Government. Simultaneously,
we expect all races and political
parties to join with us in the task of
establishing a New Malaya under the
democratic flag..
It was apparent that the MCP adopted a
cooperative policy towards the British, as a tactic, and
also in the hope that they would be allowed to play a
political role in postwar Malaya. For the British,
cooperation with the MCP or the resistance movements was
necessary in their plan to fight and reoccupy Malaya
under Operation Zipper. However, with the sudden
surrender of the Japanese forces , the role of the
resistance movements in the military operation was no
longer necessary. In these new circumstances, the
resistance movements posed a political problem to the
British planning to reoccupy Malaya. According to Lord
Louis Mountbatten, the Allied Commander of the Southeast
Asian Command:
In the case of Malaya, there is of
course the difficulty that the
resistance movements are largely
composed of Chinese elements and that
the Chinese in the greater part of
Malaya did not in the past enjoy
equality of status. If we back them to
any appreciable extent, and accept
their cooperation, we shall owe them a
special debt and this will give them a
stong case if they choose to ask for
special privileges .
132
Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
did not need to be reminded by Mountbatten, as he himself
realized they would face delicate political issues when
they began to set up a military administration in
Malaya. He had already informed Lord Louis Mountbatten
that:
You will realise that the presence in
substantial numbers in Malaya of
Chinese and Indians makes the future
constitutional development a matter of
some delicacy, particularly as these
communities are likely to demand a more
intimate [sic] place in the
constitutional set up in the future
than they have been given in the Malay
States in the past, while at the same
time the great economic power which
they have already secured has led to
antagonism between themselves and the
Malays. We must be prepared to face a
risk of sectional antagonisms showing
themselves more definitely in the
settlement of a new constitution.4
Mountbatten agreed with the directives on Policy in
Malaya which pointed to the prospect of forming a single
Malayan Union embracing all the States and the
Settlements of the peninsula, and of constitutional
progress directed towards the development of democratic
self-government. He insisted Singapore be included in the
proposed Union. He also emphasized some of the points in
the directives, which said that participation in the
government by all the communities in Malaya was to be
promoted, subject to a special recognition of the
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political, economic and social interests of the Malay
race. He added that he felt that the British objective
should be to break down racial sectionalism in every way
open to them, politically, economically and socially, and
to endeavour to substitute the idea of Malayan
citizenship.
Louis Mountbatten made a suggestion that the
military administration should set up an elected advisory
council and on further consideration their efforts should
be directed toward promoting responsible democratic
institutions at the bottom by beginning with the village
and. ward. He added that with such modest beginnings
might lie the key not only to future self-government,
but to the difficulties inherent in a pluralistic
society. He stressed that:
If we can make a start in this way by
getting people, whether Malays, Chinese
or Indians, to combine together to
deal as citizens (and not as racial
- communities) with the local problems of
their village or ward we may hope that
one day they will come to look at the
wider problems of Malaya in the same
light, and that at least Malayan-born
and Malayan-domiciled Chinese will
begin to identify themselves with
Malaya instead of seeking political
guidance and interference from China 6
However, the Colonial Office considered it premature to
introduce an election in Malaya during that time. One
reason was the administrative difficulty in deciding
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who had the right to belong to Malaya, thus enabling
them to participate in the election. 7 In their view, the
creation of Malayan tjnion citizenship would form the
basis for a franchise and therefore they needed to
determine which persons belonged to Malaya by being
born there or by having another claim to naturalisation.
They were doubtful that it would be feasible to complete
the sifting of the population into the category of
belonging to Malaya	 during the	 military
administration. 8
Lord Louis Mountbatten had received the final
draft on. Chinese policy and the creation of Malayan Union
citizenship in early September 1944. He told Oliver
Stanley that they were substantially in agreement on
certain matters. He wrote, "I am sure you share my wish
to see the country politically unified and racially
united, since these are indispensable prerequisities to
the building of a free and happy country there." 9 He
agreed that,"it is essential that the Chinese and Indian
elements should be legally assimilated, and should be
made to feel committed, to local responsibility." Towards
the Malay, he said he felt sorry to see that they
should, by general consent, be found incapable of
competing on equal terms, "economically and
educationally," with the Chinese and Indians. He urged
Stanley to announce His Majesty's Government's policy
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immediately, as the "Japanese war may be over by the end
of 1945" and he hoped they would be back in Malaya before
that. He said:
I consider that the time to announce
our policy, and to give it full
publicity, is NOW, and that there is no
time to be lost, if I am not to be
asked to undertake a campaign against a
part of the world which should have
been prepared by suitable Political
Warfare, but where on the contrary we
will have again missed the bus)°
Lord Louis Mountbatten considered British post-war
policy to be a "weapon" and "putting it at its very
lowest, if we can expect but little help and sympathy
from the Malayan [Chinese] populations (which I
personally do not believe) we should at least be able to
ensure their benevolent neutrality in our invasion of the
country." 11 He was very concerned that the Chinese
dominated resistance movements might attempt to fight
against the British troops during their invasion of
Malaya. Ralph Hone, the Chief of Civil Affairs of the
Malayan Planning Unit, and other senior officers were
also worried that "the communists in the jungle at the
time of the Japanese surrender had every intention of
taking over control in Malaya." 12 Mountbatten pointed
out that the potential danger would be minimised by
disclosing the post-war policy which offered political
concessions to the Communist dominated resistance forces
in particular, and "to the Chinese community in
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general." 13	According to
	
Louis	 Mountbatten,
announcement of the British post-war policy was
important. In his view: '.. .sornething (must be) done
about this very vital matter before it is too late."14
Southeast Asian Command of the Allied powers was
unable to send its troops into Malaya immmediately after
the unconditional surrender of Japanese on 14 August
1945. Louis Mountbatten was instructed to delay the
landing until 31 August by General MacArthur, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. General
Terauchi, the Supreme Commander of the Japanese forces in
the south region, also made it clear that he would not
obey Mountbatten's order until he had been ordered by
the Japanese emperor. During this time, SEAC decided to
to increase the strength of Force 136 personnel in order
to control the resistance forces in Malaya. Meanwhile,
Cohn MacKenzie the Commander of Force 136, reported that
they faced difficulties in connection with Anti-
Japanese Union Forces and asked 	 SEA headquarters to
disclose the relevant details of British post-war
policy. He pointed out two important grievances coming
from the AJUF: firstly, they consisted entirely of
domiciled Chinese whose citizenship status was inferior
to the Malays, and secondly, their organisations were
treated as illegal.15
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A few days later, the	 SEAC's broadcasting
stations were instructed to disseminate propaganda
about; (1) The maintenance of law and order, (2)
Britain's strength and its confident determination to
carry out its mission to Malaya, (3) Britain's approach
being likely to be sympathetic to 'progressive elements'
in Malaya, and (4) an avoidance of over-optimism about
returning to peace-time conditions) 6 On a radio
broadcast from SEAC headquarters on 25 August, the
guerrillas were told to move into the vacated area left
by the Japanese forces and maintain peace and order. They
were urged to put themselves under the command of
British troops and follow orders from the local British
commanders as soon as possible. The guerrillas were
also told that the British Military Administration, which
would take over from the Japanese forces, would help them
to take their rightful place in Malaya. After the radio
broadcast, Davis from Force 136 headquarters in Malaya
urged SEAC to recognize and treat the guerrilla forces
as part of the Allied forces. The SEAC conceded this
recognition of the guerilla forces 	 on	 4 September
1945.17
Before British troops landed in Malaya, the MPAJA
and other guerilla forces had already taken over control
of a vast section of Malaya. In some areas such as Alor
Star in Kedah, the Malays prevented the MPAJA or the
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Communists from taking control. In some areas, the MPAJA
carried out summary executions against policemen,
detectives, Kempetai informers, and others whom they
considered traitors or collaborators with the Japanese
Military Administration. As the Malays were not
particularly hostile to the Japanese occupation and the
Japanese had been using the police forces which mainly
consisted of Malays to suppress the Chinese resistance
movements, the MPAJA's actions caused racial riots in
many parts of the Malayan peninsula)8
British troops landed in Penang on 2 September
1945 and more troops were landed in Singapore on	 5
September. They found out that the MPAJA was in
facto control of the greater part of Malaya. A British
Military Administration was formed to govern Malaya
before the setting up of a future civilian government.
The Malayan Communist Party and the MPAJA
continued to cooperate with British troops and the
British Military Administration in Malaya. They let their
aims be known to the British authority. They were
as follows:
1. To support [the] United Nations of Russia,
China, Britain, Greece, America and the new
organisation for world security;
2. To establish a democratic Government in Malaya
with electorate drawn from all races of each
State and [the] anti-Japanese army;
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3. To abolish Fascism and Japanese political
structural laws in Malaya;
4. To enforce free speech, publications and
societies, and obtain legal status for [the]
anti-Japanese army;
5. To reform [the] educational system and
improvement of social conditions of the
people;
6. To improve living conditions,development of
industry, commerce and agriculture, provide
relief for unemployed and the poor, increase
wages to standard minimum and establish eight-
hour working day;
7. To punish traitors, corrupt officials,
hoarding and profiteers and stabilisation of
prices;
and
8. To ensure good treatment for members of anti-
Japanese army and provide compensation for
families of those who died for the Allied
cause. 19
The British directives on Chinese policy, the
creation of Malayan Union Citizenship, and the Malayan
Union scheme in general, were compatible with the aims
and aspirations of the MCP and MPAJA. Under the "Malaya,
Long Term Policy Directives- Chinese Policy" the MCP and
the KMT and other illegal organisations were recognized
as legal or lawful associations, unless the governor of
the proposed Malayan Union declared them illegal.
The BMA also carried out the Chinese policy by
granting freedom of speech
	 and publication to the
Malayan people. The prewar Registration of Societies
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Ordinance was not reimposed. Cheah Boon Kheng has the
impression that this policy was the result of the
favourable attitude of Mountbatten towards the Chinese
and the MCP. 20
 However, as the present writer has
indicated elsewhere, this policy was deliberately
formulated by the inter-departmental Committee of the
Colonial Office, the Foreign Office and the Malayan
Planning Unit of War Office in London. The BMA carried
out the Chinese policy as directed by H.M.G. as it found
out the conditions were favourable. It was possible that,
with this policy, the British could induce the MCP not to
seize power immediately after the war or during the BMA
period in Malaya. 21
 Elsewhere, in Indo-China, for
example, Communists had moved to seize power by force at
the end of the war.
The MCP carried out a moderate policy and let
the opportunity of seizing power slip away. Not only
that, they continued to cooperate with the BMP, td
disband the. MPAJA and surrender some of their weapons.
This cooperation was possible as the British adopted a
liberal policy towards the MCP and other Chinese
political movements.
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Part II
British Policy Towards the Chinese Community During
the British Military Administration,
September 1945-March 1946.
During the British Military Administration,
Colonel Victor Purcell became the Principal Chinese
Adviser to Ralph Hone, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
He was responsible for the implementation of the
policy directives on Chinese affairs. Among Bri€ish
official circles, he was known as the most pro-Chinese
officer and the most outspoken critic of British "pro-
Malay policy." As the principal Chinese adviser, he
adopted a more liberal policy towards the Chinese
community in line with the Colonial Office's "Long
Term Policy Directives: Chinese Policy." According to
Ralph Hone, "freedom of speech, press and association was
allowed in full degree and very generous treatment wath
accorded to the members of the Chinese Resistance
Forces. ,,22
In line with this liberal policy, the Secretary
of Chinese Affairs, did not continue his pre-war role
of controlling the Chinese press. The pre-war Societies
Ordinance was not re-imposed, and societies or
associations were not required to be registered. Other
enactments or ordinances which were used in the past to
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control Chinese political activies were retained, but
not put into practice. The British adopted this policy
in consideration of such factors as follows:
(a) The recognition extended by the Governor,
shortly before the fall of Singapore, to the
existence of Chinese parties, included the
Kuomintang and the Malayan Communist Party,
which were not registered according to law.
(b) The achievements of the Resistance Forces
during the period of the Japanese occupation,
and the agreement made by the Supreme Allied
Commander with the Anti-Japanese Army which
was under the control of the Communist Anti-
Japanese Union.
(c) The intention of the Colonial Office to amend
the Societies law to provide that a society
was legal until declared otherwise by the
Governor-in-Council 23
As a consequence of this liberal British policy
and	 developments during the
	 war, the pattern of
Chinese politics changed.The division between the
politics of the Straits Chinese, or moderates, and the
Kuomintang and the MCP or radical groups was obscured.
The most noticeable features of the Chinese political
scene during the BMA period were the almost complete
absence of the Straits Chinese as a political body, the
decline of the Kuomintang , and the emergence of the MCP
as the major force in the Chinese community.
The politics of the Straits Chinese, as a group,
were moribund during the BMA period. This community had
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been in decline. As a result of extortion by the Japanese
Military Administration, the Straits Chinese financial
position had been crippled. Furthermore the professional
class of this community, such as lawyers and teachers
lost their sources of income as a consequence of Japanese
occupation. Victor Purcell, who left Singapore via
Malacca for Kuala Lumpur, on 10 October 1945 noted that
'. .when I [V. Purcell] talked with them [the Babas] I
found their minds still obsessed with bitterness of the
Japanese Terror. ,,24 According to Purcell, "a good deal of
their wealth, I believe, has passed to an a1ien Chinese
element attracted to Malacca by the gambling farms and
the lures of the Black Market." 25 As a consequence of the
Japanese occupation, the Straits Chinese no longer had
strong feelings that they were a distinct Chinese group.
During the "Double Tenth" celebration, Victor Purcell
noted that there was "a great procession in which Babas,
Kuomintang members, and [the Communist dominated] A.J.U.
became for a moment, simply Chinese."26
They were without political leadership. As the
writer has mentioned, some of the most prominent leaders
of this community such as Dr. Lim Boon Keng and Heah Joo
Seng carried out an appeasement policy towards the
Japanese Military Administration, and became the most
important figures in the Overseas Chinese Association.
They were labelled as collaboraters. Others, like Lim
Cheng Yan, who had
	 served as a judge, or who had
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taken posts in the Japanese Military Administration faced
the same consequences. After the Japanese were defeated
in the war, the OCAs collapsed and their leaders and
others who served in the Japanese Military Admistration
went on the run to avoid the wrath of the Anti-Japanese
resistance movements. Some of the Straits Chinese leaders
who took refuge in India, such as Tan Cheng Lock, still
had not returned to Malaya. Others, such as Lay Lian
Teck, the president of the Singapore SCBA had died, and
some had been rounded up and executed by the Japanese.
Under these circumstances, the social and political
organisation of the Straits Chinese became dormant. The
Straits Chinese also were without their own press to
voice their views. On top of this, the SMA was not in
favour of the Straits Chinese serving as Chinese
representives in the advisory councils, as in the pre-War
period. During the EMA the Straits Chinese were almost
totally isolated. Their former leaders only made •a
comeback to the Malayan political scene after the
establishment of civilian government.
During the war, the Kuomintaq as a body was
almost defunct. The members went into hiding from the
Japanese forces. Many of their leaders and supporters
were rounded up and executed by the Japanese. Some, like
the Straits Chinese leaders, were forced to cooperate
with the Japanese Military Administration. As a
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consequence they lost their high social status and
political influence among the Chinese community.
During the BMA the Kuomintang and its youth wing, the San
Mm Chu II Youth Corps, were recognised and had
representatives on the Advisory Council of Singapore.
After the Chinese Consul General arrived in Singapore,
the Kuomintang carried out small political activities
such as staging some memorial ceremonies for the victims
of the Japanese. The Chinese Chambers of Commerce were
still associated with theKuomintang and some of their
leaders were also leaders of the Kuomintang .	 The
orientation of the Kuomintang was still towards the
motherland. However, R. N. Broome noted that the
Kuomintang did not pose any threat to the British
position in Malaya. 27
 According to him "... the danger
which led to our opposing the K.M.T. in the past has
largely disappeared, and I myself see little chance of a
Chinese Imperialist party gaining ascendancy in Malaya,
at least for a long time." 28
 He added that, there "may
well be imperialist designs on Malaya from China itself,
though I can see no danger.. . there until China settles
her own internal troubles, which looks like being a long
business." 29 One of the activities which connected Malaya
to China, was a fund raising campaign for the
reconstruction of the motherland after the war. However,
according to Stephen Leong, the response from the
Overseas Chinese was not comparable to the contribution
collected during the national salvation period of 1937-
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1941. Some of the Kuomintang leaders were moderate,
and cooperated with the BMA on certain occasions. When
the GLtJ launched a general strike on 29 January 1946
some of the Kuomintang and Chinese Chambers of Commerce
supported the government and declared that there was "no
sympathy for the strike amongst business men and that
shopkeepers would open their shops if they could be
given protection." Consequently the GLIJ and the Communist
activists called off the strike.31
The MCP emerged as a real force when Japanese
rule came to an end in August 1945. It controlled the
guerrillas of the MPAJA and the MPAIJIJ which was later
replaced by the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL)
According to R. N. Brootne, the leaders and members of
these Communist organizations were young men, most of
them under twenty. 32 The MCP adopted a policy of
cooperation with the British government at this stage as
the res-ul.t of the agreement signed in January 1944
between the MCP's representatives and Force 136 officers.
The MCP and its youth wing, the NDYL, were recognized by
the BMA and both had representatives on the Advisory
Council of Singapore. Among them was Wu Tian Wang, the
Singapore MCP official.
Under the liberal British policy, the MCP was
able to carry out their political activities unchecked
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by that authority or the Malayan police. During the
post-war period, towards early 1946, the MCP was more
concerned with the reorganisation of the party and
continued to cooperate with the BMA. The MCP played an
important role in the disbanding of the MPAJA's
guerillas and avoided an armed clash with the BMA. The
MOP apparently adopted a moderate policy or approach to
achieve its political ends during the BMA. One of the
obvious reasons for this was that the MCP was under
moderate leadership. The Secretary-General himself, Loi
Tek, was a British secret agent. He asserted a great
influence on the MCP's Central Executive Committe and was
hailed as saviour and preserver of the MOP. 33 He was one
of the MOP leaders who negotiated and signed the
agreement of cooperation between the MCP-SEAC in January
1944. During that time, he was called Itchang Hung.0
British Intelligence only realized he was Loi Tek at the
end of December 1945. Loi Tek commanded great influence
in the MCP. Some of the MCP's members knew Loi Tek was a
traitor and the Kempetai's agent during the Japanese
occupation. However, their attempts to expose the real
identity of Loi Tek in September failed, as the Central
Executive Committee of the MOP considered the allegation
incredible. During the end of 1945 Loi Tek continued to
play a role as the supreme leader of the MOP.34
Loi Tek's influence within the MCP was obvious
when the MCP decided to cooperate with Force 136 to
148
disband the MPAJA in December 1945. According to Cheah
Boon Kheng, Loi Tek was in favour of the proposed
disbandment of the MPAJA guerrillas but the rest of the
members of the Standing Executive Committee strongly
opposed it. 35
 After holding a long negotiation with the
General Officer Commanding(GOC), Malaya Command, the
MPAJA leaders presented '... eight points on which
they required assurances, before they were prepared to be
demobilized, and among these points were the question of
freedom of association and the operation of the pre-war
Societies Ordinance." 36 To reciprocate, the GOC under
SAC's authority, mentioned the substance of paragraph
one, two, three, and seven of the llMalaya, Long Term
Policy Directives-- Chinese Policy." It should be
noted that the present writer has discussed about this in
fairly precise detail elsewhere. The decision was taken
based on a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies on 9 December1944. 37
 The Secretary of State told
the War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo that
"...the organisation in question [Force 136] has had to
be given certain guidance on the subject [British future
plans] for the use of its agents." 38 Its was authorised
to communicate these to the MPAJA. Therefore, according
to Ralph Hone, the undertaking given to the MPAJA was
made without any further reference to London.39
The MCP cooperated with Force 136 by disbanding
the MPAJA in December 1945. However, it was discovered
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that it had not cooperated fully with the British. The
MCP had hidden some of its weapons. While the MPAJA was
dissolved, ex-MPAJA comrades formed the Federation of
Anti-Japanese Army Ex-Servicemen's Associations, with
Kuala Lumpur as its headquarters. Various branches were
established in Negeri Sembilan, Johore, Perak and other
states. The Associations' aims were to cultivate ties of
friendship among the ex-guerrillas and to help members
in various fields. This organisation sponsored a
newspaper, the Charn Yew Pau (Combatant's Friend) which
was	 pro-Communist,	 anti-Kuomintang	 and	 anti-
imperialist. 40 This organisation provided a well
organized military arm for the MCP during the Communist
revolt in 1948.
The MCP used the opportunity provided by liberal
British policy to spread its influence into every
section of the population in Malaya. It formed or led
various associations, social, cultural, political, and
trade unions. On 25 September 1945, the Selangor State
Committee of the MCP, the MPAJU, and the MPAJA organized
a Selangor State Congress of the People's
Representatives. They invited all racial communities to
send delegates but only the Chinese responded with
enthusiasm. The Congress proposed the formation of the
Selangor People's State Committee as "... a public body
to express public views represented by peoples of all
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nationalities •	 An Executive Committee was formed,
consisting of ninety-one members. 	 Forty five of them
became members of the Working Committee. The Selangor
Congress passed twenty-three resolutions which demanded
that the BMA should: (1) put into effect the Atlantic
Charter with regard to self government and democracy, (2)
support the programme of the Malayan Communist Party, (3)
realize self-government.. .and (4) guarantee absolute
freedom of speech, press and publication.42
The MCP carried out political activity by
participating in the advisory councils which were set up
through out the country by the BMA. The BM gave equal
treatment to the MCP and its youth wing, along with the
Kuomintang and its youth wing, to avoid the appearance of
taking sides with any party. Both the MCP and its youth
wing had two representatives. As the MCP also controlled,
directly or indirectly, the General Labour Union and the
Malay Nationalist Party, which had their representatives
in the Advisory Councils, the Communists dominated the
councils. The Singapore Advisory Council convened a
first meeting on the 14 November 1945. As the Communist
or radical groups were overwhelmingly represented in the
Advisory Council, V. Purcell considered it "marked an
epoch in the history of Singapore." 43
 He also noted that
the Communist representatives took part during discussion
on almost every topic such as on supply, trade and
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industry and industry and social problems. 44 Wu Tian
Wang, a Communist representative, was very critical of
the status of the Council, which was not a
democratically-elected legislative council, as the MCP
were demanding.45
Towards the end of 1945, the MCP carried out
political activities to influence the English educated
professional class and the masses. A moderate political
organisation. the Malayan Democratic Union, was formed in
December 1945. According to Gerald de Cruz, one of the
founding members of the MDU, "the idea of the MDU was
conceived by Lim Hong Bee and the MCP during the Japanese
occupation." 46
 Lim Hong Bee contacted Philip Hoa Lim, Lim
Kean Chye and DeCruz to organize the MDU. Later John Eber
was recruited to become one of the Executive Members.
According to Yeo Kim Wah, the announcement of the
Malayan Union scheme in October 1945, encouraged their
leaders to form this organisation in the hope that a new
democratic order would soon be introduced into Malaya.47
However, de Cruz has denied the Malayan Union Scheme
played any role in the formation of the MDU. 48 The
political manifesto of the MDIJ was: self-government for
Malaya within the British Commonwealth of Nations, a
legislative Assembly for Malaya composed of freely
elected representatives, votes for all Malayan citizens
above the age of 21 years irrespective of race, sex,
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religion, or property; complete freedom of person,
speech and meeting; educational reform including free
elementary, secondary, and technical education for all, a
social security scheme including free medical services
throughout Malaya; improved standard of life for all, and
complete equality in the employment of Malayans and
removal of colour restrictions.49
The MCP also made an attempt to influence the
Malay community by sponsoring a radical Malay Nationalist
Party . An inaugural congress was held in Ipoh between
the late December 1945 and early January 1946 to form
this party. According to Victor Purcell, many "shades of
Malay opinion were represented, 1,50 including Raja
Kamaraizaman Setia t3saha Sultan Perak and Tengku Mahmud
Mahayuddin (Pegawai Perkera Pereman of Kelantan)
According to Victor Purcell, the main points stressed by
speakers at the congress were: the necessity of mutual
respect between the Malay Nationalist Party and the
Sultans, the continuing idea that Malaya belongs to the
Malays but that a greater racial front incorporating
other races should be created, the Malay struggle
for the basic rights of the people and the realisation
of their national independence, and the friendship
between the Malays and Chinese which	 should	 be
strengthened as the Chinese occupied a very
important position in the commercial and industrial
fields 51
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The Malay Nationalist Party was formed with
Mokhtaruddin Lasso as its first president. 52 According
to Purcell, the MCP "was taking a leading hand in the
formation of the M.N.P." 53 Chen Tien Hua, the Head of
the Perak Peoples' Association attended the congress.
Other leftist leaders, including Miss Lee Kiu, were also
invited to the congress. This close cooperation between
the MNP and the MCP was opposed by some of the branches
of the MNP, such as the Klang branch. 54 Under the MCP's
policy of cooperation with the British, it avoided
direct confrontation with the BMA. It let the NDYL,
trade unions and other	 organizations	 challenge the
Government. The major clash between the Communist-
dominated organizations and the British happened on 15
February 1946. The Communists decided to call a strike,
and celebrate the anniversary of the defeat of the
British and the loss of Singapore.
The main reasons for the MCP's strike seem to
have arisen from two factors. The first involved the long
term accumulation of discontent and dissatisfaction of
the the MCP members concerning hardships caused by
shortages of foodstuffs, gross inflation and low
wages. 55
 The second was the immediate cause of the
strike. Apparently the MCP decided to make use of the
anniversary of the British capitulation of Singapore to
the Japanese, namely 15 February as the date to register
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their protest against the BMA. It also seemed the
intention of the Communists was to hold mass meetings
and processions for Itselfhumiliationul, with the intent
to bring the British into disrepute.
The BMA decided to ban the celebration and the
strikes. A statement from the Chief of the SEAC was
issued. It declared that:
Since it was established in Malaya more
than five months ago, the British
Military Administration has not only
allowed but encouraged full freedom of
speech and the Press.. . .however I the
BMAI has no intention of allowing
advantage to be taken of this, nor that
civil disturbances should be fomented,
hatred of the Administration aroused, or
the just process of the law impeded in
anyway.56
The EMA gave a warning that it intended to use
its full power to suppress actions of that kind from
whatever quarter they might come. However, the MCP and
the trade unions, undeterred by the warning, continued to
make preparations for a stoppage of work and the holding
of a procession. Police took action to disperse a
procession in Singapore on 15 February. They were
attacked by the crowd and were forced to open fire; two
people were killed. 57 In Labis, Johore, police were also
attacked by the crowd and forced to open fire; fifteen
people were killed. The clash with the police continued
when a demonstration was held at Mersing 	 to express
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sympathy with the victims of the Labis incident. The
Police also took action by arresting ten Chinese
agitators who were ordered to be deported to China under
the Banishment Ordinance. However, this order was not
carried out during the EMA.
The BMA-MCP relationship seemed to deteriorate
rapidly when the Military Administration approached its
end. The liberal BMA policy towards the MCP was
replaced by more repressive measures to control Communist
militancy. The Malayan Police had begun to press the
British government and the BMA for more power to
suppress or control Communist political activity after
the general strike.
R. Onraet, the police adviser to the EMA urged
the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State for the
Colonies to change the liberal policy. First, he opposed
the proposed policy which would allow "societies and
counter societies to exist without registration."58
According to Onraet, there were grave dangers in the
growth of all such societies ". . . as their growth can
only be checked after the society proves itself to have
dangerous or unlawful objects." 59 Second, he opposed
the Banishment Enactment, which was retained in theory,
but was not being put into practice. Onraet commented
adversely on the appointment of the MCP or other
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extremist organizations' representatives on the Advisory
Councils. He also opposed the freedom of the press;
according to him, the Chinese press "is more afraid of
the extremists than it is of the government. . ." and as a
result the Chinese press had became "the mouth-piece of
the extremist. "°
The Colonial Office defended its Chinese policy
as being a result of the British-Chinese resistance
forces cooperation during the Japanese occupation. It
seemed that the British government had made a promise to
give political concessions as a reward for the MCP
cooperation in fighting against the Japanese forces. R.
Onraet, who later resigned and returned to London,
criticized the government's action. He said, it "was
perhaps of military advantage to back the [Communists]
Guerrillas, but need... [sic] we make them promises for
the future?." 62
 He added, and "if we did should we not
analyse the spirit of the promise-maker and the twisted
interpretatIon made of it by the elements to whom the
promise was made?" 63
 He accused Victor Purcell "of
giving wrong advice" on a new policy which "favoured the
return in strength of old subversive forces that had once
caused bloodshed in Malaya."64
As a consequence of the conflict between the
Chinese radical movements and the EMA, the British began
to distrust and become disillusioned with the Chinese
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community in general. However, British policy changed
gradually until the civilian government replaced the EMA.
The British government faced strong opposition to the
Malayan Union policy, along with a lack of interest among
the Chinese community towards the scheme, so the British
abandoned their Chinese policy and the Union scheme and
started to become more pro-Malay.
After the establishment of the Malayan Union, the
British government began to ignore the radical groups in
their planning for future constitutional development in
Malaya. The MCP also had begun to dissociate themselves
by not taking part in the government bodies as the SMA
came to an end.
Part III
Malayan Union Policy and the Chinese Reaction
On 10 October 1945 G. H. Hall, who replaced
Oliver Stanley as the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, mentioned the Malayan Union scheme in a brief
announcement in the House of Commons. On the following
day, Sir Harold MacMichael as a Special Representative of
His Majesty's Government, arrived in Malaya to conclude
a new treaty with every ruler, or Malay Sultan, in the
Malay States. Under the new treaty each Sultan would
158
cede full jurisdiction to H.M.G. A few days after he
arrived, Harold MacMichael visited them to explain the
new constitution and to secure their agreement to this.
His mission was completed on 25 December 1945, and he
returned to Britain a few days later.
After the acquisition of full sovereignty by • the
Crown, the Colonial Office issued the first White Paper
on 22 January 1946 which described in more detail the
Malayan Union scheme. On the same day the Straits
Settlements (Repeal) Bill was introduced in Parliament to
pass the legislation necessary for the new constitutional
proposal. On 30 March, the British government announced
that the implementation of the Malayan Union citizenship
had been delayed, but proceded to promulgate the other
constitutional proposals. On 1 April Gent was installed
as a Governor of the Malayan Union and a civil government
replaced the BMA. As planned, Singapore formed a separate
entity with its own Governor. Thus Malaya came under
direct control of the Secretary of State for the
Colonies. As the Crown had direct jurisdiction under the
Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, the Crown could
legislate by the means of Orders in Council. The first
legislation was to give legal protection to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies, members of the Colonial
Office, the War Office and the staff of the Crown Agents,
f or their actions when they used the various trust funds
belonging to various Malay States and the
	 other
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governmental and non-governmental bodies. 65 As the
present writer has indicated elsewhere this action solved
the problem of the London funds of the Malay sultans.
After the solution of the Malayan fund problem
Gent appparently was more flexible on Chinese policy and
the constitutional arrangements for Malaya. After just
one month, Gent decided to modify the Union policy and
planned a federal policy which reflected almost a revival
of the so-called pro-Malay policy of prewar years.
According to Cheah Boon Kheng , one of the considerations
which led to this development was British disillusionment
with the MCP during the BM and "the less than total
enthusiasm of the Chinese for the Malayan Union
policy." 66 After the announcement of the Malayan Union
in London on 22 January 1946, the Chinese did not come
forward to support the scheme, as had been expected by
the government. Not a single Chinese newspaper published
the whole text of the White Paper. 67 The Chinese press
did not comment on the Malayan Union proposal until 31
January 1946. According to the SEAC Director of
Intelligence reports, the initial Chinese attitude was,
"completely apathetic." 68 The Chinese were more
preoccupied with economic problems and civil disturbances
during that time. To the majority of the Chinese the new
constitutional proposals "meant little or nothing to
them, except where they affect their own personal
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affairs." 69 Among the politically conscious Chinese,
opinions were divided. The Kuomintang and China-born
Chinese remained generally unenthusiastic about the White
Paper. 70 Their political loyalty was still to China. To
them acceptance of Malayan Union citizenship raised a
problem of nationality status as they were Chinese
nationals. According to Chung Hwa, the Chinese
newspaper, ".. . If we [the Chinese] want to have rights of
citizenship in Malaya, we must either openly declare or
quietly consent that we are separated from our mother
country." 71 It seemed ridiculous for the Chinese to
accept Malayan Union citizenship if they needed to
renounce their Chinese nationality. Some of the Chinese
newspapers such as the Modern Daily, also opposed the
retention of the Malay Sultans as "traditional and
spiritual leaders under the Union." 72 The Chung Hwa also
commented that the Sultans of the Malay States only
represented their own individual interests. This
newspaper added that the future of democracy would be
greatly affected by the retention of the Malay Sultans.
The Sin Mm Chu on 24 January 1946 strongly criticized
the Union scheme as it far from enchanced the political
status of the Malayan people: it only "consolidated
Britain's hold on Malaya and Singapore." 73 However, the
Hua Ch'iao welcomed the citizenship proposals.74
The proposed Malayan Union scheme almost
fulfilled the demands and aspirations of the Straits
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Chinese or moderate Chinese groups. However, leaders like
Lim Cheng Yan, Heah Joo Seng and Tan Cheng Lock did not
come forward to fully support this policy. As the writer
has mentioned, the Straits Chinese leaders seemed to
have gone into hiding, or were not in Malaya during that
time. This was the most obvious reason for Chinese lack
of support for the Union policy.
The Straits Chinese came to defend the Union
policy a bit too late. On 2 April 1946, Tan Cheng Lock
wholeheartedly welcomed the Malaya Union policy. He said
that the Chinese, . .who intend to settle permanently in
this country welcome the opportunity to acquire the
rights of citizenship, so that they may completely
identify themselves with Malaya and be loyal and
faithful to the land of their adoption, to which they are
prepared to give their undivided allegiance." 75
 He
really hoped that HMG ". . . being convinced of the
rightness and justice of its Malayan policy [and] will
not beat a retreat in the teeth of the opposition of the
old-fashioned and ultra conservative diehards, who desire
to sabotage the Union plan." 76 However, Gent, in his
reply to Tan Cheng Lock mentioned that a change in the
Union policy was desirable.77
The MCP and radical movements felt there was lack
of progressive proposals. Instead of giving self-
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government to the Malayan people, Malaya was being
reduced to being a Crown colony. To support the Union
meant supporting the revival of British imperialism. The
Communists also opposed the separation of Singapore from
mainland Malaya, and the citizenship proposals, which
did not, according to them correspond with legitimate
rights. 78 The MCP demanded the adoption of "Democratic
Principles" for the establishment of a Pan-Malaya
Unified Self-Government, with Singapore as the centre of
control administratively and commercially, the
formulation of a democratic constitution, the conferring
of citizenship rights to all domiciled persons above
eighteen years of age, and the granting of equal rights
to vote, equality in administration, and equal
opportunity to participate in social and economic
reconstruction.
The MDtJ which was sponsored by the MCP,
considered the White Paper a "progressive document."8°
But this body also demanded self-government within the
Commonwealth, a freely-elected legislative assembly,
voting rights for all Malayan citizens above twenty-one
years of age, and complete equality in the employment of
Malayans. 81
 The MDtJ adopted a moderate line towards the
Malayan Union scheme, as this organization consisted
mainly of English educated and professional classes.
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While Chinese reactions were divided, the
majority of Malays were united in opposition to the
scheme. To them, as J. Allen put it, the Malayan Union
scheme was "an earthquake." 82
 The Malays who faced an
uncertain future during the MCP-BMA period cooperation
felt even more vulnerable with the introduction of the
Malayan Union policy. Their fears focussed on two issues:
the transfer of full power and jurisdiction to the Crown
and the creation of Malayan Union citizenship which
offered equal status to Chinese and other non-Malays.
After the announcement of the White Paper, the Malay
press strongly criticized the Malayan Union scheme. The
tJtusan Melavu, on 24 January described the White Paper as
"a blow for the Malay Rulers and their subjects."83
According to this newspaper, the Rulers had descended
from the throne to the pulpit. Another newspaper, the
Mallis bitterly commented on the citizenship proposal
which seriously compromised the rights of the Malays and
reduced their status, more or less to "...the Red Indians
in North America and the aborigines in Australia."84
The Seruan Ra'ayat, on 25 January described the
citizenship proposals as "an act of injustice to the
Malays, the native inhabitants of Malaya." 85 In response
to the Malayan Union scheme, the Malays revived such pre-
war states associations as Persatuan. Melayu Johore and
Persatuan Melayu Selangor. On 3 January 1946 ]Jato Onn
Jaafar formed the Per gerakan Melayu Seman-jung Johore with
the aim of uniting the Malays, and defending their
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rights and privileges through cooperation with the
Government and among the Malays themselves. 86
 At first
the Malays also criticized their own Rulers, for example
in Johore, where the Sultan voluntarily signed the
MacMicheal Agreement. However, the Sultans and their
subjects closed ranks at a later period to protest
against the British government. The Kedah ruler
revealed that he was forced to sign the agreement by
Harold MacMichael. Thus the validity of the Agreement
could be disputed or was in doubt, at least.
The Malays' opposition to the Union was later co-
ordinated in the Pan-Malayan Congress on 1 March 1946.
The Congress later formed the United Malay National
Organization with Dato Onn Jaafar as the President.
Almost all the Malay associations came under TJMNO,
except the Malay Nationalist Party which supported the
union government.
The British ex-Malayan Civil Services Officials
Opposition to the Union Policy
The Malayan Union policy was not only opposed by
the Malays but by their supporters in London as well.
They were former British officials who had served in
Malaya. Some of them were known as the 'Old Stagers' who
were biased towards the Malays. After the announcement of
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the Union policy, they turned up to fight for the Malay
cause, and, indirectly, for British interests in the Far
East. Among them were Richard Winstedt, Frank Swettenham,
George Maxwell and Sir Cecil Clementi. On 13 and 14
February 1946 Maxwell criticized the White Paper and the
planners who, in his view, had little knowledge of Malaya
and its people. 87 He also criticized the planners for
ignoring the treaties and other obligations that the
British government had to the Malay Rulers and their
subjects. His criticism focussed the attack mainly on
the citizenship proposals and the Union.
Sir R. Winstedt was violently opposed to the
Union policy, after the scheme was announced by the
Secretary of State in October 1945.88 In his article
which was published in The Straits Times on 15 November
1945, he attacked both the policy and the means of
bringing it into effect. He regarded the method used as
brutal and dictatorial and said that the policy meant
"the extinction of the Malay in political life." 89 He
believed that Chinese would swamp the Malay. Sir Cecil
Clementi, whom the Chinese found to be the most
unsympathetic Governor, adopted a similiar view. He was
very concerned for the Malays. He feared that any
admission of Chinese and Indians to political rights in
Malaya would destroy British-Malay friendship and drive
the Malays into violent opposition which would probably
link with the uprisings in Indonesia.90
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In response to the initial opposition to the
Union policy, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
decided to call a meeting with former British officials,
and others who were concerned with the affairs of
Malaya. The Colonial Office noted that the opposition to
the scheme was flawed. 91
 Some of the ex-MCS did not
offer any alternatives to the Union policy, other than a
return to the old system.
	 "This", according to
Bourdillon, "amounts
	 to standing still." 92
	He added
"events will not [stand still] ." He proposed that the
Secretary of State defend the Union policy by pointing
out that "the claims of Chinese and Indians, support[ed]
by the Chinese Nationalist government and the Indian
nationalists, will become increasingly strong and
increasingly impossible to resist." 93
 On the other hand
he said, "the Malay will become increasingly dependent on
the continuence of British protection." He added, this
"position would inevitably lead to an upheaval, and in
the upheaval it would be the Malays who would go
under.
A meeting was held at the Colonial Office on 26
February 1946, and Creech Jones acted as chairman. It
was attended by Sir George Gater, and colonial officials
including Gent, Paskin and Lloyd. Among the ex-MCS who
were present were F. Swettenham, Cecil Clementi and R.
Winstedt, others included A. S. Haynes, E. Hake and also,
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Capt. L. Gammans, a Labour M.P. According to Creech
Jones, the Malayan Union policy was one to commend
itself to the people of Malaya ; it satisfied the
aspirations of all involved and won the favourable
comment of world opinion. 95 He said that modifications to
the Union policy were being made and he wanted to find
out the feelings	 of people interested in Malayan
affairs.
Many of the ex-MCS were not to be swayed, and
were critical of the Citizenship schemes and the transfer
of the jurisdiction of the Malay Rulers to the Crown.
Their attitude towards the Chinese in Malaya was
hostile. Cecil Clementi said that the Chinese-born were a
menace, hostile to the Malays and not good citizens. 96 He
also distrusted the Kuomintang , which in his opinion had
the intention of ousting the Europeans in Asia. Capt.
Gammans shared the same views. He said citizenship was
"far too easy" and "there were no safeguards for the
Malay Rulers." 97 He added that "the White Paper will
hand over Malaya to China."98
Faced with opposition to the Union, the Colonial
Office delayed implementing the Malayan Union citizenship
scheme. However, as has been mentioned, the Malayan Union
was established by the British government on 1 April
1946. The Malay Rulers and the followers of UMNO
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boycotted the installation of the Governor and the
Governor General for British Southeast Asia.
As anti-Malayan Union agitation became intense
and widespread, Gent changed his mind and urged the
Secretary of State to modify the Union policy. In his
letter on 4 May Gent pointed out that the value of the
policy depended on the cooperation with the Malays and
urged HMG to be prepared to accept federal proposals.99
His recommendation was based on his discussion with the
Malayan Security Services which considered that the "very
serious likelihood of organised and widespread non-
cooperation and disorder on the part of the Malay people"
would assist the Malayan Communist Party and Indonesian
political organizations)- 00
 The Acting Director of the
Malayan Security Service, in his report for the month of
April, warned that the passive resistance of the Malays
would turn into violence and bloodshed if their demands
were ignored. The MNP had already urged the Malays. .to
denounce the policy of moderation advocated by Dato Onn
and the Sultans and to join the Pan-Indonesian campaign
to oust the British. Gent also pointed out that the MCP
would take any opportunity to disturb the peace to
forward its aim of overthrowing the British Malayan
government 101
It seems that the British government not only
feared a direct threat from Dato Onn and his Malay
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followers and the ex-MCS "but there was also the
indirect threat of what might happen if these leaders
lost the battle they were fighting along purely
constitutional lines which [would] decide the final
issue." 102
 The Malays might turn to Indonesia for
leadership. The British would not be able to win the
support of the Chinese who had shown a lack of interest
in the Union policy, and the MCP had already begun to
confront the British. It seemed there was only one
choice for the British and that was to win over the
moderate Malays and revive the so-called pro-Malay policy
of the pre- war period. According to MacDonald, the
Governor-General of British Southeast Asia, Britain
needed to reach an agreement with the Malays in order to
maintain their leadership in the Far East. 103
 In his
view, if the Britain failed to reach an agreement:
• we shall begin to lose acceptance of
our leadership by local peoples, and a
protess of our being at each stage
[a] bit behind local political opinions
(such as has been so unfortunate in the
history of the Indian problem) will
start. We must, of course, keep in
mind that there are powerful political
groupings in Asia which are ready to
exploit any weakening of our position
i. e. Indian nationalists and
Imperialism, Chinese Imperialism and
especially Pan Malayan Movement led by
Indonesians 104
On 2 June, Gent and MacDonald began to hold an
informal meeting with the Malay Sultans to discuss new
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constitutional proposals for Malaya. They also held
discussions with Dato Onn on 19 June 1946. An Anglo-
Malay Working Committee was formed on 25 July, consisting
of representatives of the British government, of the
Malay Rulers, and of TJMNO, to negotiate and formulate a
new constitutional proposal.
The Working Committee adopted the following
principles as the basis of its discussion:
(a) that there should be a strong central
government to ensure the economical and
effective administration of all matters of
importance to the welfare and progress of the
country as a whole;
(b) that the individuality of each of the Malay
States and of the Settlements should be
clearly expressed and maintained;
(c) that the new arrangements should, on a long
view, offer the means and prospects of
development in the direction of ultimate self-
government;
(d) that, with a view to the establishment of
broad-based institutions necessary for
principle Cc) to become effective, a common
form of citizenship should be introduced which
would enable political rights to be extended
to all those who regard Malaya as their real
home and as the object of their loyalty;
(e) that, as these States are Malay States ruled
by Your Highnesses, the subjects of Your
Highnesses have no alternative allegiance, or
other country which they can regard as their
homeland, and they occupy a special position
and possess rights which must be
safeguarded.105
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The Constitutional negotiations between the
British and the Malays, formally began in the early
August and continued until November l946)06 The Working
Committee Reports, which contained the drafts of the
proposed Federation Agreements, received the conditional
approval of HMG on 11 December. It did not receive full
approval until it was examined by the Consultative
Committee, which was appointed by the Governor and
contained representatives of the non-Malays. However, the
final draft of the Federation Agreement, which in effect
became the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, was
mainly based on the original Report of the Working
Committee.
The British government conceded to Malay demands
by returning the internal sovereignty of the Malay
Sultans, and they recognized the special position of the
Malay and modified the unpopular Citizenship scheme. The
Malays in return agreed to British demands for a strong
central government and external sovereignty on external
affairs and defence.The new constitution adopted a new
name, the Federation of Malaya, with a High
Commissioner as the head of government.
With the introduction of the Federal policy came
a change in British	 policy	 towards the Chinese
community.	 The most important part of the previously
formulated, "Long Term Policy Directives-Chinese Policy. TI
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(the Malayan citizenship proposals) was not implemented.
However, Edward Gent implemented another part of the
policy regarding the proposals on the Societies
Ordinance. He did this by publishing a Bill on 27 July
1947 which gave an option for societies to register and
put themselves under the control of the Registrar of
Societies. Those Societies which chose not to register
would • not be under the control of the rn
 Registrar.
According to W. Blythe , despite strong opposition from
the Malayan Union Advisory Council and the Singapore
government, Gent was not prepared to abandon it) 07
 Thus
Gent maintained one of the commitments of the British
government to the MCP and Kuomintan g . This meant that
under the Federation policy the Chinese community would
be encouraged to return to foreign or China-based
politics, and maintain their status as aliens.
Conclusion
The postwar period, up until the establishment of
the civil government of the Malayan Union, marked the
beginning and end of British liberal policy towards the
Chinese community in Malaya. The EMA adopted a liberal
policy based on the Colonial Office's "Long Term Policy
Directives: Chinese Policy" and also the intentions of
creating of the Malayan Union citizenship. Under the
liberal policy, control over Chinese political activities
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was not imposed. The Registration of Societies Ordinance,
the Banishment Ordinance, and other means to curb Chinese
political activities in the pre-war period, were not put
into practice during the BMA. The Chinese Secretariat
relaxed their control on the Chinese press. In theory the
EMA allowed the fullest freedom of speech, publication
and association, in contrast to pre-war times. Based on
the "Long Term Policy Directives: Chinese Policy", the
Kuomintang and the MCP and other illegal organizations
were treated as legal. As a result, the power of the
Malayan police to check and control Chinese political
activities was restricted or curbed.
Apparently in response to this liberal British
policy, or for other reasons, the MCP continued to
cooperate with the BMA and adopted constitutional means
in their political struggle during this period. However,
BMA-Communist relations deteriorated rapidly in the
middle of February 1946, as a consequence of a general
strike launched by pro-Communist organizations. 15
February marked the beginning of a British distrust of
the MCP and the reintroduction of the pre-war measures to
curb radical political or labour movements. These events
also changed the attitude of Victor Purcell, the planner
and the Principal Adviser for Chinese Affairs towards
the MOP. He was convinced that no compromise could be
made with the MCP and suggested that the EMA adopt a
tough policy.108
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British liberal policy indirectly encouraged the
growth of the political activities of radical movements,
such the MCP, MDU and MNP and China oriented movements,
such as the Kuomintang. The Straits Chinese and other
moderate Chinese leaders failed to respond to the new
developments during the EMA. The Malayan Union proposals
which were announced during the BMA were favourable to
and would benefit, many of the Chinese. However, the
proposals had not aroused sufficient interest among the
Chinese. Some supported the principle of equality for
all citizens but were sceptical about choosing to become
Malayan Union Citizens as they were still proud of
maintaining their status as Chinese nationals. Others,
such as the MCP, regarded the Malayan Union policy as
promoting British imperialism in Malaya.
Unlike the Chinese, most Malays were united in
opposing the Malayan Union scheme. Under the leadership
of the Sultans, Dato Onn and UIvINO, the Malays pressed
the British government to return the sovereignty, and
their rights as sons of the soil to them. The former
British MCS also strongly supported the Malay and opposed
the Union policy. As the Malayan Union policy failed to
win support and cooperation from the Chinese and was
opposed by the Malays, Edward Gent submitted his
recommendations to modify the plan in May 1946. The
British decided to work closely with the moderate Malays
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under the Sultans and tJlvINO. The radical Chinese whose
aims were to overthrow the British government in Malaya
and other Chinese who were	 China-oriented, were not
consulted during the formulation of the new
constitution. The final result was a Federation scheme
which reflected almost a revival of the pro-Malay policy
of the pre-war period.
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CHAPTER V
Chinese Political Agitation against the Federal
Proposals and the Emergency, 1947-1948
The response of the Chinese community to the
Federal policy was predictably hostile. Apprehensive
about their political future, they began a vigorous
campaign and agitated against this policy. Consequently
the Malayan -Communist Party launched an armed revolt,
officially known as the "Emergency." A few months later
the Chinese and other non-Malays in Penang formed a
movement for the secession of Penang from the Federation
of Malaya. Faced with these unprecedented demands and
opposition, the British made another attempt for speeding
up the solution of the Chinese problem.
Part I
The Malayan Chinese Anti-Federation Agitation
In the first three months of civil Goverment in
Malaya, the Chinese community generally appeared to be
indifferent to the constitutional developments under the
Malayan Union scheme. The MCP continued to follow its
moderate line in the struggle against the colonial power.
According to the Malayan Security Services, Political
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Intelligence Journal(PIJ), the MCP's political activities
up to 30 April 1946 had been "confined to
reorganization, to the mobilisation of Civic Rights
associations and to protests against the enforcement of
the Sedition and Banishment Ordinance and in particular
against the conviction of Chu Kau, a Johore Anti-Japanese
Army leader sentenced to death for murder.' However, the
MCP also made an attempt to be reconciled to the
government by replacing convicted leaders, such as those
in Singapore, with new men of local birth. The MCP
actually expected to be recognised officially and given
representation. 2 The only gain it got from the
government was an invitation for several ex-members of
the anti-Japanese army, including Chin Ping and Lau Ma,
to attend the London Victory Parade in June. The British
government later awarded Chin Peng, the MCP leader, an
Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his distinguished
record with the Anti-Japanese Forces (AJF)
On 1 May 1946 the MCP and the Malayan General
Labour tJnion organized the Labour Day celebrations, which
were described by the as a "a failure to an extent
but a success in discipline." 3 The organisers made an
attempt to "make the best possible propaganda use of the
celebrations in order to regain the prestige which they
had lost after the repressive action been taken against
them during the last few months." 4	Some of their
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speeches and pamphlets criticized the British
imperialists, while others mentioned the fact that the
Labour government used the most fearful methods to
suppress the people, like those used by the Conservative
Party, and that the racial emancipation movement and the
proletarian revolution were inseparable. They also
mentioned maladministration of the BMA and the re-
imposition of the reactionary policy of colonial rule,
which had brought about the bankruptcy of the propertied
class and unemployment among the workers as well as
widespread f amine. 5 However, the MCP and GLtJ avoided
clashes with authorities and according to reports
"of real intimidation were, however, negligible, both
before the celebration and on the actual day."6
In the meantime the arrival of Chinese consular
officals in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang had
stimulated the Kuomintan q to revive activity and
recover its lost prestige and popularity among the
Chinese community. It ran a newspaper, the Mm Pao, and
also attempted to develop its youth wing, the San Mm Chu
I Youth Corps throughout the country. The Kuomintang and
Chinese consular officials seemed to carry out a policy
of cooperation with the local government but the
warned the government that "their motives must be viewed
with a certain amount of scepticism." 7 During the May
Day celebrations the Kuomintang and its youth wing and
Chinese Chamber of Commerce (under the leadership of Tan
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Kah Kee) were invited to participate, but decided not to
take part.
In April 1946 a branch of a new Chinese party,
the Chinese Democratic League, was opened in Singapore by
Hu Siu Yue. The CDL had its Headquarters in Hong Kong.
According to the importance of this new political
party in Malaya would lie in its appeal to the centre and
to the moderate wings of both the Malayan Communist
Party and the Kuomintang and in particular in its strong
antipathy towards extremists of the latter. 8 The general
policy of this party was "democracy and Unity for China,"
and "regarding Malaya, its policy {was] to consolidate
democratic unity in China to propagate democratic
development of the people of the Southern Regions and to
fight for the early realisation of democratic policies."9
Hu Yit Tse, the leader of the CDL in Singapore,
mentioned that there would be "no interference with
Malayan po1itics." However, PIJ suspected the real
intention of this organization in Malaya. According to
the PIJ in "actual fact the C.D.L. will almost
certainly align itself with the M.D.U. and the M.C.P.
against the so-called 'Fascist Remnants' among the
British and K.M.T." 11
 Up to 15 May 1946, the CDL had set
up 3 branches in Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur.
According to the
	 the CDL in Malaya would, "probably
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receive the backing of Tan Kah Kee and perhaps of Au Boon
How, and other business magnets." 12
 One of the
organisers in Singapore was Li Tiet Mm, who was a
secretary to Tan Kah Kee. The Penang sub-branch of the
CDL was also formed after a visit coinciding with that
of Tan Kah Kee.
Towards June 1946, the colonial government was
under strong pressure to change its Malayan Union policy.
The British government began to hold discussions with the
Malay Sultans and the representatives of tJT vlNO regarding
constitutional matters. The Malayan public was kept in
the dark, as the discussion was held in the utmost
secrecy. However, the Chinese envisaged that there would
be no changes in the Malayan Union policy and came out in
support of Malayan Union citizenship proposals in a mass
meeting which was held in Kuala Lumpur by the
representatives of forty-two Chinese associations and
guilds)- 3
 As soon as the Colonial Office made known its
intention to replace the Malayan Union with a new
constitution for Malaya, the Chinese community in
Malacca under both Tan Cheng Lock and Goh Chee Yan, the
president of the Malacca Chamber of Commerce, made an
appeal to the British government to consult all sections
of Malayan opinion before arriving at a final decision on
this vital matter "affecting the welfare and interests
of all and everyone of different communities in this
country. ,,14
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The MCP, according to Yeo Kim Wah, apparently
realized that the convening of the Anglo-Malay Working
Committee was likely to lead to a British volte-face on
the constitutional question. 15 The British government
might be forced to change the Malayan Union scheme and
adopt a constitution which would be likely to be more
restrictive for the non-Malays. The MCP organized a
20,000 strong rally at Farrer Park in Singapore in late
September to demand a self-governing Malaya in which all
communities would enjoy equal rights.. Meanwhile Tan
Cheng Lock warned that if they were presented with a fait
accompli, they would mount "...a campaign of passive
resistance and non-cooperation with the government, which
would be unfortunate and disastrous to the country as a
whole. ,l7
It took almost six months for the Anglo-Malay
Working Committee to produce their report. In November
1946, MacDonald brought the report to London for
Whitehall's approval. About this time, the MCP, the MDU,
the MNP and Tan Cheng Lock had decided to form a united
front to oppose the constitutional proposals. According
to Yeo Kim Wah there were several opinions on the
initiative to form a united front. 18 A leader of the
MDU attributed it to John Eber and Lim Kean Chye, but
Gerald de Cruz, who was also one of the MDU leaders, was
of the opinion that it was an MCP initiative.
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Initially, a meeting was held on 17 November to
discuss the formation of a united front. It was attended
by two MCP representatives, (Liew Yit Fun and Chai Pek
Siang), two representatives of the MNP (Ahmad Boesteman
and Musa Ahmad) , one representative of the Communist
controlled newspaper, Democrat, (Gerald de Cruz), and
two non-Malay leaders (H.B. Talalla and Khoo Teik Ee).
The meeting adopted three principles which were suggested
by Tan Cheng Lock	 as basic to the coalition's
programme.19
After the meeting reached an agreement to form
the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action, de Cruz, as a
representative, went to see Tan Cheng Lock and invite him
to lead this coalition. On 14 December, Tan Cheng Lock
and John Eber jointly sponsored the Council of Joint
Action (CJA) in Singapore. It consisted of various
organizations from right to left wing but mostly of
Communist-led organizations. Among others, there were
the MDU, MNP, MIC, SCEA, the General Labour Union (which
later became the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions
and the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions) , the
Singapore Womens' Federation and the Peasants' Union. The
SCBA withdrew from the coalition as it realized it was
dominated by the left wing.
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The CJA made it known that its intention was to
negotiate with the government in order to formulate a
constitution which was based on the three principles:
(a) A united Malaya inclusive of Singapore,
(b) Responsible self-government through a fully
central legislature for the whole of Malaya.
(c) Equal citizenship rights for all making Malaya
their permanent home and object of their
undivided loyalty.20
The MCP did not join the CJA; however, its youth-
wing, the Malayan New Democratic Youth Leaque became a
member of the coalition on 22 December. Other Communist
dominated organizations, such as the ex-MPAJA Comrades
Association, also joined this coalition which was
later renamed the Pan Malayan Council of Joint Action
(PMCJA). Although the MCP was not a member, it could
control the MPAJA through its contact organizations. Tan
Cheng Lock was even elected as a chairman of the PMCJA
based on the advice of the MCP. According to Yeo Kim Wah,
the MCP favoured Tan Cheng Lock, as it realized that the
PMCJA had to rely overwhelmingly on Chinese support.
Another reason was that the PMCJA hoped Tan Cheng Lock
could get support from Chinese business community leaders
such as Tan Kah Kee, Lee Kong Chian and Yong Shook Lin.21
Meanwhile the MCP itself provided the mass base for the
PMCJA such as the members of the General Labour Union.
Eber reminded Tan Cheng Lock of this fact and said that:
190
The speakers of GLtJ, whose voice,
though not very loud is very important,
are listened to with respect and
attention. They have only one vote, in
spite of the fact that their membership
is certainly at least half of the total
membership of all the Joint Council
associations. They are very co-
operative on this question of having
only one, and it is up to us to see
that their voice carries great weight.
Their membership is about 300,000, you
see.22
The left-wing character of the PMCJA was one of
the reasons it failed to attract the Chinese Chambers of
Commerce or Chinese commercial interests. At first, Tan
Kah Kee was expected to become an honorary member of the
council. However, he decided not to join. According to
Yeo Kim Wah, "it is necessary only to note that the
Chinese business interest could not be expected to enrol
in a coalition in which the voting procedure would force
them to play a subordinate role to the communist-
controlled organizations. ,,23
The PMCJA also failed to get support from the
Malay community which considered it as a Chinese
controlled organization. tJIVINO and the Malays regarded
the MNP as betraying Malay interests to a predominantly
Chinese coalition. To counter such allegations, the MNP
decided to form its own united front of Malay
organizations which included Pembela Tanah Air (PETA),
Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS), Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API)
and others, under the name of Pusat Tena ga Ra'ayat
191
(PUTERA) . Later PMCJA-PUTERA was formed as an inter-
racial alliance. In order to attract support from the
Malays, or as a concession to PTJTERA, the alliance PMCJA-
PUTERA agreed to add some principles as follows:
(a) Malay should be the official language of the
country,
(b) Melayu should be the title of any proposed
citizenship and any national status in Malaya.
(c) foreign affairs and defence should be the
joint responsibility of the government of
Malaya and the British crown; and
Cd) the national flag should have the Indonesian,
red and white colours.24
The main task of PMCJA-PUTERA was to put strong
pressure on the government to negotiate with them on
constitutional matters and to drop their previous
discussions and agreement with the Malay Sultans and
UMNO. After the Working Committee's constitutional
proposals were off ically published and with the formation
of the Consultative Committee, the PMCJA decided not to
submit any proposals or enter into any negotiation as the
Consultative Committee was regarded as not representative
of the people in Malaya. In December 1946, Tan Cheng Lock
urged the Secretary of State, Arthur Creech, to open
direct negotiations with the PMCJA which, he claimed, was
the sole body representing the domiciled Malay and non-
Malays. 25
 He criticized the Committee Report which did
not foreshadow the future development of Malaya along
democratic lines.
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British officials did not consider the PMCJA to
be a significant political body and did not pay much
attention to its demands. 26 Gent considered this
organizations as left wing, as it consisted of some
radical groups such as the GLU, and that it did not
represent any major Chinese organizations such as the CCC
or SCEA. Gent was also of the opinion that the PMCJA
would not receive wide-spread support from the people of
Malaya. According to Gent, pits claim to represent even
the non-Malay Asiatic-domiciled communities had little
basis. !,27
In the eyes of local officials the PMCJA was not
a strong body as it represented "very divergent views and
aims." 28 However, the Colonial Office considered that
the PMCJA had the potential to become a source of trouble
and asked the Governor of the Malayan Union to see if
there was any possibility of discussing constitutional
matters with this organization. However, Gent felt it
was not necessary, as it would discourage other bodies or
individuals from expressing their opinions through the
Consultative Committee. Gent was also of the opinion that
discussion with the PMCJA would result in increasing its
influence and ability for pressure.
MacDonald, the Governor-General, had a different
view regarding the PMCJA. He considered it was necessary
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for the Governor to hold a meeting with the PMCJA so as
not to alienate this body. 29 He also feard that the
swing of popular opinion to the PMCJA posed a threat to
the British government, though Gent said it was not
really united and strong. The action of the MNP of
pulling out of the PMCJA and forming the Pusat Tenacia
Raayat (PTJTER) had shown it was not credible. Gent also
regarded Tan Cheng Lock's association with the PMCJA as
deplorable. According to Gent, his action was the result
of his bitterness towards the British government as he
was not given a Knighthood by the British government.30
Meanwhile the PMCJA organized public rallies to
appeal to the Malayan people to unite and protest against
the Federal proposals. In a public meeting on 26 January
1947, Tan Cheng Lock criticized the British government
and Federal proposals. He said:
The constitutional proposals constitute
a breach of the pledge of His Majesty's
Government to ensure and facilitate the
progress of the people of this country
towards unity and ultimate self-
government within the British
commonwealth and empire, and promote a
broadbased citizenship which will
include without discrimination of race
or creed, all who can establish a claim
to belong to this country.31
Towards mid-April the PMCJA stepped up their
campaign against the Federal proposals. Together with
PUTEP.A it held a public meeting in Taiping, Perak on 13
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April 1947. Both groups declared their opposition to the
Federal policy. They also proposed to convene a "People
Conference" to formulate a "democratic constitution" as
an alternative to the Federal policy.32
The Chinese Chambers of Commerce, who had decided
not to join the PMCJA, now directed their attention to
the Federal policy and the Malayan political scene. The
Chinese business community felt their economic and
commercial interests threatened by Malay nationalism,-
which had succeeded in compelling the British to
formulate a Federal policy as an alternative to the
Malayan union.It seemed to them from now on the Malays
would become the dominant political force in Malaya. On
23 February, the ACCC held a conference to protest
against the Federal proposals. In its despatch to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, the ACCC made
strong criticisms that the Federal proposals were
"prepared without consulting the feelings, wishes and
aspirations of its inhabitants as a whole" and were
"undemocratic and retrograde in structure and
conception." 33
 The ACCC also claimed that the citizenship
proposals "were discriminatory in character and designed
to exclude the vast majority of the Malayan Chinese from
a legitimate share in the public life of this
country. . . ,'	 On 25 March 1947 the ACCC sent another
despatch to the Colonial Office. As advised by Gent, the
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British ignored the ACCC demands. The British
government was undeterred by the anti-Federation
movements. In July 1947, it published a summary of its
constitutional proposals and was determined to impose the
new policy. This policy reflected a revival of Britain's
so-called " pro-Malay policy" of the pre-war period. The
previously formulated "Chinese Policy" and the Malayan
Union citizenship scheme were abandoned. Under the
Federal policy, the British government again established
Malaya as the land of the Malays or Tanah Melavu with
the adoption of more favourable citizenship proposals for
the Malay, recognition of the special position of the
Malays and return of internal sovereignty to the Malay
Sultans
The Federal policy for the first time made a
distinction between Malays and non-Malays. The word
"Malay" was defined as a person who habitually speaks
the Malay language, professes the Muslim religion, and
conforms to Malay custom. The Federation also indirectly
divided the Chinese Community into the Straits Chinese
(British subjects) and other Malayan born who were
westernized or half-assimilated, and the more numerous
alien Chinese. The Straits Chinese or other British
subjects in Malacca and Penang still enjoyed their
previous position or status in addition to their rights
as Federal citizens. The Malayan born Chinese in the
Malay States, whose parents were also locally born were
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qualified to become Feneral citizens by 'operation of
law'. The vast majority of the alien Chinese could of
course acquire citizenship by application, but this
required an adequate knowledge of Malay and English and
hence automatically debarred many from becoming Federal
citizens. As a result, large numbers of the Chinese
would remain aliens in Malaya. However, Indonesian
immigrants who were recognized by the Malay Sultans as
Malay subjects, together with the Malays, were granted
citizenship by operation of law under the Federal policy.
The Federal proposals were the product of the
negotiations between the British government, the Malay
Sultans and tMNO which were carried out from August to
December 1946. The British government did give all
interested non-Malay communities an opportunity to
express their views on the proposals before they were
fully approved. However, the final proposals were almost
the same a the Report of the Anglo-Malay Working
Committee. This pro-Malay policy was justified on the
grounds that the Malay, "needed protection from the
encroachment of the economically and politically
sophisticated Chinese." 36 Without such protection, the
Malays felt their political life in their own country was
in doubt.
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As might be expected, the Federal policy provoked
an outcry from the Chinese and other non-Malays. In their
view, Federal policy was the ultimate application of the
principle of "divide and rule." 37 It brought the ACCC or
the Chinese business community closer to the PMCJA-
PUTERA. In order to accommodate ACCC wishes, the PMCJA
was renamed as All Malaya Council of Joint Action
(AMCJA), as the term "Pan-Malayan" denoted a communist-
influenced body.38
The coalition of ANCJA-PUTERA adopted Indian
tactics in fighting against the constitution. According
to Albert Lau, the first suggestion to adopt these
tactics came on 19 July l947. However, as the present
writer has indicated, Tan Cheng Lock had warned the
British government in October 1946 about the possiblity
of resorting to a campaign of passive resistance and non-
cooperation against the government. However, during this
time, Tan Cheng Lock showed a greater effort to use the -
Indian nationalist tactics by openly calling for a civil
disobedience campaign and a determination to fight the
implementation of Federal policy. Both Tan Cheng Lock,
and ]JeCruz, another AMCJA leader, were prepared to face
the consequences	 of being jailed by the British
authorities •40
On 17 August various Chinese organizations,
guilds, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Malacca,
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decided to launch a hartal as a method of protest against
the Federal policy and "HMG's 'breach of faith' in
breaking its pledge of full consultation." 41 The ACCC
itself sent a dispatch to the Colonial Office to express
their anger and disappointment with the British decision
to impose a "retrogressive" constitution, despite its
being opposed strongly by the people of Malaya. This
organization also demanded the appointment of a royal
commission to make a study on the constitutional issues.
A hartal was launched in Malacca on 9 September
1949 followed by another in Perak on 25 September. The
AMCJA-PtJTERA and the ACCC launched a widespread hartal on
20 October which "paralysed nearly all the main towns in
Malaya." 42 Lee Kong Chian, the president of the ACCC
explained to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
'that their actions were based on popular demand and
demonstrate a feeling of bitterness among a large number
of responsible people towards the Federal policy.43
However, the British government adopted an uncompromising
position towards the anti-Federation movements.44
Towards October 1947, the AMCJA-PUTERA drew up
and published their own constitutional proposals for
Malaya which was called "The People's Constitution." "The
People's Constitution" was based on the ten principles of
AMCJA-PTJTER2. According to Yeo Kim Wah, it was a largely
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MDU-MCP contribution to political thinking in Malaya.45
It proposed "the establishment of an elected sovereign
Federal Legislative Assembly, ... and the life of the
Assembly to be three years." 46 It stressed that "there
shall be no communal electorates, candidatures,
representatives or allocation of seats whatever. 1,47
However "the Malays are given the privilege of having 55%
of the seats in the first-three Assemblies." 48	The
framers of this constitution also proposed the creation
of a council of races to prevent discriminatory
legislation based on religion or race.
The People's Constitution proposed the creation
of a common citizenship which it called "Melayu
nationality." 49 The locally born in Malaya would be given
Melavu citizenship or nationality automatically based on
the principle of lus soil. Citizenship by naturalisation
would be offered to those who had resided for eight out
of the preceding ten years in Malaya. They would need to
pass a simple test of competency in the Malay language.50
According to Yeo Kim Wah, the People's
Constitution embodied a delicate balance of interests
between the non-Malay left wing parties and the MCP on
one hand, and the Malay left wing parties on the other.51
The guarantee to the Malays of 55% of the seats in the
first three Assemblies or over a period of nine years,
the establishment of a "Council of Races" and the
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creation of Melavu citizenship were major concessions
from the left-wing Chinese dominated political
organizations to the Malays under PtJTERA. However,
according to W. Linehan, these measures in the long run,
after the abolition of the Council of Races and the
withdrawal of the 55 guaranteed seats in the Assembly,
would make the Malays like that "unfortune king, so well
known in their history, whose bottom was being stuck with
thorns at the same time that his mouth was being fed with
bananas.	 ,,52
The People's Constitution was rejected by
colonial officials who did not in any respect alter
Federal policy. 53
 The government was also unmoved by
the October hartal. Meanwhile the AMCJA-PtJTERA was in
"dire financial difficulties" 54 which hindered the aims
of sustaining a strong campaign against the government.
After October, it concentrated its activities on fund
raising to finance the "agitation" campaign. Meanwhile,
Lim Hong Bee, its representative in London, urged that a
British parliamentary fact-finding group should tour in
Malaya. Lim also set up a News and Information Bureau
and published a newsletter, The Malavan Monitor, to
enlighten British public opinion on the Malayan
situation.55
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In the meantime, seven Chinese Chambers of
Commerce held a conference in Singapore against the
Federal Policy in early December to discuss their future
method of struggle. It decided to send a delegation to
discuss the matter with Malcolm McDonald. On 8 December
1947, McDonald informed Gent that ten Chinese, including
Lee Kong Chian, Tan Cheng Lock and H. S. Lee had
discussions with him regarding the Federation
constitution. They were informed that "...no section of
opinion in the House of Commons felt that the
Constitution should be altered in any respect." 56 The
leaders of the CCC were "undecided what to do".
According to MacDonald, "they will regard the sending of
a further letter to the Secretary of State and my promise
to speak personally to the Secretary of State on the
matter as the utmost that they can achieve, and they will
present these actions as a sufficient development to save
face.
The -anti-Federation movements in Malaya
collapsed after the implementation of the Federation
scheme in February 1948. It did not win any concessions
from the British government who adopted the "pro-Malay
policy." However, this movement had caused a growing
awareness and interest among the Chinese community on
political and constitutional issues of a local nature. It
brought together the Straits Chinese, the Kuomintang
dominated ACCC, and MCP-led organizations to fight for
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the Chinese and other non-Malays' political rights. As a
result, it reduced the flavour of a Chinese nationalism
which was oriented towards the motherland. However, the
failure of the anti-Federation movements indicated the
failure of the MCP's struggle by constitutional means. As
a consequence the MCP dropped its moderate line and
resorted to armed revolt against British rule in Malaya.
Part II
The Communist Insurrection and The Emergency
The anti-Federation movements disintegrated after
the inauguration of the Federation of Malaya. The Straits
Chinese and Kuomintang leaders, such as those in the
Singapore Chinese Chambers of Commerce and others, called
off their boycott of the Federal Legislative Council and
accepted seats on it. They were concerned that
opposition to the Federation would hurt their economic
and commercial interests. Meanwhile the MCP dismantled
the AMCJA-PUTERA, as it had lost faith in the
constitutional struggle. Two months after the AMPCJA-
PUTERA collapsed, the Communist launched an armed revolt,
officially known as the "Emergency."
According to R. B. Smith, controversy "still
surrounds the question whether the Communist-led
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uprisings which developed across Southeast Asia during
the months from March to September 1948 were the outcome
of a deliberate international communist strategy or
merely the product of coincidental decisions by
individual communist parties."58
According to official records, there are
indications that the change from the constitutional
policy of the Communist Party in Malaya to a policy of
violence was directed from outside sources. 59 Gerald de
Cruz, a former member of the MCP, also held the same
opinion, that the MCP launched an armed revolt as a
result of Stalin's orders. 6 ° However, we can conclude
with certainty that there is not enough evidence to
support this. It can be said that the MCP decided
to drop their moderate line and resort to armed struggle
as a result of developments within Malaya. Perhaps one
of the reasons was that the colonial government had
broken its "promise" to the Communists. As the present
writer has indicated elsewhere, the colonial government
had formulated the "Long Term Policy Directives: Chinese
Policy" which it later incorporated into the Malayan
Union scheme. British officers used the directive to
induce the Communists to continue to cooperate with
them during and after the war. One reason the MCP agreed
to disband the MPAJA was because the General Officer
Commanding (GOC), Malaya Command, pointed out to them that
British policy was based on this policy directives.
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According to Ralph Hone, during the negotiations which
took place in the early part of 1946 with the leaders of
the MPAJA, the leaders of the MPAJA presented to the GOC,
Malaya Command,	 "eight points" on which they required
assurances,	 before they were prepared to be
demobilized. 61
 Reciprocally, "the substance of
paragraphs 1,2,3, and 7 [of the directive on Chinese
Policy] was communicated to the M.P.A.J.A. leaders in the
course of negotiation." 62 Ralph Hone added: "the
undertaking given to the M.P.A.J.A. was based on the
directive and not vice-versa and was, of course, given by
the G.O.C. under S.A.C's authority without any further
reference back to London."63
Based on this evidence, the colonial government
was bound to implement their Chinese policy under the
Malayan Union scheme. However, the civil government
seemed to ignore the undertaking between the BMA and
MPAJA except on the question of the Societies Ordinance.
During the constitutional negotiations between the Malay
Sultans and the UMNO leaders with the colonial
government, the Communist-sponsored AMCJA-PUTERA was
ignored. Not only that, Malcolm MacDonald, Governor-
General of British Southeast Asia regarded Communism as
"Enemy No.1 in these territories and in South East
Asia." 64
 In his opinion "Communism was capable of
becoming quite a formidable one" and any accommodation
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to the AMCJA- PUTERA's demands would "strenghten the MCP
and weaken the Government." 65 MacDonald declared
! I Communism would have to be dealt with in a pretty big
and effective way in the Malayan Union and Singapore."66
Therefore the colonial government took strong measures
and actions to suppress Communist activity.
M. Stenson held the opinion that the Communist
rebellion was caused by the employers' efforts to reduce
wages and obtai-n stricter control over their labour
forces, while at the same time undermining the newly-
formed unions. 67 The colonial government aided the
employers by controlling trade union activities. The
government's restrictions on Communist activity increased
throughout the spring of 1947, especially on the labour
front. On 31 May , the government banned any federation
of labour unions, and decreed that all trade union
officials would be required to have a minimum of three
years experience in the trade or industry which the union
was concerned with. According to Stenson, the new laws
or measures effectively crippled overt Communist
influences in the labour movement and destroyed the Pan
Malayan Federation of Trade Unions which was declared
illegal.68
The MCP itself was faced with internal conflict
during early 1947. Loi Tek, the Secretary General of
the MCP was under investigation over his past
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activities. 69 He was an Annamite who arrived in
Singapore, brought in by the Singapore Special Branch.7°
He managed to infiltrate into the MCP top hierachy and
assumed the leadership of the MCP after the crisis of
1936. During the Japanese occupation, he became a
Japanese Kempeitai agent and helped the Japanese to
liquidate the senior party members at Batu Caves in
September 1942. However, he was cautious .". .not to
throw in his lot altogether with the Japanese." 71 Being
the Secretary General of the MCP, he also cooperated with
officers of Force 136 during the Japanese occupation.
After the war, Loi Tek (alias Mr. Wright) resumed his
contacts with the Special Branch in Singapore.
Immediately after the war, an attempt was made to
unmask the real identity of Loi Tek. An allegation that
Loi Tak was a traitor to the party appeared in a Penang
newspaper in September 1945.72 However, this charge was
regarded as incredible, as it has been made by MCP
members who had themselves collaborated with the
Japanese. However, criticism of Loi Tek's leadership and
his irregular behaviour was to persist in early 1947.
This matter was brought to the attention of the Singapore
Police Special Branch. Major R. J. Isaacs of the Field
Security Section made an investigation to discover Loi
Tek's true identity. 73
 The process of investigation was
known as "The Wright (alias Loi Tek) Case." As a result
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of the investigation, it was revealed that Mr. Wright or
Lol Tek was an agent of the British police. The case was
closed and Loi Tek was advised not to contact the police
and he totally disappeared from the political scene. On
the other hand, Chin Peng, Loi Tek's chief aide during
the war carried out an investigation on Loi Tek's (alias
Mr. Wright) past activity. Loi Tek was absent during
the 6 March 1947 Central Committee meeting and since then
the MCP never saw him again. In May 1947 he was formally
expelled from the party and Chin Peng became Secretary-
General. . It took more than a year for Chin Peng or the
Central Executive Committee(CEC) to make a full report on
Loi Tek or "The Wright Case."
On 28 May 1948 the CEC issued the report entitled
"Statement of the Incident of Wright", which described
Loi Tek as an "internal traitor" and the greatest
culprit in the history of the MCP. 74 He was charged with
"pressing for policies which could not be carried out,"
thereby serving as "a running dog and traitor of the
revolution." 75 As a consequence of the "Wright Case," the
MCP needed something to restore confidence among its
members. The CEC had admitted that it had committed very
serious mistakes in their course of struggles.76
Accordingly the CEC pointed out that the "comrades" of
the CEC "have endeavoured their utmost in getting the
Party to turn away from a blind alley to a new path as
evidenced by the recent fixing of a new policy which has
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gained the full and unanimous support of comrades of the
entire Party." 77 According to Anthony Short, by the
time (28 May 1948) the Loi Tek report was issued "the
Party had already changed course and the Emergency was
no more than three weeks away."78
According to C. B. Mclane, the Fourth Plenum of
the Malayan Communist Party which met in Singapore from
17 to 21 March 1948, marked a turning point in the
strategies of Malayan Communism comparable with the
adoption of the Ghoshal Line in Burma six weeks
earlier. 79 During this Plenum of the MCP's Central
Committee, three resolutions were adopted. Firstly, they
gave a political analysis of the current situation in
Malaya, which concluded that the Labour Government in
Britain was irredeemably imperialist. In this situation,
the struggle for independence must ultimately take the
form of "people's revolutionary war" and the MCP would
provide leadership in "this most glorious task."
Secondly, with regard of political strategies, it set
two tasks before the party: the reversal of the former
"ostrich policy" of "surrenderism" and the preparation
of the masses for an uncompromising struggle for
independence. Thirdly, it stressed the need to
restore party discipline after the laxness of the Loi
Tek	 period.80	 However, "the Fourth Plenum did not
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specifically call for an uprising but stressed the
urgency of preparing for it."81
The first action in the implementaion of this new
line of struggle was focused on an urban area. The
Singapore Harbour Board Employees tJnion (SHBEU), an
unfederated union dominated by Communists, launched a
strike on 23 March to 4 April 1948 demanding better
wages and conditions of work for the workers. The SHBEU
urged the workers to "rely on (their) forces to solve
all difficulties" and to "launch gigantic bloodshed
against the imperialists should the employers continue to
belittle (the labourers') forces." 82
 The police took
action to break the strike by raiding the premises of
the SHBEtJ and SFTtJ. They arrested and jailed nine labour
leaders on charges of sedition and intimidation.
After the general strike, the SFTtJ made a plan to
hold a mass demonstration of 100,000 people on May Day.
The Malayan Security Service was suspicious of the SFTtJ's
real intention. According to the PIJ:
There have been indications recently
that the communists, working through
labour unions, have been preparing for
some important event. Whether they were
merely preparing for May Day or whether
they were working to fit in with a
wider world pattern (the Italian
Elections, events in Berlin, events in
Burma) is not yet known, but there are
indications from many sources that
major events are being prepared for,
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and although the recent events [the
General strike] in Singapore resulted
in the defeat of their immediate plans,
it is unlikely that the communists will
accept it as a total defeat.83
The SFTtJ asked permission to hold a May Day
rally and a procession. The government only allowed them
to hold the rally and put a ban on the procession on
grounds of interference with traffic. 84
 The SFTU
announced that they would defy the government ban and
continue to hold both the rally and the procession. Later
the government decided to ban both the rally and
procession which forced the SFTU to call off the mass
demonstrations. However, the SFTU organized a closed day
meeting which was attended by the MCP's representatives.
In this meeting, the MCP'S representatives continued to
press for a militant line and called upon the people to
"take part in a mass struggle to hold back the attacks of
the reactionaries by using their strength."85
On 10 May 1948, as a result of growing government
suppression of legal Communist activities, the MCP held
the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee. The MCP
adopted a twelve-point "plan of struggle" to counter the
government's programme. According to Anthony Short, "the
decision taken at the Fifth Plenum in one sense was a
declaration of defensive war, an unmistakable call to
clear the decks for action, a confession of
constitutional failure, in that the political struggle
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was now taken on to another level but, at the sametime,
it was to be a graduated poliical struggle rather than a
coup d'etat or recognisable revolution."86
The Fifth Plenum decided to attack the British
imperialists through the workers and to use trade unions
as its main weapon in the struggle. The "plan of
struggle" also emphasized the primary use henceforth of
"illegal action"; it "called for strikes specifically
aimed at the disruption of the Malayan economy, demanded
a more vigorous assault on the democratic parties and on
the national bour geoisie (including Chinese elements
sympathetic to the Kuomintang), and proposed measures to
attract intellectuals and peasants to the Communist
cause. ,,87
In preparation for carrying out this new policy
the MCP had instructed the state committees to form
mobilisation sections to deal with all problems connected
with the armed struggle and agreed that violence could be
used against the opposition from mid-May onwards. The
MPAJA Executive Council held a meeting on 5 May and
District MPAJA ex-Service Comrades' Associations were
told to compile fresh records of all members including
those who had left the associations. 88 Large scale
mobilisation was carried out in Perak, Johore and
Selangor. The MPAJA ex-Service Comrades's Association,
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trade unions and organisations affiliated to the MCP had
been instructed to remove all photographs, list of names
and other documents which might be of use to the
police. 89
 On 30 May an MCP mobile corps was formed in
Perak with selected ex-MPAJA members led by Yong Lam. The
members selected for the corps were instructed to report
to an unknown camp on 2 June for three days training. The
corps, which would be armed was ready to move into town
areas on 8 June 1948.90
In the meantime, reorganization within the MCP
itself had been carried out. The members of the Central
Executive Committee had been increased to fifteen. 9 - In
February 1948, there were just eleven members and during
normal periods, it was around nine. Among the new CEC
members was Lau Ma, one of the Malayans who had
participated in the Victory Parade in London. Lau Ma
later became the highest military commander of the MCP in
Perak. At the state level of the MCP, reorganization also
had been carried out. For instance, the whole MCP Perak
set-up was reorganized at the beginning of May 1948. Two
sections were formed, the political and the military
section. The political section function was to mobilise
the people, organize the members, and gather food
supplies for the armed forces and carry out other
important directing work. The function of the military
section was to mobilise all the armed forces and carry
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out executive orders from its military council regarding
the use of arms.
During the reorganization of the MCP, the Indian
Section, under Balan was separated. 92
 It was put under
the direction of the Communist Party of India but
operated in conjunction with the MCP. The Malay Section
was abandoned as unprofitable. The MCP spent about
$50,000 on the formation of the MNP. However, the
results of the Malay movement were disappointing for the
MCP. On the labour front, the MCP continued to support
the trade union struggle which caused industrial unrest
throughout Malaya from May 1948 onward. For instance, the
Harbour Workers Union staged a major strike at Port
Swettenham on 18 and 19 May. During the strike it was
reported that there were two cases of suspected arson in
the railway sidings and an attack on an European manager
employed by Tan Teck Bee, the contractor. Twelve Indian
workers were arrested, according to the union, "without
reason." 93
 Up to 4 June, the High Commissioner informed
the Colonial Office that there were twelve serious
incidents, including nine murders and three attacks on
European estate managers, involving serious injuries.
The incidents occurred in Penang, 	 Perak, Selangor,
Negeri Sembilan and Johore. At this stage the government
still put the blame on the
	
Pan-Malayan Federation of
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Trade tJnions. 94
	The MCP campaign still put
	 the
government in the dark. According to the U:
The long-term objective of their [the
MCPI campaign is still obscure.It may
not have a specific object. It may be
defensive action to bolster morale
against improving conditions, cheaper
labour, lower prices, a tightening of
the Trade Union Enactment and the fear
of co-operation among employers.95
The government's attitude towards the MCP's
campaign up to 31 May 1948 was still uncertain. According
to the , if this campaign was a local tactical plan
the government could expect the MCP to cease their
attacks and keep them in abeyance until another
opportunity arose. 96 In the opinion of the if the
MCP continued their attacks, whatever the costs, then it
was clear their plan was part of a world-wide plan of
aggression by Russia, which was intended to lead to
war. 97
 Later it was clear that the MCP would continue
their attack on all fronts. On 16 June 1948, three
European planters were murdered in Sungai Siput, Perak.
Then the government declared a state of emergency which
continued for twelve years.
The MCP's Politics of Terrorism
According to Anthony Short, the mobilisation of
the MCP for the armed struggle was carried out in three
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phases. 98 The first phase involved the disappearing of
the hard core of the MCP assault forces which were
unknown by the general public into the jungle. The forces
consisted of some professional revolutionaries who
formed the mobile units, Lau Ton g Tui or the "Killer
Squads." They normally operated in a small group of four
or five for the purpose of eliminating their selected
targets. The second phase required open members of the
MCP and its affliates-- particularly the MPAJA Ex-
Comrades Association--to retire to the hills and await
further instructions. The final phase witnessed the armed
struggle of the MCP once the Emergency was declared.
Lucian W. Pye makes a remark that the MCP had
"an extraordinary faith in the benefit of guerrilla
warfare" 99
 which was based on Mao Tse-tung doctrine's and
the practices of the Communists in China. For the
purpose of launching a guerrila war, the MCP formed the
so-called Malayan People Anti-British Army (MPABA)
shortly before the Emergency. Ironically, the MPABA was
not sufficiently strong to fight the security forces in
Malaya in a total "guerrilla" situation. This failure led
to the MCP's adoption of the politics of terrorism.
The primary objective of the MCP terrorism was to
cause unrest and chaos in the countryside)- 00 Managers
and contractors in the rubber estates and tin mines
became logical targets of their attacks. With the
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disappearance of the managerial personnel in the estates
and tin mines, the MCP hoped to establish its control
over the labour force and, through their control, obtain
food, intelligence and local support. In addition, the
MCP planned to transform the labour force into guerrilla
fighters. The Kuomintan g leaders and their supporters
became likewise the targets of Communist attacks. If
successful, the attacks would provide Communists with a
political vacuum in the Chinese community, making them
ready to accept the latter's leadership. Other targets of
the Communist attacks were the police and government
officials, and the security and administrative machinery
of the government, without which the economic and
administrative structure would collapse.
The second objective of the MCP campaign was the
establishment of Communist governments in various
liberated areas in the country, which ultimately would
join together and form a government of the entire
liberated zone. The final objective of the MCP was to
launch a general revolution and achieve final victory by
defeating the British and local armed forces, and by
forming a Communist regime or the Republic of Malaya. In
actual fact, however, the Communist campaign did not
advance further than the primary phase.101
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• The Communists started the campaign of violence
with the killings in Sungai Siput. On 27 June 1948 the
guerillas launched a large scale attack on the Kuala Krau
police station in central Pahang) 02
 After the attacks,
the guerilla army moved back to their camps in the
jungle. Most of the guerrilla camps were former MPAJA
camps which were unknown to Force 136 liaison officers.
On 1 July 1948 the Communist guerrillas launched
another major attack in Gua Musang, A force of about a
hundred guerrillas attacked and captured the police
post. There is evidence that the Communists were
supported by a large number of Chinese in Pu1ai)03
Government forces managed to retake the post after five
days of Communist occupation. After fighting with the
security forces, the guerrillas again withdrew to the
jungle. The attack in Gua Musang was the first attempt
by the guerrillas to establish a liberated area. Though
they failed, the Communists were able to raise great
concern among top government officials. MacDonald, the
Commissioner-General wrote:
Events like the Kelantan police capture
will stimulate recruitment. . to the
guerrillas, and will thus increase the
armed strength of the total [Communist]
forces which we must eventually
destroy. 104
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After the Kelantan event, MacDonald pressed the
British Government for the early arrival of the
Inniskillings or other troops to Malaya. 105
 With the
arrival of the nniski1lings the Communist attacks were
disrupted. It was reported that the morale of the
Communist guerrillas -- particularly among the new
recruits-- was low. 106 A comparative lull from Communist
attacks followed, namely between early 1949 and the
middle of the year. It was during this period that the
COmmunists began to recruit on a large scale for the Mm
Yuen or Mass Organisation, which was similiar to the
Malayan People Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU) of the
Japanese occupation time. However, the Mm Yuen
represented the civilian wing of the guerrillas and
served as an auxiliary fighting unit. Also during this
period, the guerrilla forces were increased from 8 to 10
regiments. The MPABA was replaced by the Malayan Races
Liberation Army (MRLA), an attempt to present the
Communist guerrillas as a multi-racial force. For
example, the 10th Regiment, consisting of Malay
guerrillas, operated in Pahang. This " Malay Regiment",
harried by the Gurkhas and other security forces, finally
disintegrated by the end of 1949.107 The MCP's attempt to
present a multiracial tipeople l s War tl
 facade met with
failure.
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Towards the middle of the 1949, the guerillas
increased their attacks on the police, army and
planters)- 08
 it was not unusual for the guerrillas to
make an attack on ordinary civilians. One of those
attacks was carried out in Kampar, Perak which killed
four and wounded forty-five civilians. On 11 September
1949, the guerrillas under Chin Nam, launched a large
scale attack on the small town of Kuala Krau in Pahang.
The guerrillas tried to capture the police station and
form a liberated area. This attempt was crushed by the
security forces.
After the Kuala Krau event, the Central Committee
of the MCP cautioned the party not to isolate itself
from the masses but to continue building a Mm Yuen
infrastructure)- 09
 The Central Committee directive of
December 1949 stated the following:
Temporary bases should first be set up
among the Mm Yuen territories; Miii
Yuen work work would be expanded with
increased activities, radiating
spearheads into enemy-held territories,
so that an intermeshing of territories
would be the result, ... [This tactic is
expected to result in] entanglement and
encirclement of the enemy and their
bases of communication and centres.
This sort of tactic could lead to
extremely fluid situations in a
difficult period for the MRLJA , but it
could be done.11°
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By early 1950, the main force of the guerrillas
was retrained, regrouped and revitalised. The non-combat
unit of the guerrillas had also been reorganised and was
• . probably equal to that of government in the matter of
supplies and superior in the matter of
intelligence." 1The guerrillas increased their attacks
throughout the whole year with the peak during the first
week of September. During the period, there were 4,739
incidents involving Communist attacks. The security
forces suffered 889 casualties, with 393 deaths and 496
wounded. The terrorists suffered 942 casualties with 648
deaths, 147 captured, and 147 surrendered. 112
 There were
also a large number of civilian casualties: 646 deaths,
409 wounded, and 106 missing.
In October 1950, the Joint Intelligence Advisory
Committee reported to the Federal War Council that,
"there had been gradual improvement in MCP organisation,
leadership and military tactics and the existing MCP
policy of extended activity, unless checked, was likely
to cause a serious breakdown in civilian morale." 113 The
strength of the MRLA at this time was between 3,000 to
3,500 ,excluding unidentified units or guerrillas in
Southern Thailand.In addition there were about 1,200
armed ancillaries. The Communist insurrection reached its
peak in 1951. According to goverment sources, it was
probable that over one million of the Chinese population
were at least potential supporters at the height of the
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Emergency. l14 The Communist insurrection declined rapidly
after 1952 . According to government sources, the
estimated strength of the terrorists was:
	
Average for 1951...	 7292
"	
"	 1952.. .
	 5765
"	 1953...	 4373
"	 1954. . .
	 3402
"	 1955. . .
	 2798
	
1956. . .
	 2231
	
1957. . .	 1830115
The Emergency was the colonial government's
response to the Communist insurrection, seen as imported
"alien" politics from China. It was largely a "Chinese
affair." The Chinese community was an accessible target
for penetration by the MCP, upon whom they could rely for
money, supplies, recruits and information. 116
 The
solution to end the Emergency was to be found not only in
military but also in political strategy. However, the
dominating position of the Malay community within the
framework of the Federal policy of 1948 had discouraged
the Chinese from active cooperation with the
government. 117
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Part III
The Penang Secession Movement, 1948-49
The inclusion of Penang with the Federation of
Malaya had aroused dissatisfaction among some sections
of the non-Malay communities. 118
 They were the Straits -
born Chinese and the business communities. They resented
the Federal constitution which gave the Sultans and the
Malay representatives controlling powers over legislation
and restricted citizenship rights for non-Malays. The
constitution divided the people in Malaya (including
Penang) into Malay, non-Malay or immigrant. As
indigenous peoples, the Malays or subjects of the Sultans
were accorded a "special position." Thus the non-Malays
or British subjects felt their status or rights had "been
assailed and almost taken away" as they were regarded as
immigrants. 119
 From their point of view, a large
proportion of.. the Malayan Malays were themselves
comparatively recent "immigrants." Furthermore, the non-
Malays pointed out that under Federal citizenship,
British subjects, born in the Settlements, who did not
habitually speak the Malay language, and did not conform
to Malay custom, had a lower political status than
Indonesian immigrants as the Indonesian was the subject
of the Sultan and considered as Malay)20
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The Straits Chinese, who were proud of their
British identity and connection with the British Empire,
also feared that the creation of Federal citizenship
would impair their legal status as British subjects. Heah
Joo Seang, a former president of the Penang SCBA , wrote
to The Straits Budget in March 1948:
The Straits Chinese of Malacca and
Penang enjoyed a status as British
subjects and I cannot understand the
desirability of donning the mantle of
Malavan citizenship unless I am forced
to. 121
He opposed the inclusion of the Penang and
Malacca settlements into the Federation which, according
to him, was unfair, unforgivable and came very much at
the wrong time. Another Straits Chinese leader, Dr.Lee
Tiang Keng feared that the Straits Chinese community
would not get the same or equal treatment with the Malays
in the Federation although they could maintain their
status as British subjects.122
The business communities' opposition to the
inclusion of Penang into the Federation scheme was
largely out of fear that the rights of Penang to free
port trade would be withdrawn in the future. Previously
the Penang traders had faced some restrictions on the
entrepot trade after Penang had been included in a
political and customs and excise union with mainland
Malaya; this was under the BMA and Malayan Union. 123 For
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instance the copra traders needed to weigh and check the
quantities	 of	 copra	 they brought from	 other
countries such as Burma, Thailand and Sumatra in
order for it to be re-exported duty free. These measures
were necessary as the copra from mainland Malaya was not
exempted from export tax. The copra traders preferred to
trade with Singapore as there were no restrictions and
they got better prices. As a result Penang's traders
strongly protested against the new restrictions which
they had never experienced before Penang was included
within Malaya. Dr.F.C. Benham, economic adviser to the
Governor-General, who made an inquiry about these
problems, agreed that some of the entreport trade "may be
driven away from Penang by unnecessary restrictions and
formalities	 which	 cause	 delay,	 expense,	 and
incovenience. ,,124
Dr. Benham made a report and recommended the
restoration of Penang to a genuine free port, enjoying
the same privileges as Singapore. His report was tabled
at the Federal Legislative Council in May 1948. By that
time Penang had already been included in the Federation.
Thus Benham's report reminded them of the difficulties
of their struggle to maintain the free port status of
Penang. 125
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The non-Malays of Penang held the view that the
inclusion of Penang into the Federation was not in the
interests of its people. They pointed out that Penang as
the highest developed settlement had been reduced to the
status of a junior partner, as a former Crown Colony
had been relegated to a Protectorate. As a member of the
Federation, it was not given full rights but on the other
hand it contributed a large income to the Federation
from the collection of taxes. The income derived from
Penang was being used for the benefit of the "backward"
Malay states.126
The non-Malays, particularly the Chinese
community in Penang, were also dissatisfied at the ways
and means which brought Penang into the Federation. 127
 As
the present writer has indicated the colonial government
excluded the non-Malays from preliminary discussions on
Federal policy. The Chinese community in Penang resented
this action. Under the banner of the Penang Chamber of
Commerce, the Chinese Town Hall and the Penang SCEA, they
sent a petition to Creech Jones, Secretary of State for
the Colonies, in March 1947 on the "constitutional
proposals for Malaya." They opposed the Federal
citizenship proposals, which according to their
interpretation "would whittle down the prescriptive
rights of British subjects" and would "lead to great
injustice." 128
 They made a request to the British
government to
	 appoint a royal commission to examine
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local conditions and formulate a constitution for Malaya.
However, the colonial government ignored their demands.
The colonial government also ignored the demands of the
ACMJA-PtJTERA and the ACCC. Thus, the decision to include
Penang and Malacca in the Federation and the exclusion
of Singapore was made without taking into account the
wishes of the people in the former Straits
Settlements.129
The first movement for the secession of Penang
from the Federation of Malaya was largely a Straits
Chinese affair. In November 1948, T.W. Ong (Singapore
SCEA) informed Lim Huck Aik (Penang SCBA) and Ee Yew Kim
(Malacca SCBA) that he would propose the restoration of
the Straits Settlements at the Singapore SCEA's impending
annual general meeting. 13 ° This initiative was leaked and
published by the Straits Echo on 22 November 1948. The
president of Penang's Indian Chamber of Commerce and J.
P. Souter, the president of the Settlement of Penang
Association came out in support of secession. On 4
December the Penang SCEA formally supported secession.
The Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce at first resolved
that it would be more advantageous for Singapore to join
the Federation. Later it decided to support Penang
secession. The Penang Eurasian Association also came to
support it.
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An interim Secession Committee was formed in the
first week of December with D.A. Mackay, the chairman of
the Penang Chamber of Commerce, as the chairman and
Ponnudurai, the president of the Penang Clerical and
Administrative Union as secretary. This committee decided
to hold a public meeting on 13 December 1948 to debate
the issue of Penang's secession from the Federation. At
the public meeting, which was held at the Chinese Town
Hall, the Penang and Province Wellesley Secession
Committee was formally created. It made a resolution that
the Settlement of Penang would adopt all constitutional
means for obtaining its secession from the Federation of
Malaya and the reversion of the Colony to the Straits
Settlements which according to them, "would be in the
best interests of Penang and Province Wellesley. ,,131
The Penang secession movement was purely a non-
Malay affair. Not even one Malay attended the public
meeting or became member of the committee for
secession. The Malays-- particulary in Penang-- came out
in strong opposition to the secession movement. An UMNO
official considered that such a move during the early
stages of the Emergency was bound to have a serious
effect on the feelings of the Malays. The Malay press,
such as Utusan Melayu, described it as a destructive
step, fraught with evil consequences for the people of
Malaya. 132
 The paper feared such action would lead to
inter-racial tension	 between the Malays and the
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immigrant races and it urged the return of Penang and
Province Wellesley to Kedah. Warta Ne gara, another Malay
newspaper regarded the separation of Penang from the
Federation as another "threat by 'foreigners' and
'aliens' to the existence of the Malays in their own
land. ,,133
As a response to the Penang secession movement,
an official of the Penang UMNO proposed that Malay
associations including the IvlNp should form a committee
to resist the movement. 134 However, it failed to
materialize, as the MNP feared the colonial government
might take action against it. Instead the Malays in
Penang held a mammoth public meeting on 8 January 1949.
It was attended by 2,000 Malays and their purpose was to
show they were united in opposition against secession.
The secession movement came at a
	 most
unfortunate time for the colonial government in Malaya.
During this time, Britain was planning to carry out a
special policy towards the Chinese community in order to
get their cooperation in the war against the Communist
guerrillas. It was the intention of the colonial
government to confer political rights on the Chinese
community, or other non-Malays through consultation and
consent between the Chinese and Malay leaders. However,
the secession movement increased the tension between both
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communities and made it more difficult for Britain to
bring Malay and Chinese leaders to the conference table.
MacDonald, the Commissioner-General, did not want
to hurt the feelings of the community leaders in Penang,
although he opposed the secessionist movement. Thus he
wrote to D.A.Mackay, one of the leaders of the
secessionist movement, to show his sympathy to the Penang
grievances. He wrote:
Penang has grievances regarding its
treatment within the Federation and
these must of course be dealt with
fairly by the authorities. I am certain
that the new High Commissioner will
consider them with a sympathetic mind.
In my opinion he should be given time
to consider the problem fully.135
Regarding Penang's economic complaints, MacDonald
pointed out that Dr.Benham would arrive in Malaya before
the end of December and would discuss with Henry Gurney,
his report and views on the economic problems faced by
Penang. He urged the secessionist leaders not to press
their claim until he could have an opportunity to discuss
with them the various moves by the government on certain
issues which were larger than those concerning the
constitutional position of Penang alone. He mentioned
some of the important plans being made	 by the
government	 for the security and well-being of the
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citizens of Penang, the Federation and also Singapore.
The plans were:
1. Diplomatic action is being sought to
strengthen co-operation between friendly
Governments against the Communist menace in
South-East Asia.
2. Conversations are pending which may lead to
agreement between the Malay leaders and
Chinese leaders on political relations between
the Malays and Chinese throughout Malaya.
3. Plans are being prepared for the closer
economic and political association of the
Federation and Singapore.136
MacDonald feared that the publicity connected
with the movement for secession in Penang might bring a
setback to government plans, but he did not suggest to
Mackay to abandon the plan for secession. He met the
Secession Committee members on 2 January 1949. Once again
he promised to deal with Penang's grievances, "but was
unprepared to concede secession." 137 He pointed out that:
1. The Penang secession agitation, if continued,
would cause a deplorable split in the Chinese
community in the Federation and Singapore,
since just as many good Chinese leaders were
opposed to secession as favoured it. This
would have deplorable effects on the influence
of the Chinese in Malayan affairs.
2. It would exacerbate interracial hostility
between the Malay and the Chinese....
3. The agitation would divide Penang from
Province Wellesley, for the Malays in the
Province would undoubtedly vote in favour of
continued adherence to the Federation.
4. The agitation would also divide Penang from
Malacca for it appeared that opinion in
Malacca would also favour continuation in the
Federation.
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5. It would postpone the day when a closer
association between the Federation and
Singapore became practical politics. The
Government's firm objective is to join the
Federation and Singapore more closely together
economicall administratively and
politically. 8
MacDonald agreed with Henry Gurney's view, that
the agitation "would not become a serious issue unless
the secessionists continued their campaign."- 39
 He
believed that the secession movement leaders seemed to be
in a mood to use the upheavals as a stick to beat and
pressure the government with the intention of getting
certain objectives	 other than just the declared
objective of secession which was impracticable. The
best solution for the government was to persuade the
secessionists to keep quiet.
As a consequence of his meeting with the
secession committee in Penang, MacDonald explored some of
the Straits Chinese leaders' views on this matter. T.W.
Ong told him that the British Straits-born Chinese
Association intended to hold a meeting in support of the
Penang secession movement. MacDonald argued that the
question of Penang's secession was primarily an internal
matter for the various members of the Federation 14 ° and
people "in Singapore, as residents of a separate
territory, should not interfere." He pointed out that "a
campaign in favour of ... [secession] would do terrible
damage to relations between the Chinese (including the
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Straits-born Chinese) and the Malays." 141 This would
prejudice the chances of much of the constructive work
for good relations between all communities in Malaya, and
for cooperative relations between the Federation and
Singapore.
On 20 January 1949 the Secession Committee
decided to move a resolution in favour of secession in
the Settlement Council which was due to meet on 10
February. Dr. Lee Tiang Keng decided to resign from the
Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) and second the
Resolution. 142 His action nearly wrecked the CLC, as the
Malay members considered that his attitude seemed "to
indicate insincerity on the part of a Chinese member of
the CLC itself." 143 The CLC decided to persuade the
Secession Committee against moving a debate on Penang's
secession by sending three of its members,
Thuraisingham, Khoo Teik Ee and C.C.Tan, to Penang. They
held discussions with eight of the members of the
committee and persuaded them to postpone the motion in
the Settlement Council. However, a slight majority of the
Committee were in favour of proceeding with the motion.
The Secession Movement Committee at the
Settlement Council moved a Resolution in favour of the
secession of Penang, an important step in their plans.
The Resident Commissioner of Penang gave an official
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reply that it was a proposition which the Federation
Government could not accept)-44 Futhermore, according to
him, the government Was already taking steps to solve
the economic and administrative difficulties which were
faced by Penang. He also allayed the fears of British
subjects regarding their rights. The motion was defeated
by a vote of ten in favour and fifteen, mostly official
members, against. However, according to The Straits
Times, ". . had a free vote been allowed, the motion would
have been carried by a convincing majority."145
After the defeat, the secessionists decided to
appeal to Arthur Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for
the Colonies through the government of Malaya. On 22 July
1949, a petition was presented to the Resident
Commissioner and in mid November 1949 it was despatched
to London. In January 1950, Henry Gurney made detailed
comments on the various points raised by the petitioners
for the attention of the Secretary of State for the
Colonies. 146
 He pointed out that the large majority of
the population of Penang did not appreciate the issues
raised by the petitioners. In his opinion, "...Penang
could never succeed in establishing a claim to separate
status as a Crown Colony.. "' He advised the Secretary
of State to highlight the consequences of granting the
petitioners' request which in his opinion would deprive
the people of the Settlement of the local autonomy which
they possessed at that time. He also pointed out that
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there were some flaws in the petitioners' argument. There
was, for example, a contradiction in D.A. Mackay's
statement with regard to the status of Province
Wellesley. According to Gurney, Mackay previously made
a statement that "Malacca and Province Wellesley whose
interests are similiar to the mainland [peninsular
Malaya], should be incorporated in the Federation.-48
However, in his speech in the Settlement Council on 10
February 1949, Mackay stated that Province Wellesley
"must remain part of the settlement [of Penang] •,,149
These two statements contradicted each other. Mackay
also refused to explain the question of returning Penang
to its former status".. .in association with
Singapore." 150 According to Gurney, Mackay was afraid to
expound on this subject as it would expose ". . .the
weakness and loose thinking of the .. . [petitioners']
case." 151 However, Gurney accepted the petitioners's
argument regarding "the limitations on the eligibility of
the British subjects of Penang for Federal citizenship
under clauses 124 and 125 of the Federal Agreement."152
He pointed out it was possible to remove these
disabilities. It was under the consideration of the
local goverment and the CLC. He hoped the outcome of the
discussions and the proposals to revise the whole of the
provisions of the Federal Agreement relating to
citizenship could adequately meet the requests of the
petitioners. Thus he advised the Secretary of State "that
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the reply [for the Petitioners] should wait until the
citizenship proposals had been agreed.. ,,153
One of the colonial officials felt it was unusual
at that time to receive a petition such as this from
Penang, "a dependant territory praying for the
continuance of Crown Colony status and for the abolition
of constitutional arrangements which might lead ... to
their severence from British Colonial rule." 154 However,
he also realized that the petition was not motivated
solely by affection for British rule. In his opinion the
underlying motive was undoubtedly a real fear among the
non-Malay community that their incorporation in the
Federation might in the long run mean that they would be
irrevocably part of a state in which Malay interests and
influence would predominate and British traditions and
interests might be submerged.155
In the meantime the Secretary of State travelled
out to Malaya to assess its problems. He arrived and met
the Penang Secession Committee at the end of May 1950. He
rejected the secession of Penang from Malaya and pointed
out in the meeting that ".. . the complete unity of all
the people of Malaya was needed to win the battle against
the terrorists." 156 However, he agreed that their rights
could not be sufficiently protected within the framework
of the Federal Agreement of 1948. He hoped that these
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problems would be solved by the CLC and the local
government.
In September 1951, the secessionists received a
full reply from the Secretary of State for the Colonies
which among other things mentioned that ". . . the
apprehensions of the petitioners were not well founded
and that a case has not been established either for
initiating action to change the status of Penang or for
the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate the
question further." 157
 By this time the secessionist
movement was long dead.158
The secession movement failed to remove Penang
from the Federation of Malaya or reconstitute the Straits
Settlements. However, the government did remove some of
the grievances of the Straits Chinese and business
communities. 159
 The Bill for the Banishment of British
Subjects, which had been opposed by the Straits Chinese,
was abandoned in 1949. The Custom Duties (Penang) Bill,
(1949) and the Rubber Excise (Penang) Bill (1949) were
presented and passed by the Federal Legislative Council.
Thus, the status of Penang as a free port was maintained.
The Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance
(1952) was introduced which made it easier for the
Chinese to become Federal citizens in comparison with
previous citizenship clauses in the Federal Agreement.
The Straits Chinese were confirmed in their right to
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enjoy their status as citizens of the United Kingdom and
Colonies, in addition to Federal citizenship. One of the
important leaders of the secession movement, Dr. Lee
Tiang Keng, was appointed as a "Member" for Health in
the Federal Government. This reduced the fear of the
Straits Chinese in Penang that they were given
inadequate representation in the Federal Government. In
fact, the Straits Chinese community was favoured and
over-representated on government bodies such as the
Settlement Councils of Malacca and Penang, and the
Federal Council in relation to the numbers of this
community. The British government also made an attempt to
merge Singapore with the Federation by forming a Joint
Co-ordination Committee in 1953. This Committee made a
serious attempt to persuade Malay leaders to discuss some
kind of union or partnership between Singapore and
Malaya.- 60
 It took ten years before Singapore merged
with Malaya, together with Sabah and Sarawak under the
Federation of Malaysia. But in 1965 Singapore was
separated from the Federation.
Conclusion
The colonial government, which was confronted by
Chinese political agitation against the Federation policy
of 1948, Communist	 terrorism-- a manifestation of
politics from China-- and the Penang secession movements,
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needed to change its policy towards the Chinese in
Malaya. The new policy to be introduced at the close of
1948 focussed on the process of Malayanization of the
Chinese community through the cultivation of .Malayan
Chinese awareness and denial of foreign (mainland China)
influence.
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CHAPTER VI
The Malayanization of Chinese Policy,
1948-1951
In response to the Communist insurrection, the
Chinese political agitation against Federal policy, the
Penang Secession Movement and developments in China, the
British government reemphasized the Malayanization of
their Chinese policy. The main aims were to defeat the
Communists and win support from the Chinese community.
The effort to achieve these goals had several facets:
1. The development of a Malayan-centred Chinese
political party.
2. The movement for inter-communal co-operation,
particularly on the issues of citizenship,
education, Malay economic problems, and the
future development of Malaya towards
responsible self-government. 	 -
3. The fusion of Malay and Chinese nationalism
into a Malayan nationalism which had as its
object the building of a Malayan nation of
different races.
Part 1
A Revival of a Chinese Policy
According to the Annual Report for 1948 of the
Department of Chinese Affairs, "1948 was a difficult year
for the Chinese community in the Federation." 1 First,
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they faced the future with uncertainty as a result of the
Federal policy which gave the Sultans and the Malay
representatives controlling powers over legislation and
also restrictions over citizenship rights for this
community. Second, they faced various problems after the
MCP launched an armed revolt against the Maiayan
government. The problems arose from the fact that the
Emergency was largely a Chinese affair.
The MC?, the guerrillas, and the Mm Yuen (the
civilian arm of the MC?) were maintained and supported by
the Chinese community. The Chinese squatters,
particularly in the remote settlements, provided food and
intelligence for these organizations. Thus government
operations to wipe out the Communist guerrillas in one
way or other affected the Chinese community. Some of the
measures to defeat the Communists involved large-scale
arrests and detentions of Chinese, the evacuation of
Chinese squatters and also the destruction of Chinese
settlements such as Kachau Village in Selangor. 2 In
certain circumstances, Chinese who were innocent but
suspected as Communists were shot on the spot by
government forces. 3 The Chinese themselves in fact became
the target of Communist attacks because they were
members or supporters of the Kuomintanci or because of
their failure to support and cooperate with the
guerillas.
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The Emergency also created interracial conflict
between the Chinese community and the Malays. The
conflict was aggravated by the fact that the local forces
used by the colonial government were mostly Malays,
against Communist guerrillas which were in effect
created and maintained by the Chinese community.
Meanwhile the Chinese public at large displayed a
"fence-straddling" attitude towards the government's
efforts to defeat the Communists.4
According to the Annual Report there were three
reasons why the Chinese community did not •come to support
and cooperate with the government in its effort to
suppress the Communists. 5
 First, they did not have much
confidence in the power of the government to maintain law
and order in the remote settlements, villages and small
towns. In fact, the power of the government in these
areas was never properly re-established since the end of
the Second World War. Second, the Chinese squatters were
too frightened of reprisals to give any information
regarding terrorist activities or movements. Third, the
Chinese had the least to lose from a Communist victory.
In fact, it should be noted that they would probably gain
something better if the Chinese dominated MCP took over
power, rather than remain in their present position
under the Federal policy. Furthermore, they were
unwilling to express public approval of a government
campaign which involved Chinese who were the victims of
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circumstances. These groups were those who were neither
guilty nor innocent but had been associated with the
Communists either on account of the patriotic common
front during the Japanese occupation or because they were
exposed by terrorist pressure and without protection of
the security forces.
With this background, the Department of Chinese
Affairs felt it was necessary to evolve a new or special
Chinese policy. This department admitted past policy on
the Chinese had been a mistake. According to the Annual
Report on Chinese affairs:
No attempt was made [after the War] to
curtail the freedom of association,
though for Chinese this had the
particular consequence of producing a
variety of organisations, some of which
were not consistent with the policy of
Malayanisation on account of their
China bias or of the civil unrest which
they were trying to bring about. 6
The Department of Chinese Affairs pointed out the
need for a special policy for the Chinese community which
it described as "one of bringing the maximum pressure on
all persons whose behaviour was prolonging the emergency
while, at the same time, encouraging the Chinese to
believe that the Federal government was fundamentally
concerned for their well-being in the country and wishes
as a first step to increase the liaison between
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government and the Chinese community which had been
interrupted after the return of the Civil government in
l946." This department also stressed that the Federal
government had the responsibilty "not to allow the
Chinese to imagine that their position was deteriorating
so rapidly as to make it likely that their morale and
loyalties would disappear completely."8
Henry Gurney, who replaced Gent as a High
Commissioner of Malaya, shared the same view as the
Departrent of Chinese f fairs on policy towards the
Chinese community. He wrote to Creech Jones, Secretary of
States for the Colonies, that it was necessary to have a
special policy regarding the Chinese. In his view, "the
Malayanisation of the Chinese will be a long and
difficult process in which wise guidance and help will be
required at every step." 9
 He also pointed out that there
was a comparative lack among the Chinese of the kind of
public spirit which was the essential basis of true
democracy." 1 ° These facts, he argued, would impair
Britain's "well-intentioned attempts to lay the
foundations of Malayan democratic government."11
Henry Gurney also agreed with the Department of
Chinese Affairs' view that past policy on the Chinese had
been a mistake. In his opinion, as a result of the
previous policy, "on the one hand, there was an enormous
expansion of the Kuomintang, whose interests and outlook
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were completely bound up with Nationalist China and on
the other hand, the attempted regimentation of Malayan
labour by the Malayan Communist Party, who were
undoubtedly acting under orders from Moscow." 12
 The final
result of the previous policy was the emergency, "which
has compelled the Malayan government to interfere with
the freedom of the individual in a way unknown in Malaya
since the British have been associated with its
government. ,,13
The developments in China also induced the local
government to reemphasize the need for a policy for
"Malayanising the Chinese." 14 At the end of 1948 , it
seemed that events in China were more dangerous for the
Malayan government than the Communist revolt in Malaya
itself. The Communists in China looked certain to defeat
the Kuomintang and take over a large part of that
country. The Malayan government feared the "excitement
about the news from China would affect the Chinese
community in Malaya's attitude towards the government and
towards other communities in this country." 15 Henry
Gurney was of the opinion that it was clearly in the
interests of the Chinese " to cut themselves adrift from
China especially now that the Communists seem likely to
secure control of the whole country." "If possible"
said Gurney, "the prospect of becoming Malayan must be
made more attractive to them."
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The colonial government began to evolve a new
Chinese policy at the end of 1948. Among the steps that
were taken, was holding of a discussion on the liaison
aspect of the new policy. According to the Annual Report
on Chinese Affairs, "the revival of the Chinese Advisory
Boards and support for the proposed Malayan Chinese
Association were undoubtedly the most important features
of this part of the policy." 17 Another part of the new
policy "was the establishment of a Government Committee
to investigate the squatter problems and make
recommendations and proposal to appoint two Chinese
speaking 'squatter officers', in order to encourage the
Chinese to look for understanding and confidence from the
Government. ,,18
The Department of Chinese Affairs pointed out
that ". . . the special problems connected with the Chinese
community, problems which impinged on internal security,
tenure of land... and on the political question of the
prospects of the Chinese in the Federation, were not easy
to solve." 19 It stressed that the role of the government
should be like the Chinese community's doctor;" giving it
unpleasant medicine now in order to bring it back to
health and ensuring it a place under the Malayan sun."20
The British government realized that in order to
win support of and Malayanize the Chinese community it
needed to amend the Federal citizenship clause which
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restricted citizenship rights for this community. It
also realized that any steps taken towards this direction
would antagonize the Malays. Thus it needed to encourage
the Malays to adopt an accommodating attitude towards
Chinese demands. On the other hand, the government also
realized the fear among the Malay leaders of Chinese
economic power. Thus the local government encouraged the
Chinese and the Malay leaders to solve their problems
through tconsultation and consent" between both
communities' leaders. At the same time it needed to
encourage the formation of a Chinese association,
equivalent to UT4NO, to represent this community.
Part 11
The Development of Malavan-Centred Chinese Politic:
The Malavan Chinese Association
As a result of the Communist insurrection, the
British attitude towards "foreign Chinese political
parties" changed. The liberal policy which had been
introduced after the Second World War was replaced by
the policy of the Malayanization of Chinese politics. In
July 1948 the MCP, its youth wing and Ex-Comrades
Association and other Communist-led organizations had
been declared illegal. 	 On 25 February 1949, just two
days before the inauguration of the Malayan Chinese
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Association, British officials in Malaya and Singapore
took steps to ban other "foreign Chinese political
parties" including the China Democratic League and China
Democracy Promotion Society. 21
 The British considered the
existence of foreign-centred political parties as a risk
to internal security in the Federation and in Singapore,
particularly after the establishment of Communist
government in China. The local government feared these
political parties might easily become instruments of the
Communists or other active forms of support for Communist
"bandits" in Malaya. At this stage, the government felt
it unnecessary to take action against the Kuomintang
"which in any case ... [during that time] appears to be
dying naturally." 22
 Thus British officials created a
political vacuum in the Chinese community and prepared
the ground for the building of a locally-centred
Malayan Chinese Association as a new force in Malayan
Chinese politics.
There was no doubt that the local government
played an important role in the formation of the MCA.
However the idea for the formation of this organization
was conceived by Tan Cheng Lock during the war. As the
present writer has indicated, Tan Cheng Lock informed
the Secretary of State for the Colonies in September 1943
of the intention of the Malayan Chinese to form this
association. However "the formation of the MCA did not
materialise when Cheng Lock first proposed it, as no
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support for the idea was forthcoming from the colonial
authorities" 23 or the Chinese community. According to
Heng Pek Koon, "Cheng lock himself did not possess the
organisational resources and support base to successfully
launch a pan-Malayan political party."24
At first, Tan Cheng Lock made an attempt to form
a Malayan Chinese League in early May 1948. Its main aim
was:
To wean the China-born Chinese from
China and Chinese politics and
encourage them to transfer their love,
for the good of all concerned including
themselves, to Malaya which should aim
at attaining to full dominion status
within the British Commonwealth and
Empire, through the organization of the
Malayan Chinese League ... with a view
ultimately to merging it in or
affiliating it with a Malayan Nationa
Unity League... to embrace all races.2
According to a Political Intelligence Report of
15 January 1949, Tan Cheng Lock's attempt fell flat, but
he was "still active in urging unity among the Chinese
who are prepared to make Malaya their home." 26
 On 5
December 1948, once again Tan Cheng Lock mentioned his
intention of forming a Malayan Chinese Association in his
speech to the Malacca Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 27
 The
moderate Chinese leaders who were also members of the
Federal Council came to support this proposal. The
Department of Chinese Affairs also supported it. In its
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Annual Report for 1948, it mentioned that the "...
support for the proposed Malayan Chinese Association was
undoubtedly the most important feature	 ...	 [of
Britain's new ] .. . policy." 28 MacDonald, Commissioner
General, welcomed this idea for the formation of a
Chinese tIAssociationI but considered the timing to
announce the proposals of its formation was unsuitable.
He wrote to Tan Cheng Lock on 15 December 1948:
• . [I] . . . am personally averse to steps
being taken in this direction at the
moment.I think it would be wise to have
the proposed talks with some of our
Malay friends in the first instance.
Propaganda in favour of the formation
of the [Malayan Chinese] Association
before that might be misunderstood and
arouse suspicions amongst the Malays.
After preliminary talks have taken
place, there could be no such
misunderstanding. ,,29
However, before Malay opinion was sought, Tan Cheng Lock
and the Chinese members of the Federal Council began to.
organize the MCA. On 19 December, Gurney send a telegram
to the Colonial Office informing them that the step was
being under-taken by the leading Chinese to form an
association which would be open to all who regard Malaya
as their home. 3 ° The object of this association was to
co-operate with the government and other communities in
restoring peace and good order in the country. According
to Anthony Short, "Rules were being drafted and were to
be discussed with Gurney."31
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On .29 December 1948, the first Sino-Malay talks
were held in Johore Eharu, attended by Tan Cheng Lock,
Dato Onn and other Malay and Chinese leaders. According
to Thio Chan Bee who also attended this meeting, Tan
Cheng Lock sought the approval of the Malay leaders for
his proposals to form the Malayan Chinese Association.32
He mentioned that the objective of the proposed MCA was
"to co-operate with the Malays to build a new nation."33
Thus there was no reason for the Malays to oppose this
proposal.
In the meantime, Gurney also held a discussion
with MacDonald on Chinese proposals to form the MCA, and
interracial problems. On 6 January 1949, he wrote to
MacDonald:
Malay feeling against the Chinese is
building up rapidly. This is only to be
expected when the fight with the
bandits is largely between Malay Police
and Chinese and I should be grateful
for anything you can do to bring home
to the Chinese the grave danger in
which, in my view, their good name in
Malaya now stands. As I said to you
[MacDonald] I do not think there is any
time to lose in getting the Malayan
Chinese Association formed and into
active operation. Responsible Chinese
are wasting their time talking about
the secession of Penang while their
Rome is burning.
From this time onwards, Gurney and MacDonald
continued to put pressure on the moderate Chinese leaders
to organize the proposed MCA. On 25 January 1949 Gurney
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held a meeting with Chinese leaders including H.S. Lee,
Yang Shook Lin and Khoo Teck Ee. 35 He tried to persuade
them to accept the restoration of peace and order as a
prominent objective of the association. On 15 February
MacDonald held discussions with some Singapore Chinese
leaders such as Lee Kong Chian and Thio Chan Bee
regarding the proposed talks of the CLC and also
regarding squatter problems. He informed them that Gurney
would hold a dicussion with the proposed MCA members in
order to inform them about government policy on squatter
problems and also to seek their opinion on that matter.36
It was no doubt the government's intention to
pressurize the proposed MCA to support government policy
and get their cooperation regarding the Chinese
squatters. It was made known to the Chinese leaders that
the government would take strong action against the
squatters including the repatriation of large numbers of
squatters from particular areas where the record of
support for the terrorists and murders was bad. Tan
Cheng Lock, however, was in favour of resettlement of the
squatters rather than repatriation. According to the
Annual Report of Chinese Affairs:
This dawning realisation prepared the
ground for the remarkable response to
the Malayan Chinese Association-a
response born almost of despair-and a
willingness to speak up on behalf of
the squatters not merely as unfortunate
individuals deserving pity but as the
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primary obstacle to the restoration of
peace in Malaya and therefore a
responsibility for the Chinese
community.37
In the meantime, according to Heng Pek Koon,
the representatives of the Kuomintang (Nationalist)
government in China, knowing the fall of Peking was
imminent, used their remaining time to mobilise support
for the proposed MCA which they hoped would take the
place of the Kuomintang as instruments of propagation of
the Nationalist cause to the Chinese in Malaya. 38
 This
role was obvious in the formation of the proposed MCA
branches at the state level. For instance, a few weeks
before the inaugural meeting of the MCA, Haji Ibrahim Ma,
the Kuomintang consul in Ipoh, took steps to prepare the
groundwork for the formation of a society to become the
Perak Branch of the MCA. The proposed society was not
formed, but the Chinese consul was able to spread pro-MCA
feelings among the most prominent Chinese leaders in
Perak. He also appealed to them to attend the inaugural
meeting of the proposed MCA in Kuala Lumpur. He also
directed the local Chinese guilds and associations in
various states to help organize the setting up of MCA
branches.
Towards the end of February the colonial
government took steps to 	 ban China-oriented Chinese
political parties such as CLD and paved the way for the
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emergence of the MCA. The British also, through
diplomatic channels, took steps not to let the proposed
MCA be used by Communist China as its instrument to
support the Communist terrorists. During this time it was
urgent to launch the MCA as a counterbalance to what in
Britain's view was "Tan Kah Kee's recent ill-judged
telegram of congratulation to the Communist leaders in
China which had created some dismay and uncertainty in
Chinese circles in the Federation." 39 The government also
took steps to ban or prohibit the organization of
Kuomintang branches by repealing the Societies Ordinance
(Amendment) of 1947. In actual fact this was done in
1950. By this time the Kuomintang government had been
defeated by the Communist Party and withdrew to the
island of Taiwan.
After nearly three months of discussion and
preparation, an inaugural meeting of the MCA was held on
27 February 1949 in Kuala Lumpur. 40 It was sponsored by
the sixteen Chinese members of the Federal Council. The
majority of them were prominent Chinese Chambers of
Commerce and Chinese guilds and associations (hua y kuan)
leaders. Among them were H. S. Lee, Leong Yew Koh and
Khoo Teik Ee. The Straits Chinese leaders who sponsored
this meeting were Tan Cheng Lock, Tan Siew Sin, Ee Yew
Kim, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng and Mrs. B. H. Oon, Tan Cheng
Lock was appointed as a chairman of the Protem Committee
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and the first president, Yang Shook Lin was the Secretary
General and Khoo Tek Ee was treasurer.
The appointment of Tan Cheng Lack received the
clear endorsement of the Commissioner-General and the
High Commissioner of Malaya. At first it was MacDonald
who convinced Gurney that Tan Cheng Lock was the most
suitable choice f or the President of the MCA. He wrote to
Gurney as follows:
[Tan Cheng Lock] commands high
respect amongst many of the Chinese,
leaders and others, in ... [many ] parts
of the Federation and in
Singapore. . . .they [the Chinese leaders]
recognise his power as a public figure
amongst	 the	 politically	 minded
Chinese. . .he was almost wholly
responsible for the famous Hartal, by
which the Chinese sought to express
their dissatisfaction with the Federal
Constitution. In other ways and on
other occasions then, he was the most
influential voice in the Chinese
circles.. . . Even the Chinese in
Penang-- though they were then more or
less led by a man of real wisdom, Ong
Chong Ken--	 submitted to his
influence .
He added that:
[The moderate Chinese leaders were
afraid] that if ... [Tan Cheng Lock] was
not the President of MCA he might, go
off at a wild tangent [mix with the
radical elements] ... and would drag a
lot of other Chinese with him.
Elevating him to the official
leadership is partly an insurance
policy against this. '
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MacDonald himself admitted Tan Cheng Lock had his own
merits for assumption of the leadership of the Chinese
community. According to MacDonald, Tan Cheng Lock "had
a longer experience of politics, a greater and more
courageous outspokenness on public platforms than most of
the other Chinese leaders.u43 Gurney agreed with
MacDonald's view on the quality of Tan Cheng Lock as a
leader of the MCA. He wrote to J.J. Paskin, the head of
the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office as follows:
He commands considerable respect among
the Chinese. He is 66 years old; he
has had experience in Malayan policies,
he is sincere; and he is able to rise
above the arguments of the different
dialect groups in Chinese society. He
is sincere in his efforts to do the
best for the Chinese. He has, therefore
a strong influence with moderate
Chinese opinion here. He is still
independent and will support the
government if he is convinced that the
Government desires to treat the Chinese
fairly.44
Athough the government gave full backing to the
formation of the MCA, it failed to influence this body
to make a public declaration that it was on the
government's side in restoring peace and order in the
country. The president of the MCA only hightlighted the
desire of this organization for "attaining inter-communal
understanding and friendship, particularly, between the
Malay and Chinese. . . . He also pointed out the desire
of the Chinese to unite amongst themselve and with other
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communities to "make this land, which feeds, nourishes,
and sustains ... [them] , [as I one country and one nation
and the object of their loyalty, love and devotion."46
Towards June 1949 some more points were added to
the MCA's objectives. Among others were : "To safeguard
the interests and welfare of the Chinese socially,
economically and politically through legal and
constitutional means; and to maintain law and order so
that Malaya will achieve peaceful and orderly
progress." 47 The addition of the last point reflected the
MCA's willingness to compromise with the government.
The latter wished this body to declare its support for
the government side in maintaining law and order in the
country. The MCA maintained the link with the
government in other ways. The MCA's constitution stated
explicitly that the "Chinese members of the Legislative
and Executive Councils would automatically become
officers of the Association." 48
 Thus according to Khong
Kim Hoong, ". . . the Government would have a direct
influence in the decision-making bodies of the
Association" as some of its officials were nominated
indirectly by the government.49
The MCA, as the handmaiden of the government,
was asked to perform a special role or "duties" in
government efforts to defeat the Commmunist insurgency.
266
According to Anthony Short, from the beginning "it was
asked to assist the police in the penetration of the MCP,
to comment on CID classification of detainees; to arrange
sureties ; and to promote incidents of surrender." 5 ° The
most well-known MCA role in counter-insurgency was in
relation to the squatter problem. In order to deny the
Communists any support from the squatters, they were
resettled in "New villages" which were completely
fenced-in with barbed wire and guarded by the local
police forces. 51 The resettlement scheme was implemented
by Lt. General Harold Briggs, Director of Operations, in
the middle of 1950. By the end of 1952, 470,509 had been
settled in 440 New Villages throughout Malaya. The MCA
was asked to provide social services for the Chinese
community in the 'New Villages'. It was allowed by the
government to conduct public lotteries in order to
obtain money f or the purpose of funding social service
for the benefit of the 'New Villages'. The MCA itself
gained some benefit from conducting public lotteries. At
first only MCA members were allowed to take part in
these gambling activities. Thus the people who wanted to
take part in these lotteries would join the organization.
The MCA also was able to spread its influence among
the Chinese in the 'New Villages' as it was the only
Chinese organization to help them. However, as a
consequence its leaders and supporters were labelled as
"running dogs" of the government and became targets for
terrorist attacks.
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Part 111
The Communities Liaison Committee
The Communities Liaison Committee was an
unofficial body but in fact it was a policy making avenue
for the colonial government in Malaya. Ideas, originating
from the government, were put forward	 by MacDonald,
(either directly or through the Chinese leaders) for
discussion by this body. Later it adopted them as its own
and forwarded them back to the government. The government
then took steps to make a further study on the CLC's
proposals and adopted them as government policy. The
members of the CLC were prominent leaders of the UMNO,
MCA and others. The meetings of this body "were held in
sanctum santorum such as the ... [Commissioner] -General's
house at Johore Bahru, King's House in Kuala Lumpur (the
residence of the British High Commissioner) and ..
Government House in Penang." 52 The colonial government
played an important role in guiding and giving ideas on
the subjects	 to be discussed and the timing of the
meetings.	 MacDonald, Commissioner-General told the
Colonial Office that;
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Our (the government) tactics are to
complete discussion of these economic
problems before we consider the
political aspects of relations between
the communities. If the Malays feel
assured, as a result of these
discussions, that the Chinese and other
communities are in earnest in their
desire to improve the economic position
of the Malays, and that practical
results are likely to follow the
Committee's deliberations in this
field, then I [MacDonald] think the
Malays will be ready to be fairly
forthcoming in political discussion.
They realise that it will then be for
them to make some concessions to the
non-Malay communities.
Malcolm MacDonald was the architect of the
Communities Liaison Committee which was formed to solve
interracial conflict in the face of the MCP insurrection.
In early November 1948, MacDonald held a series of
personal discussions with Malay and Chinese leaders in
the hope of getting them to meet each other and make a
serious attempt to reach agreement on inter-communal co-
operation and aims in the Federation and Singapore. He
was able to persuade Dato Onn and won over Tan Cheng
Lock, who had led the critics of government policy under
the Federal constitution to work together in the
formation of the 5mb-Malay Goodwill Committee. 54 Henry
Gurney, the High Commissioner of the Federation and
Gimson, the Governor of Singapore also played an
important part. Gurney and Gimson worked closely together
to avoid taking action that might discourage the Chinese
leaders from attending the proposed Malay Goodwill
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Committee. For instance Gurney asked Gimson to defer the
introduction of the bill dealing with the banishment of
the British subjects from the Settlements of Penang and
Malacca. Gimson informed Gurney that:
I understand that considerable progress
is being made with arrangements for
full discussions between Dato Onn and
leading representatives of the Chinese
Community in Malaya. . . to reconcile
differences in view point between
Malays and Chinese. Meeting has been
arranged for 29th December [1948]
Malcolm MacDonald is to be present.
Cancellation of meeting might easily
result if you proceed with legislation
which will make Straits born Chinese
subject to banishment. . .
The first meeting between the Malay and Chinese
leaders was held at Dato Onn's house in Johore on 29
December 1948. The Chinese leaders who were invited to
attend the meeting, or in fact Ildinnerli were C.C.Tan,
S.Q. Wong, Lim Han Hoe, Thio Chan Bee, Lee Kong Chian,
Tan Chin Tuan, Tan Cheng Lock, Yong Shook Lin, and Khoo
Teik Ee. Most of them were from Singapore except the last
three. The second meeting was held in a club in Penang
where the Penang Chinese Councillors acted as hosts. At
the second meeting, five Malays and five Chinese leaders
were selected to continue discussions and try to work out
details of an agreement for interacial cooperation. The
five Malays were led by Dato Onn. The Chinese group
consisted of the leading Federal Councillors such as Yong
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Shook Lin from Kuala Lumpur, Dr. Lee Tiang Keng of Penang
and also Tan Cheng Lock and C. C. Tan, a member of the
Singapore Legislative Council. 56 Malcolm MacDonald
considered the selection and participation of members
from Singapore important, as he and Gurney and Gimson
hoped "at a later stage these talks may help them to
bring the Federation and Singapore closer together in
some form."57
The Sino-Malay Goodwill Committee faced its first
snag as there was no suitable member to serve as
chairman. The Malay and Chinese leaders asked MacDonald
to become chairman of the Committee. However, he refused
this suggestion, on the grounds that he was not a member
of the Committee and he attended the meeting as an
observer. In his opinion, the discussions of the
Committee should be wholly the responsibility of the
unofficial committee leaders. As an observer he had the
right to take part in the discussions but without making
any commitment. The members agreed with his view, and one
of them proposed that Dato Onn should be their chairman.
Dato Onn also refused on the ground that "he wished to be
free to take a full part in the discussions without the
possible inhibitions of a chairman who has to seek to
reconcile divergent partizan points of view." 58 In this
situation he suggested Thuraisingharn, the Ceylonese
Federal Legislative Councillor as a chairman whom he
hoped to be a more 'neutral' individual. MacDonald also
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gave a suggestion to the Chinese and Malay leaders to add
members from other communities to the Committee,
including members from the Indian, Eurasian and European
communities. 59
 Thus the Sino-Malay Goodwill Committee was
renamed as the Communities Liaison Committee or CLC.
According to MacDonald, the first and second meetings of
the CLC, ". . .revealed a possible basis for agreement
between the Malays and Chinese on both economic and
political questions." He told the Colonial Office that
"it would be foolish to over estimate their importance at
this stage, for the discussions wre concerned mostly
with general principles." 61 "Nevertheless," he added,
"Some of the most controversial questions, e g. the
conditions applying to Federal citizenship, were probed,
and a goodly measure of agreement appeared possible."62
"Moreover, "he continued, "the meetings have engendered
quite a lot of sincere goodwill between the two
communities, and a resolve to continue the discussions
in the hope of achieving practical results over a wide
area of subjects."63
The CLC held its third meeting in Johore Bahru on
9 and 10 February 1949.64 The meeting proceeded to
discuss the economic position of the Malays, with a view
to seeing what help the Chinese might give towards (a)
the greater employment of Malays in industry, etc. and
(b) the taking up by Malays of positions of
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responsibility in business affairs. Later they discussed
political relations between the Malays and the non-
Malays, ie. the introduction of non-Malays into
administrative services and the qualifications for
Federal citizenship. The Committee also discussed
education, particularly with a view to bringing up
children in Malaya as Malayan with a sense of Malayan
citizenship, patriotism and outlook.65
During the third meeting, the members of the
CLC's attention also focussed on another problem faced by
Malaya. The people in Penang had announced their
intention to move a resolution in favour of secession on
10 February 1949 at the meeting of the Penang Settlement
Council. 66 One of the CLC members from Penang, Dr.Lee
Tiang Keng did not attend the CLC in Johore Bahru as he
had been invited to second the resolution in the
Settlement Council Debate. Data Gantang raised the
matter at the CLC meeting and said that Dr. Lee Tiang
Keng's attitude seemed to indicate insincerity on the
part of Chinese members of the Committee. The Malays
strongly opposed the secession of Penang from the
Federation of Malaya, which was likely to raise
intercommunal quarrels on a grave scale. In the Malays'
opinion Dr.Lee's action was a challenge to the very
purposes for which the CLC had been formed. Thus they
wondered whether there was any point in the CLC
proceeding with its work.
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Other CLC members including the Chairman,
Thuraisingham and the Chinese members also strongly
disapproved of Dr. Lee's action. The Committee decided
that three of its members Thuraisingham, Khoo Teik Ee and
C.C. Tan-- should fly to Penang and persuade the members
of the Secession Comittee to postpone the proposed debate
on the secession of Penang. The CLC made a resolution
urging this, on the grounds that a debate at this time
would prejudice the prGspect of closer inter-communal
understanding and cooperation which at that time appeared
quite bright. However, one of the Secession Committee
members strongly opposed any postponement of the debate
on Penang secession.67
The Malays felt very hurt by the action of the
Penang secession movement. In their view, there was
little goodwill on the part of individuals in other
communities towards a movement for intercommunal co-
operation. Thus they decided to postpone any further
discussion by the CLC. However, MacDonald persuaded them
and pointed out that this action was unreasonable and
unfair, and he urged the CLC to carry on its meetings
regardless of the Penang 'incident' . At last, the
Committee agreed and they decided to hold a meeting in
Kuala Lumpur on 18,19, and 20 February 1949.
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The fourth meeting of the CLC was held in Kuala
Lumpur on 18 and 19 February. According to MacDonald, the
Malays had somewhat recovered from their anger at the
Penang secessionists' conduct at the previous meeting.68
The agenda for this meeting and also for the next meeting
in Ipoh was based on the economic problems of the Malays.
The discussion of the economic problems of the
Malays was carried out in four Sessions of the Committee.
It began with the examination of the problem of 'economic
adjustment' between the various communities in Malaya.
The members of the Committee agreed on a resolution that
it was of great importance for the non-Malays
themselves and the Malays to cooperate in every possible
way to improve the economic position of the Malays.
Therefore the Malays should take a full share in the
economic life of the country. The Malays pointed out that
they could not àornpete with the Chinese, who they alleged
used bribery to enable them to get licences for business,
trade and other things. As a result, they said, the
Malays were at a disadvantage and would never have an
equal chance against the Chinese in establishing
themselves in small businesses and trades. The members
decided to draft a resolution for the government to
tighten up legislation, in order to eliminate bribery and
corruption. The Malays also pointed out that the Chinese
had a virtual monopoly on major economic activities such
as transport and others. The Committee made a formula to
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ensure the Malays achieved economic parity with the non-
Malays. It was suggested that the Malays' share in
business should be increased, and that a partnership
should be created between this community and the Chinese.
At the Kuala Lumpur meeting, the British plan to
promote interracial cooperation had achieved some
encouraging results. According to MacDonald:
a. members of each community spoke quite frankly
about the other communities, and no-one took
offence at this;
b. The Chinese and other non-Malays showed great
readiness to make concessions to the Malays in
the economic field;
c. The Malays were impressed with this and lost
something at least of their suspicions of the
bona f ides of the non-Malays on the
Committee.	 69
The discussion of the economic problems of the
Malays was continued in other CLC meetings until May
1949. The CLC found a formula to help improve the
economic position of the Malays as follows:
1. The government should subsidise Malay business
ventures and set up trade schools to train the
Malays, in order to enable them to participate
in the modern economic sector.
2. Certain industries should be opened to the
Malays, such as the transport sector.
3. Preferential treatment should be given to the
Malays in the allocation of educational and
employment opportunities.
4. Non-Malay businessmen and employers should
increase the proportion of Malay participation
in all economic sectors, such as tin-mining,
rubber industries and retail trades.7°
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After an interval of three months the CLC resumed
its meetings in August 1949.71 The most controversial
subjects were the 'special position' of the Malays and
the Federal citizenship clause in the Federal
Constitution. As the present writer has indicated
elsewhere, the Chinese leaders strongly opposed the
Federal citizenship clause which denied the majority of
Chinese Malayan citizenship, either by automatic
operation of the law or through application and
naturalization. It took the CLC quite a long time to come
to terms on this matter. Actually MacDonald himself
realized that discussion on "the political aspects of
relations between the various communities was the most
difficult part of the CLC's task" and "might end in wide
disagreement between the members of the committee."72
However, at least the CLC was able to reach a
tentative agreement on some political matters. On the
question of qualifications for federal citizenship, it
was agreed to accept the principle that only those who
owed Malaya their loyalty and regarded Malaya as their
permanent home should qualify for citizenship. The
Committee stressed that the loyalty must be an 'undivided
loyalty' which rejected dual citizenship or nationality.
The Chinese members made a suggestion that all non-Malays
born in the Federation and permanently domiciled there
should become citizens automatically by process of law.
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These suggestions were similiar to the suggestion by H.
S. Lee and Leong Yew Koh, the Chinese representatives in
the Consultative Committee who published a minority
report. Braddell, the tJlvlNO Legal Adviser, who was also a
member of the CLC, supported the Chinese proposals. The
Malays, particularly Dato Onn did not flatly oppose
them. The attitude of the Malays seemed to have changed
very much following the Malayan Union regarding the
question of citizenship for the non-Malays. Dato Onn
himself admitted that they would not have considered for
a moment any such suggestion three years ago. He said
that the Malays accepted the idea that everyone,
irrespective of race, who really owed undivided loyalty
to Malaya and regarded the country as his permanent home,
where he would live and die, should be admitted to
Federal citizenship. According to MacDonald, however,
Dato Onn still "expressed scepticism about the strength
of the loyalty of some of the people involved, and
indicated that the Malays must have time to consider the
proposals very carefully."73
On some other political matters, the CLC
unanimously agreed that "the aim of the Federation of
Malaya is the establishment of self-government with
sovereign status, and that a nationality should be
created for all qualifield citizens irrespective of
races"
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On some matters, such as the relationship between
the Federation and Singapore and the possibility of the
amalgamation of both, the Committee could not decide,
while on the subject of education it was agreed that:
1. the teaching of the Malay language should be
compulsory in all Government and state-aided
primary schools.
2. Every facility should be given for the
progressive elimination of communal shools,
and the establishment of central schools to be
attended by children of all races together,
the medium of instruction in these schools
being Malay or English.75
As part of the British policy of the
Malayanization of the Chinese, MacDonald suggested that
the display of pictures of Sun Yat Sen, Chiang Kai Shek
and Mao Tse Tung in Chinese Schools be prohibited, and
that the Chinese should be discouraged from hanging up
the Chinese flag.
The next meeting was held at the residence of the
Commissioner-General at Bukit Serene on 14 to 16
September 1949. After this meeting the CLC released its
major statement, which among other things proposed:
1. There should be a thorough reconsideration of
the citizenship provisions of the Federal
Constitution.
2. That as soon as circumstances permit,
legislation should be introduced for the
election of members to the several
legislatures within the Federation of Malaya.
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3. That elections should be introduced for
municipalities and states that were ready.
4. That the government should begin preparations
on an electoral law.
5. That the franchise should be based on Federal
citizenship.
6. That the teaching of Malay and English
languages should be compulsory in all
government and government-aided schools.76
In early 1950, the CLC was able to reach
unanimous agreement on the citizenship issue. It resolved
"that the jus soli should be introduced forthwith in each
of the Malay states, so that all persons of Asiatic or
Eurasian parentage who are born in that state, are
thereby entitled ... [to them to become] Federal Citizens
under	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 present	 Federal
constitution. 1,77 This was a major concession made by
Dato Onn to Tan Cheng Lock's demands. It was made after
the Chinese leaders agreed on the "implementation of a
Malay special rights policy" and "economic privileges."78
The Government Response to the CLC's Pro posals--
The Citizenship Issue
As a consequence of the CLC discussion, the
British government began to draft a new bill in the
middle of 1951 to amend the Federation Agreement with a
view of relaxing the citizenship provisions in favour of
non-Malays. On 23 August 1951, the Attorney-General
forwarded the new bill for a discussion in a conference
between the High Commissioner, the Resident Commissioner,
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and British Advisers, held at King's House, Kuala
Lumpur. 79 However, the British government did not fully
adopt the CLC suggestion on the qualifications for
citizenship--including the principle of the lus soli.
According to Heng Pek Khon, the reason for the colonial
government's withdrawal of complete support for this
principle was based on "its concern that the sudden
granting of citizenship to large numbers of non-Malays,
potentially more than 50% of the voting population, would
be both destabilizing and politically unacceptable to
the Malays." 80 The purpose of the bill was to provide
citizenship for the non-Malays who demonstrated their
assimilation "to this country's way of life" 81 but it
stressed the need to safeguard the Malays against
"submergence by alien ways of life." Acccording to L.
Finkelstein, the chief advantage of the provisions under
this bill over the earlier terms of the Federal Agreement
was that naturalization no longer required a
demonstration of literacy, but merely ability "to speak
the Malay or English language with reasonable
proficiency. ,,82
As the government itself could not accept all the
recommendations of the CLC on the subject of Federal
citizenship, Chinese leaders such as H.S. Lee, the
president of the ACCC considered that the CLC's efforts
had proven fruitless and asked the British government for
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the appointment of an independent body or a royal
commission to make a report on the constitution of the
Federation of Malaya. They also wished recommendations to
be made on the removal of the grievances of a very large
section of the Malayan population. 83
 The ACCC argued, how
"will the Federation of Malaya become a self-governing
country if these hundreds of thousands of Chinese were
not granted the rights to which they are entitled by
their birth?" 84
 The MCA reaction to the bill was
reported to be divided. Tan Cheng Lock opposed the bill
strongly and demanded that the government appoint a
royal commission. According to him, a proper process of
Malayanization of the Chinese could not be achieved
without the extension of jus soli to the non-Malays and a
generous offer to the China-born Chinese. 85
 According to
him, the "only effective way of weaning the China-born
Chinese from being obsessed with Chinese national
politics is to make a generous offer of Malayan
citizenship, as, -for instance, that enunciated in the
original Malayan Union scheme of 1945.,86
The Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment)
Ordinance (1951) did not satisfy either the Malays or the
non-Malays. However, this amendment was actually more
liberal than the original Federal Citizenship. It enabled
nearly half of the Chinese population in Malaya to become
Malayan citizens. The Federal of Malaya Agreement
(Amendment Ordinance (1951) was referred 	 to a select
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committee for further examination and become Law in 1952.
Education Issue
As a result of the CLC's proposals on the need to
change the education system, the government appointed a
committee in 1951, under the chairmanship of L. J.
Barnes, Director of Social Training, Oxford University.
This committee consisted of nine Malays and five European
members. The aims of the Barnes Committee were
enquire into the adequacy or otherwise of the educational
facilities available for the Malays." 87
 However, it also
had a hidden motive which, according to J. E. Jayasuria
was, "to strike a death blow to Chinese schools with
their persistent communist threat. ,,88 The Committee
released a report which was known as the Report of the
Committee on Malay Education or Barnes Report in June
1951. The Barnes Report reflected the government's
intention to encourage the Maláyanization of the Chinese
and other non-Malays through the education system. The
report made a recommendation for the termination of
government aid to vernacular schools and the formation of
an interracial National School at primary level. This
National School would be open to all pupils regardless of
race and staffed by teachers who were Federal citizens
and possessed the proper qualifications. The mediums of
instruction were to be only in Malay and English. The
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Report demanded that non-Malay communities make some
sacrifices. It said:
When all this has been said, the fact
remains, that Chinese and Indians are
being asked to give up gradually their
own vernacular schools, and to send
their children... to schools where
Malay is the only oriental language
taught.
We repeat here that our proposed new
school is conceived as a school of
citizenship, a nation-building school.
We have set up bilingualism in Malay
and English as its objective because we
believe that all parents who regard
Malaya as their permanent home and the
object of their undivided loyalty will
be happy to have their children
educated in those languages. If any
parents were unhappy about this, their
unhappiness would properly be taken as
an indication that they did not so
regard Malaya. On the other hand, all
non-Malay parents who avail themselves
of the new facilities, and who set
aside their vernacular attachments in
the interests of a new social unity,
have a right to be welcomed without
reserve by the Malay people as fellow-
builders and fellow-citizens.89
The Barnes Report " sparked off a storm of
protests from Chinese social organizations from all over
Malaya." 90
	Tan Siew Sin, son of Tan Cheng Lock,
described the Barnes Report as "embodying the maximum of
racial bigotry, racial intolerance and a deep-seated
ignorance of fundamental political principles." 91 The
government was forced to take action by appointing
another committee. The committee contained two Chinese
members; W.P. Fenn and Wu Teh-yao, both of whom were non-
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Malayans. The committee was called to study the problems
of Chinese schools with particular reference to:
(1) bridging the gap between the
present communal system of school and
the time when education will be on a
non-communal basis with English and
Malay as the medium of instruction and
another language as an optional
subject, and advising on (ii)
preparation of text-books for present
use with a Malayan as distinct from a
Chinese background and content. 92
The Fenn-Wu Committee produced a report which was to
strike a major blow to the Malayanization policy. This
report reached a different conclusion from the Barnes
Report. In contrast to the Barnes Report, it concluded
that Chinese schools should be preserved and
strengthened. It stressed that the Chinese language
should continue as the first language of instruction for
Chinese pupils. The report pointed out that "to most
Chinese in Malaya, 'Malayanization' is anathema.
Accordingly it said that "Malayanizatjon can only be the
result of give and take which is based on an increasing
awareness of a community of interest and the need for
mutual tolerance and co-operation." The Report rejected
any attempt to force an unwilling fusion as it would
almost certainly aggravate animosity among the Malayan
people.
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The government itself could not make a decision
on the Barnes and Fenn-Wu Reports. Later the Central
Advisory Committee whose members included the leaders of
the MCA, was requested to study and make recommendations
on both reports. The Central Advisory Committee made a
compromise and mentioned that:
We recognize, however,that in the
present-day circumstances and
conditions in Malaya it may be
necessary to take into consideration
other factors additional to educational
principles when framing [a policy] that
all pupils should learn Malay and
English throughout the six years of
their primary course and that, in
addition, provision should be made for
Chinese and Indian pupils to receive
instruction in Kuo-Yu and Tamil
respectively.
The Central Advisory Committee recommended the
establishment of two types of national schools, English
and Malay medium schools. Chinese and Tamil medium
schools were to continue but English and Malay languages
would be taught as other subjects at a later period.
The Central Advisory Committee's recommendations formed
the basis for the Education Ordinance of l952.
The Economic Problems of the Malays
One of the most controversial subjects which was
raised during
	 the discussions of the CLC was 	 the
question of the proper share that the Malays would have
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in the economic life of Malaya. The Malay leaders in the
CLC considered this as a priority to any consideration
of the citizenship question and other political
matters. 96
 They hoped that the Chinese and other non-
Malays would made some concessions to the Malays in this
field as an exchange for their greater citizenship
rights. Consequently the CLC resolved to recommend to
the government to form a body for an improvement of the
economic condition of the Malays. Thus the Rural and
Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) was formed in
1950 with Data Onn, the "Member" of Home Affairs as the
first chairman.97
The functions of RIDA were twofold: to plan and
carry out specific schemes for rural economic
development, in particular to enable the Malay
smaliholders to participate in processing and marketing
their crops, and to organize the rural population to
improve their standard of living themselves. 98
 RIDA
implemented its first plan by establishing a rubber
processing factory in Johore. The rubber smallholders
were consequently able to process and increase the
quality of their products at the factory. They could bath
sell their products at good prices and increase their
income. RIDA also encouraged Malay smaliholders to
improve their methods of production by introducing
suitable fertilizers and heavy machinery. It also made
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some plans to set up cooperatives ctd credits consumer's shops
for the rural population.99
Part 1V
The Creation of a Non-communal Movement:
Th Independence of Malaya Party
The most significant part of the Malayanization of Chinese
policy was "the fusion of the Malay and Chinese nationalism
into a Malayan nationalism which . . [had] as its object the
building of a Malayan nation of different races." 100The CLC had
already made an attempt to soften the interracial conflict
through the following proposals: to give increased political
and civil rights to the Chinese and other non-Malay
communities; to induce the Chinese to renounce their political
ties with their motherland and accept an undivided loyalty to
Malaya; and to help the Malays to take a fuller part in the
economic life of the country. Pnother step towards
	 the
realization of the Mctlayanization of the Chinese was the
creation of a non-communal movement to generate the necessary
momentum to overcome communal barriers and promote the growth
of Malayan nationalism. Thus the colonial government gave their
backing to the formation of the Independence of Malaya Party
(IMP) which made a clean brectk with the tradition of communalism
in Malayan poltics.
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According to R. Vasil, "the real origins of the
Independence of Malaya Party lie in the period between
late 1947, when the Malayan Union plan was already in the
process of being scrapped, and the middle of 1948, a
period during which Dato Onn bin Jaafar envisaged a new
and wider role for tTh1NO." -- He adds that this took shape
as "early as 27 April 1948, long before the Communities
Liaison Committee was suggesting mixed marriages among
the different communities ... as a way of integrating the
different people and creating of a new Malayan
nation." 102
 There is no doubt these statements are not in
dispute. However, to say that there was no "necessary
link between the IMP and the Communities Liaison
Committee" is not quite right.103
The CLC played an important role in modifying
Dato Onn's attitudes and P olicies towards the non-Malay
comunities. Furthermore it was through the committee
that Dato Onn was able to win the friendship and trust
of the Chinese leaders, particulary Tan Cheng Lock. It
was a fact that some of the IMP's principles such as
"Equality for All" were part of the CLC's proposals, and
almost all of the Chinese leaders who supported the
formation of IMP were former members of the CLC.104
Furthermore Tan Cheng Lock also provided the idea for the
formation of a new non-communal party.
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Tan Cheng Lock made a proposal on the need of a
non-communal party during a meeting of the working
committee of the MCA on 21 April 1951. This party might
be superimposed upon, and co-exist with tJMNO , MCA and
the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) . According to him:
Perhaps what is needed, and the first
and most practical step to be taken
under existing development of Malayan
consciousness among the people of this
land would be to create a new United
Malayan National Organization or Party
with a new' constitution in which
members of all the races are assembled
and meet on a common ground and an
equal footing to discuss the affairs of
the country purely as Malayans and
which may be superimposed on or
superadded to and co-exist with the
existing communal bodies such as the
United National Malay National
organisation, Malayan Indian Congress
and Malayan Chinese Association which
are to be retained to care only for
the special and peculiar interests of
the various communities. 105
He added:
Thus the ground could be prepared for
the possible eventual merging of the
existing communal Associations into the
proposed non-communal and national
organization when the time is ripe for
and the circumstances should indicate
such a course.	 106
The Malayan Political Intelligence reported that,
reaction	 "to Cheng Lock's proposal to amalgamate the
three main communal organisations has been varied."107
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The Report added that the Seberang Prai Branch of the MCA
warmly endorsed the idea, and suggested the title of
Malayan Congress for the proposed body. Certain
officials of the MIC also welcomed the proposal to
amalgamate the MCA, MIC and 1JIVINO.
In the meantime, Dato Onn made an attempt to
transform UIVINO to a non-racial basis at the end of
1950. He proposed to widen the basis of the membership
of UMNO by granting associate membership to non-Malays
who were federal citizens and desired to join this
body. 108 He also made a proposal to change the name of
UIvINO from the "United Malay National Organisation" to
"United Malayan National Organisation." He made an
announcement in early June that he would form a new
party with the objective of achieving independence for
Malaya within seven years, if the members of UMNO
rejected his proposals.109
Dato Onn had a discussion with Tan Cheng Lock
before he announced his intention of forming a non-
communal body in early June. It seemed that they both
shared the same view on the need to form the United
Malayan National Organization. But as the present writer
has indicated, Dato Onn failed to influence UMNO
into transforming itself into the United Malaya National
Organisation or to change to a non-racial identity. Thus
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he and Tan Cheng Lock decided to form a new non-communal
body. However, their ideas and approach to the proposed
party were different. As the writer has mentioned Tan
Cheng Lock proposed a new "Party" with its own
"Constitution," but it should not make a total break with
the communal parties. Not only that, the new party
should be placed above non-communal parties-- tJMNO,
MCA and MIC. In other words, the relationship of the non-
communal and communal parties would resemble a pyramid-
shaped political organization or "pyramidial system."0
The non-communal party would form the peak and the three
communal parties of the tJT4NO, MCA and MIC would form the
base. Thus the members of the communal parties could join
or support the new party and could maintain their
relationship with their own communal parties. Henry
Gurney, the High Commissioner also preferred this way
when he suggested to Dato Onn to lead both the proposed
new party and triro.- 11
 However, as the present writer
will indicate later, flato Onn decided to make a total
break with TJMNO.
When Dato Onn decided to announce his intention
to form a new party, there was no clear indication as to
whether the colonial government had anything to do with
it. However, after the announcement, Henry Gurney, the
High Commissioner of Malaya, "had a long and frank talk"
with Dato Onn on 13 June 1951.112 According to Gurney,
Dato Onn explained that his intention in forming an
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Independence of Malaya Party was to free himself from
"the inactive and purely conservative elements in tIMNO
who have been obstructing his efforts to admit non-Malays
into UMNO"and who were in his view, "merely a dead weight
in any political party. ,,h13 He also mentioned that as the
leader of a new non-communal party he would be able to
take "with him the live and active elements of UMNO and
also the kampong Malays."114
Gurney gave his advice to Dato Onn to continue to
lead UMNO as well as the IMP. But Dato Onn had
already decided to resign from UMNO as "he was utterly
tired of the sabotaging of his efforts by diehards in
UTVINO" 115
 Actually, at first Dato Onn did not intend to
be the leader of the proposed IMP and had offered the
leadership to Tan Cheng Lock, but, according to Dato Onn,
Tan Cheng Lock, "was becoming more and more nervous and
would not take it on." 116
 Thus, Dato Onn had no choice
other than to assume the leadership of the proposed IMP.
As a matter of tactics, at first Henry Gurney
did not give any support to Dato Onn's intention of
forming a new party. The reason was obvious; he
could not support a political party which had the
intention of getting rid of British rule in Malaya within
seven years. It seems that Dato Onn was able to read
Gurney's mind. He told Gurney that the press reports of
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his statement referring to independence in seven years
were incorrect. He added that in fact, "independence was
not the [main] object [of the proposed IMP] . ,,h17 He
explained further that the object of the IMP was to work
for the good of people, and that independence was only a
means. With this assurance, Gurney indicated his
willingness to support the proposed IMP and continued to
discuss "how the IMP might secure seats in the
Legislative Council." 118 But he stressed that ]Jato Onn's
decision to break with UMNO was "a major one which may
have far-reaching consequences, such as a building up of
a strong ... party from the middle elements of tJMNO
who are largely government officers and may thus come
into conflict with the I.M.P."119
In early July Gurney gave a speech at a Press
Club dinner, in which he publicly declared support for
inter-communalism. According to L. Finkelstein, although
the High Commisssioner's speech was in general terms, its
timing was a significant indication of where the
government stood on the IMP issue)-20
On 26 August 1951 Dato Onn formally tendered his
resignation to the UMNO General Assembly. His place was
taken by Tunku (Tengku) Abdul Rahman, half brother of the
Sultan of Kedah and a deputy public prosecutor. Meanwhile
Dato Onn held an inaugural meeting for the formation of
the IMP at the Majestic Hotel, in Kuala Lumpur on 17
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September 1951. It was presided over by Tan Cheng Lock. A
resolution was adopted by one thousand people--
representatives of each community. It was as follows:
We, the people, here assembled, do
hereby affirm the unalterable and
inalienable right of the people of this
country to determine the future
political, social, and economic destiny
of Malaya. Fully conscious of the grave
problems of the present and the future,
we solemnly pledge ourselves to the
task of uniting the people in common
loyalty, irrespective of creed,
class,or race, and to work together
towards the goal of an independent
State of Malaya.121
An organising committee of the IMP was formed
consisting of the leaders of the Malays including Data
Onn himself and Chinese, Indians, Ceylonese and others.
The MCA's leaders who became members of this committee
were, Tan Cheng Lock, Yong Shook Liii, the secretary-
general of the MCA, and Khoo Teik Ee, the treasurer of
the MCA. All were former members of the CLC. The stated
objectives of the IMP were as follows: (1) self-
government within ten years, (2) democratic elections to
local government by 1953 and to the central Legislature,
based on adult suffrage, by 1955, (3) Malayanization of
the civil service and the creation of a Malayan service
as opposed to a colonial service, (4) free and compulsory
elementary education for all children between the age of
six and twelve by 1955, (5) improved social services,
especially in the rural areas, (6) subsidies and
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guaranteed prices for cultivators, and (7) reform of the
feudal system in the Malay States.122
As expected, the Malay reactions to the formation
of the IMP were very bitter. As soon as Dato Onn
announced his intention of forming a new party, the
Malays began to criticize it. In a letter to the press, a
Malay from Kedah wrote that the IMP would "be a prelude
to the disappearance of the Malay race"-23
 and the Malay
would be "reduced to the status of the Red Indians
striving to live in the waste lands of America."124
After the IMP was organized, the tflvINO Executive
Committee decided that the policy of he IMP was not
compatible with CJMNO and asked any members who joined the
IMP to resign from the former or be expelled. Tunku Abdul
Rahman strongly criticized the IMP which opened its
membership to all persons who were resident in Malaya
regardless of any qualification as to their allegiance,
loyalty or birthright)- 25
 In face of such strong Malay
opposition, the prospects of the IMP looked dim. However,
Dato Onn still believed that Malay support would be
forthcoming. "In six or twelve months", according to Dato
Onn, "the Malays would have got used to the idea of this
party. ,,126
The Chinese community-- particularly the MCA--
were more cautious in their support of the IMP. In
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public, Tan Cheng Lock personally made an appeal to the
Chinese community to support this non-communal
organization. Privately, however, Tan Cheng Lock
expressed reservations concerning the IMP. He still
held fast to the idea of an amalgamation of the MCA,
MIC, and tJMNO. As the present writer has indicated
elsewhere, the MCA leaders realistically continued to
cooperate with tJMNO as well as the IMP.127
Tan Cheng Lock also attempted to play the role of
a "matchmaker" between Dato Onn and Tunku Abdul Rahman.
He set up a sino-Malay Friendship and Economic
Cooperation Fund. 128 He also proposed to form a committee
comprising of Data ann, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the president
of UMNO, he himself and two others-- including a part-
time paid Malay secretary. Initially the MCA allocated
$100,000.00 for this fund which aimed for the economic
betterment of the Malays. 129
 This generous contribution
appeared more a political bribe to induce the president
of UMNO and Data Onn to participate in the proposed
committee than an altruistic move to help the Malays'
economic lot. Tan Cheng Lock discussd this move with Md.
Sopiee who was prepared to sound out tJ4NO leaders on the
proposed plan and on the question of UMNO participation
in it) 30 According to Md. Sopiee, Tunku Abdul Rahman
would be willing to participate in such a plan, if he was
invited. There was a possibility that Data Onn might
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however, refuse to work with tJMNO and counter-propose
that the fund be handled by RIDA)- 3 -
Dato Onn was, in fact, suspicious of Tan Cheng
Lock's intentions. On 30 November 1951 he urged Tan Cheng
Lock to commit himself to the IMP cause by setting up an
IMP branch in Malacca) 32
 Tan Cheng Lock agreed to Dato
Onn's suggestion and informed him (Dato Onn) that he had
written to Humphrey Ball, the MCA's legal adviser on
this matter. 133
 Tan Cheng Lock gave the impression that
Ball had been extremely useful to their cause.
On 19 December 1951 the Malacca branch of the
MCA held an informal meeting in Malacca for the purpose
of forming a Malacca Branch of the IMP. Humphrey Ball
suggested that "... a reconciliation between Ethel I.M.P
and tJ.M.N.O should be attempted before the creation of a
Branch in Malacca." 134
 "Otherwise," he added, "there was
a risk of creating a racial division." Nonetheless, the
meeting decided to form a Malacca Branch of the IMP on
31 January 1952, on condition that there should be at
least 250 people registering with the proposed branch.
The formation of the proposed branch was as it turned out
delayed until May 1952.135 In the meantime H.S. Lee, the
chairman of the Selangor branch of the MCA had formed an
alliance with the local UMNO branch to contest the
February 1952 election of the Municipal Council of Kuala
Lumpur. This action was not incompatible with Tan Cheng
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Lock's policies. As the present writer has indicated
elsewhere, Tan Cheng Lock's plan was to bring together
all communal parties such as TJMNO, MCA and MIC under
an umbrella of a non-communal party or the IMP. Because
Oof this he logically supported the principle of the IMP
and also tJMNO-MCA cooperation and Sino-Malay
cooperation. 136
Conclusion
The Malayanization policy in essence was not a-
new policy Its aims were the same as the previous Chinese
policy which was formulated during the Second World War.
The aims were to solve the " Chinese problem" and
integrate the Chinese into Malayan society. However the
methods and approaches to the achieving of these goals
were different. The previous policy was a liberal policy.
The Chinese could maintain their status as aliens and
were able to participate in China-based political
parties such as the Kuomintang and the MCP without
hindrance from the government. As the present writer has
indicated elsewhere the previous policy legalised Chinese
foreign political parties. On the other hand, the Chinese
were able to become Malayan citizens and integrate
themselves into Malayan society. For these reasons the
citizenship proposals of the previous policy bodies made
it very easy for Chinese to acquire Malayan citizenship.
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It was based on a principle of charity. The policy did
not demand loyalty first, but anticipated that the
Chinese would become loyal to the government after
they became Malayan citizens.
The Malayanization of Chinese policy, which
evolved after the Emergency, adopted different methods
to solve the "Chinese problem." The Chinese were
pressured not to give support or participate in Chinese-
based political parties, including the Kuomintang, and
were induced to form a Malayan-centred Chinese
association or the MCA. As the present writer has
indicated, the government punished severely those
Chinese who directly or indirectly supported the MCP or
the guerrillas by actions such as burning Chinese
villages and resettling them in concentration-camp style
"New Villages." But under their stick-and carrot-policy,
the government took steps to amend the Citizenship clause
of the Federation Agreement of 1948, in order to make it
easier for nearly half of the Chinese in Malaya to
become Malayan citizens. But this was not as generous
as the Malayan Union citizenship proposals. The other
half of the Chinese still had to hope they could become
Malayan citizens after they had made a clear choice
between their homeland and their adopted country and
also indicated their loyalty to it. The colonial
government recognized that the process of the
Malayanization of the Chinese should be carried out
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gradually and through interracial cooperation between
the Malays and the Chinese and other non-Malays.
The process of the Malayanization of the Chinese
from the end of 1948 to the end of 1951 was developed and
carried out by Henry Gurney with the assistance of
Malcolm MacDonald, with the intention of crushing the
Communist insurrection. Gurney not only failed to defeat
the Communists but became one of their victims. He was
assassinated by guerrillas on 6 October 1951 at Fraser's
Hill in Pahang. M.V. del Tufo became the Officer
Administrating the Government before the appointment of a
new High Commissioner. In the meantime a new government
in London was in the process of formulating new
directives and new orders for the government of Malaya.
We will examine this in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
Building a United Malayan Nation, 1952-1954
This chapter discusses the development of British
policy and political strategy in Malaya after the
assassination of Henry Gurney and Winston Churchill's
election vict-ory-- both in October 1951. These two
factors set the stage for major political changes: namely
the decline of militant Communism, and the rise of a
moderate interracial political organization-- the tJNNO-
MCA alliance.
Part 1
The Formulation of a New Polic y Directive
At the beginning of 1951, the Communist
insurrection continued and moved rapidly towards its
peak. This situation sparked off a major crisis amongst
British officials in Malaya and Southeast Asia. The
officials blamed each other for the slow progress of the
Malayan campaign. In early March 1951, MacDonald, the
Commissioner-General and General John Harding, Commander-
in-Chief of the Far East Land Forces(FARELF) went to
London to hold talks with the Secretary of State for the
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Colonies. After the meeting, MacDonald brought back the
message to Gurney, the High Commissioner, u0f the
impatience and dissatisfaction felt and expressed. . . by
certain Ministers? on his "conduct of affairs" in
Malaya.1
Henry Gurney was saddened by the fact that he
had not been informed or invited to the Ministerial talks
concerning his conduct of affairs. He was convinced that
the Secretary of State no longer had confidence in his
administration.He wrote to Thomas Lloyd, the permanent
head department of the Colonial Office,
I agree that if there is not a marked
improvement in the operational field in
say, six months' time, it will be very
advisable to have a change of High
Commissioner. 2
Gurney himself had not had much confidence in achieving
any progress in the campaign against the Communist
guerillas. Thus he said that, it was advisable that he
should be permitted to relinquish office towards the end
of the year, after Lt. General Harold Briggs left.
According to him, this "would provide the opportunity for
the appointment as High Commissioner of a suitable
services candidate. He suggested that the candidate
should be a person who possessed "some unusual
qualities if he is going to hold together the Malay and
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Chinese... [and] Indian politicians, the Rulers, planters
without repatriation to China."3
Griffiths, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies accepted the offer from Gurney, and said that it
made it "much.. . easier for him should he at any time
come to the conclusion that there ought to be a change of
High Commissioner. " At the same time he wished "that
during the next [six] months... [Gurney's] work will
receive its due reward in an ever increasing measure of
success in the anti-banditry campaign and in a
realization of the Briggs plan."5
From May to October 1951 the Malayan government
counter offensive against the Communist guerillas began
to gain some momentum. But the efforts to win over the
support and cooperation from the Chinese community as a
whole did not achieve significant success. There was,
for example, the case of conscription measures to direct
all males, particularly Chinese, between 17 to 45 to
perform paramilitary or police service. Gurney announced
the conscription measures in December 1950. At the end of
1951 only 1,800 Chinese had been conscripted, and most
were English-educated. Thousands of Chinese who were
eligible fled from Malaya to Singapore, then to Hongkong
or China. The Chinese newspapers such as the Nanyang
Slang Pao and the China Press opposed the conscription
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measures and appealed to the government to exempt
certain Chinese. Tan Cheng Lock defended the Chinese
attitude towards compulsory military or police services.
He said that "the loyalty of the Chinese was to the
family and locality rather than to the	 nation."6
Accordingly he pleaded for leniency and asked the
government to give citizenship rights to the Chinese.
This would encourage Chinese youth to join the Malayan
forces. The Chinese attitude gave the Malays the
impression that they were not loyal and did not belong to
Malaya and did not deserve to get citizenship rights in
the country. Gurney himself felt dismay at the Chinese
community as a whole.	 This was reflected in	 a
memorandum he wrote in October 1951. He wrote as follows:
The attack of the MCP was always
directed at the Chinese, to obtain
their support through racial sympathy
and intimidation. Three years ago it
was made clear to the MCA leaders that
unless they provided an alternative
standard to which local Chinese could
rally, the Communists would win. The
answer was that the rural Chinese, the
peasants, who are the real target, must
first be protected. With the help of
the MCA the whole vast scheme of
resettlement has now been almost
finished and labour forces regrouped.
Into these settlements and into trade
unions and into schools the MCP are
trying hard to penetrate and are
succeeding. If they are allowed to
continue this unopposed by any Chinese
effort whatever, the whole of the
Chinese rural population will soon come
under Communist domination. These
people are looking for leaders to help
them to resist. But what has happened ?
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(a) the government wished to recruit up to
10,000 Chinese for service in the
police. There was full prior
consultation with leading Chinese, but
as soon as the men were called up, the
cry was all for exemptions, 6,000
decamped to Singapore and several
thousands to China.
(b) Everyone knows that the MRLA and
Yuen are today being financed and
supplied by Chinese. Everyone knows
that with a few notable exceptions the
Chinese themselves have done absolutely
nothing to help their own people resist
Communism, which is today rampant in
schools and among the young uneducated
generation. How many Chinese schools
fly the Federation flag ?
(c) The wealth amassed by the Chinese in
Malaya is enormous, and all of it will
be lost unless something is done by the
Chinese themselves and quickly. The
British Government will not be prepared
to go on protecting people who are
completely unwilling to do anything to
help themselves.
Cd) A feeling of resentment is growing up
among all other communities at the
apparent reluctance of the Chinese to
help. These people live comfortably and
devote themselves wholly to making
money. They can spend $4 million on
celebrations in Singapore but can spare
nothing for the MCA anti-Communist
efforts.
(e) Chinese labour forces lie wide open to
Communism. There is no encouragement to
them to join Trade Unions, which are
mainly Indian-led. Leading Chinese have
contented themselves with living in
Singapore etc. and criticising the
police and security forces for causing
injustices. These injustices are
deplorable but are the fault not of the
police but these Chinese who know the
truth and will not tell it. The longer
this goes on, the more injustices there
will be and the greater the opening to
Communist propaganda.7
On 6 October 1951, just two days after he wrote this
memorandum, Gurney was assassinated by the communist
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guerrillas in Fraser's Hill. With his assassination, the
first stage of government's efforts	 to defeat the
communists came to an end.
In the meantime, the Labour government in London
had been replaced by the Conservatives on 25 October
1951. Oliver Lyttelton replaced James Griffiths as
Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Communist
insurrection was the most urgent and worrying problem for
him. He has written that:
It was evident that we were on the way
to losing control of the country, and
soon. The repercussions of such a loss
on South-east Asia, one of the most
troubled and tender parts of the world,
would have been incalculable. Moreover,
rubber and tin were amongst the most
important exports and dollar earners of
the Commonwealth.
My predecessor. . .James Griffiths,
in a short talk when he handed over to
me, confessed that the previous
Government was baffled by Malaya. Sadly
he said, 't At this stage it has become a
military problem to which we have not
been able to find the answer lt. . - I saw
quite clearly that I must go to Malaya
at once. The Department applauded the
idea: the Prime Minister because of our
precarious majority, agreed with a
little reluctance: the King granted me
leave. With greater difficulty I
persuaded the Whips to let my
Parliamentary Private Secretary, Hugh
Fraser, come with me.8
On 29 November 1951, Oliver Lyttelton, together
with J. J. Paskin, the Under Secretary of State in charge
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of the Far East, and A. Mackintosh, his private
Secretary, set off to Malaya. He arrived in Singapore and
declared that his first job in Malaya was "to restore law
and order as a prelude to political development." 9
 He
made a big blunder by saying to the press that "there is
no point in giving political progress to people if they
get their throats cut."-° His statements could have been
interpreted that the new Conservative government in
London was considering changing British policy towards
Malaya. It also implied that constitutional progress
would be delayed. Before his statement created an uproar
among the Malayan political leaders he corrected his
earlier announcement by saying that restoring law and
order was the first priority but that does not mean that
"the wider horizons of political development are
narrowed.
On 2 December Lyttelton arrived in Kuala Lumpur
and met separately representatives of various
organizations including the IMP, tJMNO and MCA. Tunku
Abdul Rahman, president of UMNO urged Lyttelton to
introduce political reforms as part of the struggle
against militant Communism and demanded that " 'an
interim independence government' should be formed
immediately with a British High Commissioner, and that
Malaya should be formally admitted to the British
Commonwealth." 12
 The MCA also shared his views. In
addition, Tan Cheng Lock urged the government to modify
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the Federal Citizenship Act and withdraw the 	 State
nationality bill. He said that equal 	 "rights and
responsibilities. . . 	 must be shared by all loyal
Malayans." 13 According to him it was "useless to
complain that the Chinese were neutral in a war against
Communism when the government officials followed an anti-
Chinese policy" 4 He assured the government that the
Chinese community would cooperate with the administration
"to end the Emergency if distrust and suspicions of
Chinese intentions were removed."15
Lyttelton travelled widely in Malaya and his
strenuous fact-finding tour lasted more than a week.
Before leaving Malaya on 11 December he released a major
statement on British policy towards Malaya) Part of it
mentioned that:
The ideal for which all communities in
the Federation of Malaya must strive is
a United Malayan nation. That nation
will carry responsibilities and enjoy
advantages of self-government within
the frame-work of the British
Commonwealth.... Political advancement,
economic development, social services
and amenities are rungs in the ladder.
To-day, however, we have to place
emphasis on the immediate menace. We
must ask who are the enemies of
political advancement? What is delaying
the progress towards it? The answer is
Communism. The answer is the terrorist.
The answer is Mm Yuen and those who,
partly from sympathy, create a passive
but not less serious obstacle to
victory. . . . The British believe they
have a mission and they will not lay it
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aside until they are convinced that
[terrorism] has been killed and
buried and that a true fusion of all
communities can lead to true and stable
self-government 17
On the same day, MacDonald re-emphasized the aim
of Britain's policy of bringing Malaya towards self-
government, which according to him was an unalterable
aim, transcending party politics in Britain. 18 But he
stressed that it would take a long time to complete the
task of forming a united, self-reliant Malayan nation. He
added that the pace at which the work would advance and
the date at which the ultimate aim could be reached
depended on the Malayan people.
Regarding the racial problem in Malaya, MacDonald
pointed out that it could be solved by friendly
discussions between the representatives of the various
communities, assisted by the government. 19 He agreed to
the extension of citizenship and other rights to non-
Malays but according to him, it must not be so sweeping
as to threaten the security of the Malays.
After completing his fact-finding tour, Lyttelton
found that the situation in Malaya was far worse than he
had thought. He has written as follows:
it was appalling . . . . I have never
seen such a tangle as that presented by
the Government of Malaya... There was
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divided and often opposed control at
the top.... The two authorities (civil
and military) were apparently co-equal,
neither could overrule the other
outside his own sphere. But what was
each sphere? The frontiers between
their responsibilities had not been
clearly defined, indeed they were
indefinable, because no line could be
drawn to show where politics, civil
administration, police action,
administration of justice and the like
end, and where paramilitary or military
operations begin. The civil
administration moved at a leisurely,
peace-time pace . . . . The police itself
was divided by a great schism between
the Commissioner of Police and the Head
of the Special Branch. Intelligence was
scanty and uncoordinated between the
military and the civil authorities.
Morale amo±igst planters, tin miners,
and amongst Chinese loyalists and
Malays, was at its lowest. The grip of
the terrorists was tightening, and the
feelings of the loyalists could be
summed up in one word, despair.20
In his assessment of the situation in Malaya,
Lyttelton came to the conclusion that it needed a strong
military man or a general to be put in charge of both
military and civil affairs. he also concluded that the
British '. . . could not win the war without the help of the
population, and of the Chinese population in particular"
and in order to get the support from them, the
government must show that it was "beginning to win the
war. ,,21
Lyttelton flew back to Britain on 21 December
1951. He asked Anthony Head, the Secretary of State for
War, to provide a list of potential candidates for the
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post of High Commissioner of Malaya. Although MacDonald
disagreed with a military man as candidate for this post,
Lyttelton picked General Gerald Templer as the new High
Commissioner. Templer agreed to accept this post. He was
confident that he would be to solve many of the Malayan
problems. According to him : "the military problem is
nothing, the police question can be set right, and the
civil service difficulty can be solved." 22 The main
problem in his opinion was to get the Malays and the
Chinese to say, "This is our country." He agreed to
accept a new appointment as the High Commissioner of the
Federation of Malaya and asked that the government be
given clear policy directives which could also be used
"publicly to impress HMG's purpose."23
In January 1952, General Templer held a
discussion with the Colonial Office on the "Draft
directives to the High Commissioner for the Federation
of Malaya. The draft directives re-emphasised that, this
"should be a Federation with a strong central government"
based on the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 21
January 1948.24 It also stressed that "there should be a
common form of citizenship. . . to be extended to all those
who regard the Federation or any part of it as their real
home and the object of their loyalty. .
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The draft directives reminded the future High
Commissioner of Malaya that,".. .the Malays have had no
alternative allegiance or other country... [and] ... owed
an undivided loyalty to their homeland and consequently,
it has been recognised that they occupy a special
position." 25
 Regarding British policy to the Chinese and
other non-Malays, it pointed out that "The legitimate
interests of [these] . . . communities in Malaya must
ultimately be judged in the light of the allegiance such
communities give to Malaya." It emphasized ". . . a full and
equal right in the Malayan community should in due time
be accorded to all those who, irrespective of race,
demonstrate that they owe their whole- hearted allegiance
to Malaya and take an active part in the work of building
a Malayan nation." 26 In pursuance of these objectives,
the future High Commissioner was directed to
". . .encourage and assist the development of a closer
association and cooperation between the different races
of Malaya."27
The draft directives reminded the High
Commissioner that his "immediate task ... will be the
restoration of law and order in the Federation by
defeating the communist terrorists in their efforts to
disrupt the life of the country and interfere with its
healthy political advance." 28 For this purpose, he would
also assume the role of Director of Operations and would
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exercise direct operational command over all armed forces
within the Federation.
The draft directives also emphasized the
building of the united Malayan nation with the further
prospect of self-government. The High Commissioner was
instructed to "...make clear to the people of Malaya the
[British] government's belief that the building of such a
nation is in their own hands and must inevitably depend
mainly on their efforts both as individuals who owe a
true allegiance to Malaya and as members together of the
Malayan community.t29 The draft Directive gave almost
absolute power to the High Commissioner. The specific
directions and the suggestions which were set out in the
directives were not intended to limit the exercise of his
discretion.
In the middle of January 1952, Lyttelton, the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced the
underlying policies of the British government, as
expressed in the new Directive for the High Commissioner.
According to him, the new High Commissioner would direct
the battle of ideas and concern himself with broad
measures of social, economic and political progress. He
did not mention a specific policy towards the Chinese
community, but said the new High Commissioner would seek
to reassure and enlist this community without sacrifing
in any way the interest of the Malays. He stressed that
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the Malayan problem could not be solved without the help
and support of Chinese community. According to him, the
"Chinese terrorists can never be brought to book unless
Chinese policemen, Chinese administrators and Chinese
citizens take part in the struggle."3°
Part II
The Battle For The Hearts And Minds
The British government was aware that in order to
win over the support from the Chinese community it was
necessary to make a promise of a brighter future for
them. Thus Lyttelton declared that ".. .means have to be
found of giving the Emoderate] Chinese a greater
political stake in Malaya" 31
 and for the Malays a more
important share in local economic life. It has been
argued that this policy aimed to achieve a united
Malayan nation with the prospect of increased self-
government.
General Ternpler arrived with his directives in
Malaya in February 1952. He was installed to the post of
High Commissioner and assumed the role of Director of
Operations. Thus he himself was responsible for planning,
co-ordinating and generally directing the anti-terrorist
operations of the Police and fighting forces. As he was
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in charge of both the civil and military administration
he might be able to secure full and effective co-
ordination in the war against the Communist guerrillas.
The first major change Templer instituted was
administrative. The Federal War Council which had been
started by Briggs in 1950, was abolished and merged its
reponsibilities with the Executive Council. Thus there
was one policy making body. Some members of the FWC were
absorbed into the enlarged Executive Council. He also
took action to improve and reorganize the police and
military apparatus of the Emergency. Templer realized the
shooting war only formed 25 percent of Emergency business
and 75 percent was political. Thus he concentrated also
on the efforts to win over the people's "hearts and
minds", particularly those of the Chinese community. 32
In pursuance of the directives, Templer and his
deputy, D.C. MacGillivray, made some efforts to make the
Chinese comthunity feel that they were part and parcel of
the country. Templer persuaded the Malay rulers to open
the Malayan Civil Service to Chinese and other non-
Malays. In the past "the MCS was entirely Malay and
expatriate in composition." 33 As the present writer has
indicated elsewhere the Chinese had always demanded the
opening of MCS to them and the Malays strongly opposed
this. On 1 January 1953 two Chinese were admitted into
the MCS. It seems that the recruitment of Chinese into
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the scheme was deliberately slow so as not to arouse
opposition from the Malays. By 1957 there were only nine
Chinese in a total number of 360 in the MCS.34
Nevertheless this small concession was important in the
sense that the Chinese were accepted as part of the
prestigeous Civil Service of the country.
One of the main problems facing the British
government was the lack of Chinese personnel in the
police force and the army. From a political point of
view, the war against the Communists could be portrayed
as the war between Chinese and the Malays as the Malayan
forces were almost entirely Malay in composition and the
Communist guerrillas 	 Chinese. To the Malays, the
Communist insurrection was an alien Chinese insurrection
and "something to be resisted on racial as well as on
political grounds." 35 Gurney's attempts to persuade the
Chinese to join the uniformed service ended with failure.
Templer made a greater effort to improve recruitment of
Chinese into the Malayan forces particularly the Special
Branch.
In March 1952, he launched a campaign to persuade
members of Chinese community to come to the government
side in the war against the Communists. For instance on
27 March he appealed to Chinese youth to join the
Federation Police Force. he said,
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• . . I am calling on the Chinese
community, to show their loyalty to the
country in which they live and to the
cause of freedom.This call is
particularly to the young men.. . to
express their loyalty by volunteering
to join the Federation Police Force. I
ask parents to put aside prejudice and
fear and to co-operate to this end. I
am asking for 2,000 young Chinese
volunteers to come forward... 2,000 is
a small number to ask from among three
million Chinese living in this
country. •36
Templer pointed out that the government could not reward
their loyalty in a form of more pay , but in giving them
political rights. He said, "that the Select Committee
which has been considering the Federal Citizenship Bill,
has now recommended to the Legislative Council, that all
those who serve in the Defence Forces of the Federation
shall, after completion of three years services
automatically be granted Federal Citizenship."37
In order to encourage Chinese to join the Malayan
Forces Templer announced the creation of a new unit, the
Federation Regiment which was also open to other races
including the Malays. In May the first company of the
Federal Regiment had been formed, based at Taiping,
Perak. 38 Templer also made a plan to set up a Military
Academy which was open to all races. Under Templer, all
units of the Malayan Army , except the Malay Regiment,
became multi-racial in composition. However, only a
handful of Chinese served in the Malayan forces.
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Templer also took other measures to encourage the
Chinese to participate in the defence of the country
against the Communists. One of them was the formation of
a Chinese Home Guard. A large and fully armed Chinese
home guard was created, known as the Kinta Valley Home
Guard in Perak. Its purpose was to defend the tin mines
against attacks from the guerillas. At first Templer
regarded the arming of the Chinese Home Guard as his
biggest gamble as there was a possiblity the Chinese
might pass their arms to the Communists forces or might
mutiny. 39
 But this fear was unfounded.Instead the Kinta
Valley proved they were loyal by getting involved in two
"Chinese battles" against the guerillas which ended with
their victory. 40
 As a result miners were able to open
up new mines or reopen those which had been closed down
because of the Emergency. Encouraged by this initial
success, Templer increased the number of Home Guard to
protect the rubber estates, new villages and others.
Meanwhile the regular forces were used for operations
against the guerrillas in the jungle. As a result the
government forces were able to kill 1,097 of the members
of the MRLA or 40 percent more than the previous year.41
In the meantime, Ternpler also turned his battle
for the "hearts and minds" to the Chinese in the
resettlement areas. As the present writer has indicated
elsewhere, under the Briggs Plan, a large section of the
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Chinese squatters from the forest had been removed and
resettled in new areas, beyond the reach of the
guerrillas. Templer solved one of the main problems of
the resettled squatters by giving them security of land
tenure. Another problem was the lack of public spirit
amongst the Chinese community which was the essential
basis of democracy. As the British government intended to
lay the foundations of Malayan democratic government , it
was important to teach, in association with other
communities, the art of self-government. For this purpose
the previous High Commissioner had prepared the Village
Council Bill and it was up to Templer to move it on the
Legislative Council. He did this in May 1952, and this
gave a Village Charter to the resettlement areas. It
officially renamed those settlements as "New Villages."
The Charter gave enfranchisement to some 400,000 Chinese
in some 410 New Villages.42
The Village Charter gave the first form of self-
government to the Chinese in New Villages. tJnder this the
people in New Villages would elect Village Councils
which could administer the villages directly. They would
collect their own rates and taxes and employ their own
staff and be completely responsible for their own budgets
and education. But the response from the villagers was
lukewarm. According to Ray Nyce, in some New Villages,
there was often no contest at all for the councils as it
was difficult to find villagers who were willing to fill
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offices. 43 However, this situation changed with the
progression from Village Council to Local council. The
posts to the local councils were more prestigious than
the village councils as they controlled larger areas.
The elected local council's duties were: the imposition
of taxes and fees, and issuing receipts, preparation of
annual estimates of revenue and expenditure, construction
and management of schools and public works, in
particular those involving communications, sanitation,
market facilities and recreation grounds, and others. The
council was also responsible for preserving peace in its
area.
The government, as expressed by Templer, firmly
believed that it was important to enlist the support of
the Chinese in order to defeat Communism. Templer said
this "would solve not one sixth of the Chinese problem"
in Malaya, but "would solve at least half of it." 44 Thus,
the government made much greater efforts to improve the
social and welfare services in these new villages. Roads
and often railways were built to link the Chinese New
Villages to other population centres. This enabled the
government to extend social amenities and welfare to
these villages. With these efforts it was hoped that the
New Villages "would change from reservoirs of resentment
into bastions of loyal Malayan citizenry." 45
 In fact
these measures made possible the crushing of the
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Communist rebellion and the defeat of the MRLA. But it
also caused increasing friction between Malays and
Chinese as these amenities and other social services were
rarely extended to the Malay villages. Furthermore the
promise to improve the economic position of the Malays
was not put into effect as the financial position of the
government would not permit it. 	 For instance the
government could provide only just over $2 million for
RIDA to improve the economic position of the Malays
during l952.	 The British government was unable to
fulfill its promise to the Malays.	 This could be
explained by the fact that the solution to the Chinese
problem was more urgent for the government and it would
also work indirectly for the interest of the Malay's
political future in the country. Failure to solve the
Chinese problem would result in the take over of power
in Malaya by the Chinese-dominated MCP with links to
China.
Part III
Education and the Malayanisat±on of the Chinese.
Apart from the campaign to win the hearts and
minds of the Chinese community,	 the government also
introduced some measures which the Chinese resented such
as collective punishments for any community involved in
terrorist activity. But most unpopular was 	 Britain's
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political policy on Chinese education, which was
considered by this community as an attack on their
language and culture. It was the intention of the
government to Malayanise the Chinese community through
education. A first attempt was made by Gurney but it
ended in failure as a result of strong opposition from
the Chinese community. The Barnes Report and the Fen-Wu
Committee reflected different views on the education
issue. As a result both reports were submitted to the
Central Education Committee and then to the Select
Committee for their consideration. The Committee's
recommendations which were embodied in the Education
Ordinance of 1952 were pushed through the Legislative
Council by Templer. This ordinance pointed out that:
The aim and purpose of the national
education policy of the Federation is
to achieve the sound education of all
children in the Federation using in the
main medium, for this purpose, the
official languages of the Federation
and bringing together pupils of all
races in a national tyRe of school with
a Malayan orientation.'7
A new !tNatjonal Schoolit was defined as . . .any school
providing for children of all races a six-year course of
free primary education with a Malayan orientation and
appropriate for children between the ages of six and
twelve and using as the main medium for this purpose the
official languages of the Federation." 48
 The national
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school could use either Malay or English as the main
medium of instruction. Chinese or Tamil would be taught
as a third language in the national schools where the
number of children wanting to receive it justified its
inclusion in the curriculum. It should be noted that
Tamil and Chinese vernacular schools would not be
accepted as part of national schools or national system.
The Education Ordinance of 1952 aroused amongst
the Chinese community a greater interest in the issue of
Chinese education. The MCA, whose councillors did not
speak or vote against the Education Ordinance, realized
it was important for its survival as a Chinese party to
get involved in this issue. 49 Only then wculd it get
support from the Chinese educated Chinese particularly
Chinese teachers. Therefore the MCA joined the United
Chinese School Teachers' Association (UCSTA) and the
United Chinese Schools' Committees' Association to
organize a meeting on Chinese Education on 9 November
1952. The MCA leadership supported the three resolutions
adopted at the meeting and expressed unanimous Chinese
opposition to the Education Ordinance, called for the
establishment of a national body to defend the future of
Chinese education , and decided to form a committee to
negotiate with the government for better terms of
official aid to Chinese primary schools. 5 ° As a
consequence of this meeting the MCA Chinese Education
Central Committee (MCACECC) was formed, 	 headed by Tan
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Cheng Lock. He became the main spokesman on the Chinese
education issue.
According to Tan Liok Ee "the activities of the
MCACECC did not have an impact on official policy."51
The government also did not responsed to a Memorandum on
Chinese Education which was sent to Templer. He even
refused to see MCACECC officials to discuss the
Education Ordinance of 1952. Templer told them, it was
"pointless to go over old ground." 52 He also criticized
the Chinese for pursuing a "separatist and exclusivist
position for their language and culture." 53 On the other
hand, Templer urged Chinese school teachers to assist
the government in bringing the Emergency to an end. He
pointed out to them that," there is hardly a Chinese
middle school in the country today where the evil
doctrine of Marxist Communism is not being preached in
secret and the minds of youth are being perverted by
creed which knows no human kindness or decency and rests
on a standard of values that is absolutely false."54
Templer firmly believed that the Education
Ordinance and the establishment of national schools were
vital for the formation of a united Malayan nation which
was capable of democratic self-government. He said that
it was government policy "to see . .. [Chinese] boys and
girls being conscious of the fact that Malaya is their
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home and that they are its future citizens.. .with
responsibilities and rights as such." 55
 However, it was
unlikely that the government could implement the
education policy as the financial position of the country
would	 not permit it. 56
	Up to March 1954, it was
reported that "no new national schools have yet been
built, nor have any vernacular schools been converted
into National schools, but existing government and
government-aided schools. . .are being progressively
converted to National school type as the trained staff
required become available." 57
 In the meantime Templer
had appointed a Special Committee:
to consider ways and means of
implementing the policy outlined in the
1952 Education Ordinance, in the
context of diminishing financial
resources of the Federation.58
It was appointed in November 1953 and consisted of ten
members including three Chinese.
The Special Committee produced its first draft
report in July 1954. During this time D.C. MacGillivray
had taken over the post of High Commissioner from
Templer. The Committee expressed their conviction
• .that education must be one of the highest priorities
in the national budget. . . " and re-affirmed their
belief in three principles as follows: that multi-racial
schools are essential for the education of the future
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citizens of a united Malayan nation, that there are two
official languages, English and Malay, and both must be
taught, and that there must be a single system of
education and a common content in teaching in all
schools.° The Special Committee also made an
examination of Chinese education and produced a
memorandum on "Chinese Schools in Malaya." Among others
its made the following conclusions:
1. Chinese schools are providing an education
which fits their pupils to be good Chinese,
but not good Malayans.
2. The Chinese schools are meeting a demand for
education in Malaya which cannot at present be
met by other types of Government or
Government-aided schools.
3. Politics and political influence form part of
the tradition of Chinese schools, and will
remain so as long as these schools cater
exclusively for pupils of Chinese race.
4. The principal danger of Chinese schools lies
in the Middle Schools, and urgent action must
be taken to transform these schools so that
the students they produce are fitted for life
in Malaya.
5. Communism, as a force in open and armed
conflict with the Government of this country,
is at present a most dangerous political
influence in these schools, and negative
control by close liaison between the Special
Branch and the Education Department and by the
strict enforcement of legislation regarding
registration... must continue. At the same
time positive efforts must be made to
eradicate the causes of Communism in these
schools 61
The memorandum suggested that the government adopt a
positive policy on Chinese schools and Chinese education
in general. 62
 It pointed out that the essential elements
336
of Chinese culture contained in Chinese schools should be
preserved, but at the same time that the nature of
Chinese schools should be changed to fit the needs of
Malayan society. Amongst other things it suggested: the
teaching of Kuo Yu in newly-established National Schools
and in existing English primary schools, the
encouragement of Chinese primary schools to transform
themselves voluntarily into National Schools, and
assistance to the Chinese Primary Schools which remained
as vernacular schools to improve their teaching
standards. According to this memorandum the government
needed to increase funding for Chinese schools and this
could be justified as it was accompanied by a certain
degree of "Malayanisation" of these schools. It was
confident that this process would continue and the
exclusively communal nature of these schools could be
changed.
Based on the Select Committee proposals,
MacGLL1iv-ray made a modest programme of educational
expansion. According to his plans Malaya would need to
create 300 new English medium National schools over the
next 13 years. The cost for the proposed schools,
together with two Teacher Training Colleges, was
estimated at the sum of 427 million or very much higher
than that. MacGillivray informed the Colonial Office that
there was no way to get that money for the National
School scheme. 63
 Therefore, according to him, "Her
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Majesty's Government must bless it and underwrite it
financially." 64 He added:
The process of nation-building,
although recognised as essential by the
authorities. . . has so far made slow
progress. The situation can radically
change by one means only, reforms in
the educational system which will make
it an effective stimulant to national
consciousness. The need is for
schools, dedicated to promoting Malayan
unity, in which children of all races
may grow up together, learning each his
mother tongue as a subject of study but
being taught through the medium of a
common language. The common language
must be the lingua franca of the
country, English. Only thus can racial
exclusiveness, at present fostered by
the vernacular system of education
which predominates in Malaya,	 be
broken down.65
The Colonial Office strongly supported the D.
MacGillivray's proposals National Schools in Malaya.
Colonial officials agreed that the role of education was
important if the British hoped to attain their declared
and essential aim of building a united Malayan nation. J.
Martin pointed out that the "shooting war" was only one
side of a two-pronged policy. 66 The other was to win or
in other word to control, the hearts and minds of the
people, especially young Chinese, through education. He
added that even though the Emergency would come to an
end, the struggle against Communism would continue. He
appealed to the HMG Treasury to make available some
#27 million to provide for it. Martin wrote:
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The case for this [National School
scheme] is political. Unless, in the
few years of control that still remain
to us, we act with much greater vigour
and on the basis of a far more
ambitious plan than has yet been
attempted... there is no hope of
creating a united Malayan. . . nation
attached to the British connection and
firmly aligned with the anti-Communist
world.. . . it is suggested that
approximatelyf 2 million a year for 14
years is not an excessive premium to
pay if, as we believe, it may be
decisive	 in	 safeguarding	 our
investment 67
The Colonial Office hoped the Treasury would
approve the proposals for National Schools before Malaya
achieved its semi self-government on 31 August 1955. It
was argued that the Secretary of State for the Colonies
could present this as a contribution from HMG to
Malaya. Martin pointed out that this proposed
contribution f or English-medium National schools would
be accepted i it as presented before the formation of a
new government under the Alliance. Otherwise the future
government might reject this scheme. Up to 20 August 1955
Colonial officials were still holding discussions
regarding the proposals for National Schools and failed
to reach any conclusion. 68
 In these circumstances, the
Secretary of State, who visited Malaya in late August,
felt that ' t there could be no point in his saying more to
the Alliance leaders than to exhort them in very general
terms to accept a really forward policy of National
Schools. ,,69
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In the meantime the tJMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance was
eager to review the education policy in order to give
greater satisfaction to those who wanted Malay to be the
national language. 7 ° At the same time the Alliance also
needed to accommodate the wishes of the MCA regarding
Chinese education. In these circumstance, the Malayan
government did not press the British government to
approve and underwrite the proposed National English
Schools for Malaya. Instead it would hold a discussion
with the International Bank with a view to drafting a
new "Development Plan" for education in the country.71
Part IV
Political Reforms--
Citizenship
 Chanqs
As the present writer has indicated elsewhere,
Gurney was unable to push the 1951 Bill on citizenship
through the Federal Legislative Council as it was
strongly opposed by the Malays. This Bill was referred
to the Select Committee for further examination. Its
recommendations were embodied in the Federation of Malaya
Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance of 1952 Bill. Templer
moved this Bill in the Legislative Council on 7 May 1952.
Together with this, nine State Nationality Enactments
were moved in each State and Settlement Council. The
340
Ordinance and Enactments introduced two avenues for
conferring citizenship: state nationality for those in
the Malay States and citizenship of the United Kingdom
and Colonies for Malacca and Penang inhabitants. 72 The
people of Malaya would be able to acquire Federal
citizenship by being subjects of Malay Rulers or through
state nationality and citizens of the United Kingdom and
Colonies. Thus the new citizenship scheme created one
citizenship in addition to nine nationalities.
The new Citizenship scheme was introduced in
order to confer upon a large majority of Chinese a
Federal citizenship. The new rules for becoming a
citizen were less restrictive for non-Malays than the
previous Federal Citizenship rules. But the new rules
imposed obligations as well as rights. For instance the
applicant should indicate loyalty by taking an oath of
allegiance to the relevant ruler and renounce any other
citizenship or nationality. However the language
requirement was relaxed for a period of five years from
the date the new regulation came into effect. With this
new scheme 1,157,000 Chinese and 255,000 other non-Malays
would become citizens/state nationals by operation of
the law on 30 June 1953. One Malay member of the
legislative council regarded the acceptance of the new
scheme as a tremendous sacrifice by the Malays in
allowing the members of other races to share the rights
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of the Malays. 74 However, Chinese were not happy to
abandon the principle of Jus Soil and were unhappy about
the failure to create a Federal nationality.75
The "Member" System And The Introduction Of Elections
The colonial government introduced some political
reforms, in order to "woo the masses away from the
Communists", 76 and to groom and nurture the leadership
of the moderate Chinese and other communities and to lay
the foundations of Malayan democratic government. The
most important political reforms, apart from changes in
the citizenship law, were the introduction of the
"Member (ministerial)" system and elections. 	 The idea
for the introduction of the "ministerial" or "Member"
system came from Henry Gurney. He made an announcement
in March 1950 that certain non-government members of the
Federal Legislative Council would be appointed as head of
various government departments in •order to gain
administrative, experience. 77 The government considered
this move as an important step towards self-government
and democracy. The "Member" system was introduced in
April 1951 with the appointments of five Malayans as
"Members" or the heads of Home Affairs, Agriculture and
Forestry, Lands, Mines and Communications, Education, and
Health portfolios. Among them were ]Jato Onn, the
president of tJMNO and also a CLC member as the Member Of
Home Affairs, Dr. Lee Tiang King, one of the leaders of
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the Penang Secession Movement as the Member of Health,
and E.E. Thuraisingham, the chairman of the CLC as the
Member for Education. In October 1953 two more Malayans
were appointed as "Members." They were Dr. Ismail (tJMNO)
and H. S. Lee (the chairman of the Selangor branch of the
MCA) 78
In 1951 the colonial government introduced
another major political change : elections at the local
and municipal level, and subsequently at the state level.
The first election to be held was for the Malacca
Municipality Election in November 1951. However, the
response from the people to this election was poor. All
nine candidates to the new Municipal Council were
returned unopposed. There were four candidates from the
Progressive Party, three from the Labour Party, one from
UMNO and the other was an Independent candidate.79
According to Tan Cheng Lock "Chinese did not come
forward to stand for election. . . due to the fact the
government policy had been to discriminate against non-
Malays in the matter of citizenship." 80 The Penang
Chinese also showed a lack of enthusiasm to stand for
Georgetown Municipal Council Election scheduled in
December 1951. According to Rajeswary Ampalavanar, most
of the candidates who stood for this election were
Indians. 81
 it should be noted that the Chinese formed the
largest ethnic group in both the Malacca and Georgetown
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Municipalities. The general apathy of the Chinese
community reflected their resentments towards the
government policies-- particularly on citizenship-- and
the government operations against the guerrillas which
affected their community. Tan Cheng Lock as the
president of the MCA criticized this attitude which he
said "might perhaps be detrimental to the future success
of Malaya as an independent state." 82 He added that,
people "must take a more active part in the affairs of
the country or good government will be impossible." 83 In
response to these criticisms, the Chinese in Kuala Lumpur
decided to participate in the forthcoming election for
the municipal council.
The Rise of The UMNO-MCA Alliance
The Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election of February
1952 represented a turning point in the political
development of Malaya. On 8 January 1952, the Kuala
Lumpur division of tJMNO and the Selangor branch of the
MCA, in a joint declaration, announced that they would
contest the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election on 16
February "on a common non-communal, non-party basis."84
Thus the UMNO-MCA Alliance was formed at a local level.
Many writers, for example Gordon P. Means have explained
the formation of the TJIVINO-MCA as a reaction to the IMP.
He wrote:
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The most adequate explanation of the sudden
turn-about of the MCA must take into account
the personalities of Dato Onn and Tan Cheng
Lock. Both men were very dynamic, and both
possessed too much of the quality of a prima
donna on the political stage to be able to
work together very well. Furthermore, personal
animosities had developed between them during
the extended political controversies over the
Malayan Union and the federation Agreement.
Although Tan Cheng-lock could have supported a
"non-communal" political party he could never
been an enthusiastic supporter of such a party
if it also would have given Dato Onn an
unassailable position of political supremacy
in Malaya.85
However, Gordon G. Means was unable to provide any
evidence to support his view. There is conversely
evidence which indicates Tan Cheng Lock's continued
support for the political activity of Dato Onn during the
1952-3 period. It is more likely that the alliance was
formed in preparation for the possible eventual merging
of UMNO, MIC and MCA as proposed by Tan Cheng Lock in
April 1951. It is here argued that it was not the
intention of the MCA, by forming the alliance with the
tJTvlNO to destroy the IMP, but to "co-exist" with this non-
communal party which, according to Tan Cheng Lock 's
anticipation, might become an umbrella for the communal
bodies. This was more likely the reason why he continued
to support the IMP after he had made his commitment to
UMNO.
For many contemporary political observers, the
forming of the UIvINO- MCA Alliance was a most unexpected
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event, as Tan Cheng Lock, apart from holding the
presidency of the MCA, was the chairman of the founding
Committee of the IMP. He actively involved himself with
the setting up of the IMP branches throughout Malaya.
As the present writer has indicated elsewhere, it was Tan
Cheng Lock's intention to form a "pyramidal" type of
political organisation with the non-communal party
superimposed upon the communal bodies. This proposal was
not secret. It was in fact discussed at the meetings of
the MCA Central Committee. It was also reported by the
Malayan Intelligence. 86 Afterwards this issue was
raised during an informal meeting of the MCA in Malacca
in 1951. Humphrey Ball, the MCA's legal adviser suggested
that an attempt should be made to reconcile the IMP with
tJIVINO before the formation of a Malacca branch of the
IMP. 87 It had been pointed out that his idea was to avoid
the	 risk of creating racial conflict as the Malays
strongly supported UMNO.
Consequently, at the end of January 1952 a secret
meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur and was attended by ]Jato
Onn, Rasmani R.Ramani, a prominent Indian lawyer, Tunku
Abdul Rahman ,the president of UMNO, Thuraisingham, and
one or two Chinese Councillors and Tan Cheng Lock.88
Thuraisingham asserted that "the reason for the meeting
as being the altruistic one of saving Malaya from
bloodshed" 89 or in other words to avoid racial conflict.
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Thuraisingham suggested a formation of an interracial
movement on the lines of the Communities Liaison
Committee with perhaps independence as the objective.
However, the meeting failed to achieve any positive
results as "T[unku] A[bdul Rahman] took the stand that
all must help him drive out the British before he would
discuss terms of granting rights to non-Malays." 90
 On
the other hand Tan Cheng Lock refused to make any
commitment on this matter and "excused himself to attend
a dinner with Sir J. Hay."9°
There is no doubt that the Selangor MCA chairman,
H. S. Lee and the working Committee members Ong Yoke Lin
and S. M. Yong played important role in taking the
initiative to form a coalition with the tJIvlNO Kuala Lumpur
branch to compete in the election. According to Heng Pek
Koon, it was Ong Yoke Lin who arranged the meeting
between H. S. Lee and Datuk Yahaya bin Abdul Razak,
chairman of the Kuala Lumpur tJMNO's Election Committee,
and, between them, they decided to form an Alliance to
compete in the election. 92
 The present writer found no
evidence which indicates Tan Cheng Lock had instructed H.
S. Lee to approach the UMNO leadership. There is
however, evidence confirming that Tan Cheng Lock did
inform other MCA leaders of the informal meeting of the
MCA Malacca branch and of the suggestion put forward by
Ball. Tan Siew Sin, son of Tan Cheng Lock, wrote to Dato
Onn on 18 January 1952 to say that:
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My father [Tan Cheng Lock] informs (me)
that Shook Lin (Yong Shook Lin, the
Secretary General of the MCA) is under
the impression that we in Malacca are
afraid of forming a branch of the IMPjust because two lawyers [S.Shammugam
and Humphrey Ball] are against it.93
During the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Elections, the
leaders and members of the MCA seemed divided. Some of
the MCA leaders such as Tan Slew Sin and Yong Shook Lin
vigorously supported the IMP. Thus the MCA avoided a
break up of their relationship with the IMP. At the same
time the Selangor branch of the MCA fostered
	 close
relations	 with tJT4NO. It seemed that
	 the main MCA
personalities were caught in a real dilemma. While the
Kuala Lurnpur voters clearly supported the tJMNO-MCA
Alliance by giving them nine of the twelve seats, the IMP
managed to secure two seats, while another seat was
won by an independent candidate.94
According to R. Vasil, Tan Cheng Lock delayed
sending a message of congratulations on the success of
the TJtvlNO-MCA alliance. 95 In actual fact however, H.S. Lee
received the telegram of congratulation from Tan Cheng
Lock in the morning of 18 February 1952. In his message
Tan Cheng Lock stated that he wished that the cause
of 5mb-Malay co-operation and the MCA political
activities should triumph throughout the country. 96 On
the same day H.S. Lee also received the message from
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Tunku Abdul Rahman, in which the Tunku said that the
"Alliance great achievement profit[s] Malaya." 97 The
Tunku hoped it might be everlasting and spread. H. S. Lee
wrote to Tan Cheng Lock,
I have no doubt in my own mind that no
self-government for Malaya would be
successful unless we have a united
Malaya, but to obtain a united Malaya
it is in the first instance necessary
to obtain the mutual understanding and
co-operation between the Malays and the
Chinese, the biggest racial groups in
the country.... If the tJMNO-MCA
alliance could be established in the
other parts of the country, it would go
a lon way to achieve a united
Malaya. 8
H. S. Lee pointed out that:
The result of the Kuala Lumpur
Municipal Election unmistakenly shows
that the public has no confidence in
the IMP, at least in the capital of
Federation. When the founder of the
IMP together with other leading IMP
members could not get more than two
seat out of twelve in the Kuala Lumpur
Municipal Election after making ever
effort to get the vote, it seems
unlikely that the IMP will be able to
achieve any success elsewhere.99
In his reply, Tan Cheng Lock said that H. S.
Lee's views on the question of Sino-Malay co-operation
were very sound.- 00 However, he informed H. S. Lee that
the influential members of the MCA wanted co-operation
with the IMP)- 01 According to him, it was likely the
MCA was divided on the question. He was in favour of
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leaving it to the individual branches of the MCA to
decide whether they would cooperate with the IMP or the
UMNO. But he stressed that : "Principles are more
important than people. I support the principles of the
IMP, UMNO-MCA co-operation and Sino-Malay
cooperation." 102 Thio Chan Bee, a close friend of Tan
Cheng Lock held the same views. He told Tan Cheng Lock:
"Your conciliatory attitude is right ... [as] .. . at the
moment there is nothing very definite--all in a state of
flap." 103 He suggested that "tJMNO-MCA [would] have to be
linked up on the basis of common aims and common
programme of change
	
re the constitution, etc..".
According to him, their friend, Dato Onn "stands for
change but went too fast for the rank and file of the
Malays so that they have turned to communal leadership
again." 104
 He added that: "What is now needed is a
rallying together of tJMNO-MCA-IMP, but it will need god's
guidance and help to be successful." 105 He advised Tan
Cheng Lock to "show goodwill to rival units and hold up
the ideal of all-Malayan unity and Co-operation for the
good of all and for the country."106
Meanwhile the MCA leaders of the Selangor branch
continued to foster a closer relationship with the UMNO
leaders. It was, for instance, reported that Tunku Abdul
Rahman, the president of UrVINO "had a very useful meeting
with local MCA leaders" in Kuala Lumpur at the end of
February 1952).07
 On 22 February H. S. Lee was reported
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to have sent a "highly confidential" letter to Tan Cheng
Lock, proposing an ultimate Federation-wide Sino-Malay
alliance. 108
 But H. S. Lee refused to disclose its
contents as he considered "it would be harmful" to the
interests of the MCA. 109
 In actual fact, H.S. Lee only
informed Tan Cheng Lock that he had
	 had several
discussions with Tunku Abdul Rahman. 1- 3
-° According to
H.S. Lee he had found the Tunku "to be very sincere and
reasonable." 113- He added that the Tunku would send a
letter to the leaders of TJMNO in various States and
Settlements--suggesting they to contact the leaders of
the various MCA branches. In his opinion it was necessary
for the Chinese to show their response in order to obtain
whole-hearted co-operation from the Malays) 12 He
suggested to Tan Cheng Lock to meet the Tunku at an early
date.
In his reply on 29 February 1952, Tan Cheng Lock
sought H. S. Lee's views on certain matters to be
discussed in the proposed rneeting. 13
 Tan Cheng Lock told
him, he needed to clear up certain points of policy in
the relationship between the tJMNO and MCA, such as
whether the Tunku personally was in favour of the
principle of -lus soli and whether he advocated the policy
of "Malaya for the Malayan." 14 Tan Cheng Lock also asked
Lee to discover whether the Tunku was in a position to
work to get tJMNO to agree on those principles. H. S. Lee
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wrote to Tan Cheng Lock to say that the Tunku's personal
views were as follows
If everybody horn in the Country is
allowed to vote, the principle of Jus
Soli is therefore, established.115
The Tunku added that, in "order to get his view agreed
to by his tJ.M.N.O. Branches . . . there should be liaison
meetings between the leaders of the U.M.N.O. and the
leaders of the M.C.A. in the various States and
Settlements to discuss confidentially and in a friendly
manner these various points."1
The first meeting of UMNO and MCA leaders was
held on 3 January 1953. Both Tan Cheng Lock and Tunku
A.bdul Rahman, the president of tJTvlNO, were eager to
consolidate the alliance of both parties. They agreed to
"set up the the Alliance Roundtable as a vehicle to
institutionaliz e the UIvINO-MCA Alliance on a pan-Malayan
basis."-- 7 Until early 1955, the Alliance Roundtable
acted as the supreme decision-making body of the
alliance)- 18 This body directed the states' branches of
tJNNO and MCA to form states liaison committees and work
at a low level to run the affairs of both parties. The
Alliance Roundtable was changed into the Alliance
National Council in early 1955. This body became the
umbrella for the UMNO and MCA and also the MIC when this
body joined the Alliance.
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Tan Cheng Lock and The IMP
After the Kuala Lumpur election Tan Cheng Lock
did not appear to abandon his idea of forming the
"pryamidial" system of political organisation. Thio Chan
Bee, his friend, told him that he must "remain loyal to
Dato Onn. . . out of gratitude and from a long term
view." 119 He stressed that IJato Onn stood "for more
change in the Malay policy so as to accept Malayan
Chinese as equal fellow citizens." 12 ° Thus Tan Cheng Lock
continued to help Dato Onn in forming branches of the IMP
such as the one in Malacca. When the Malacca branch of
IMP was formally formed on 10 August 1952, Tan Cheng Lock
and his son, Tan Siew Sin, accepted membership of the
executive committee of this branch)- 2
- However Tan Cheng
Lock declined nomination as chairman on the grounds that
his "hands are full."122
Towards September 1952 the relationship between
MCA leaders and Dato Onn deteriorated as Dato Onn was
infuriated with what he saw as the case of double-
dealing on the part of Tan Cheng Lock. He launched a
campaign to criticize MCA's activities such as the
running of lotteries. 123
 He said the MCA had been able to
amass large sums of money through the running of
lotteries and part of the money was used for political
work. In September 1952 the IMP's central national
council passed a resolution, calling for the prohibition
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of lotteries run by political parties. As a result, Tan
Slew Sin, the head of the publicity section of the MCA
was furious. According to him, by passing these
resolutions the party (IMP) had thrown a direct and
hostile challenge to the MCA. 124
 Consequently Tan Siew
Sin resigned from the IMP on 18 September 1952. However,
Tan Cheng Lock said nothing about this. He continued to
support Dato Onn and the IMP for another year.
By the end of 1952 it was clear that the IMP
failed to attract support from the Malay or the Chinese
communities. One of the leaders of the IMP, Data Panglima
Eukit Gantang, made a suggestion to Thuraisingham to hold
a series of meetings to study the "political scene
against the Malayan national background." 125
 The first
meeting was held in Ipoh on 29 and 30 January 1953 and
was attended by Data Panglima Gantang himself, Data Onn
bin Jaafar, Heah Joo Seong, Yong Shook Lin, former MCA
Secretary-General and others including MacDonald, the
Commissioner-General. After the meeting discussed the
political situation in Malaya, Data Penglima Bukit
Gantang suggested the formation of "a central political
body." 126 MacDonald agreed with this suggestion and
pointed out that in India, the Indian problem was solved
through the Round Table Conference. In another meeting
held in Kuala Lumpur on 12 February 1953, MacDonald
suggested that a central political body should work
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through the existing political organizations rather than
promote a new political party as being suggested by Yong
Shook Lin and Dato Onn.127
As a result of those meetings, the Malayan
National Conference was held on 27 April 1953. This was
attended by various social and political organizations
including the IMP. However, the tJMNO and MCA boycotted
the conference)- 28
 The Conference failed to form a
national coalition of all parties. As a consequence of
this Dato Onn felt he was betrayed by Tan Cheng Lock and
the MCA leaders as it was they who induced him towards
non-communalism. He carried a campaign to discredit the
MCA. For instance, in March 1953 he alleged that the MCA
and the Chinese Chambers of Commerce cooperated to carry
out a plan to make Malaya the twentieth province of
China. He also said the MCA was controlled by the Chinese
Chambers of Commerce which according to him, had "become
the underground Kuomintang Party."-29 These charges were
strongly cdndemned by the MCA leadership. Tan Cheng
Lock's son, Tan Siew Sin, moved a motion of censure on
Dato Onn in the Federal Legislative Council on 7 May
1953. But the motion was defeated with only nine in
favour and forty against it. In the meantime, Tan Cheng
Lock, who was still involved with IMP attempts to hold a
protest meeting against Dato Onn, called it of f after the
defeat of a motion of censure in the Council.130
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After this incident, the political alliance
between Tan Cheng Lock and Dato Onn came to an end. In a
sad statement Dato Onn described how he had attempted to
promote inter-racial harmony and cooperation and the
sacrifices that he had made. He said, "having left TJMNO,
the present president of the MCA and I agreed to form a
non-communal party which would take into its fold members
of all races and of all communities." 131 He added, "1
have kept my part of the bargain."
In early 1954, Dato Onn dismantled the IMP and
formed a new political party, the Party Negara (National
Party) which was of a more pro-Malay orientation but its
membership was open to all races who were subjects of
the Ruler, or Federal citizens or British Subjects.132
The formation of this party reflected Dato Onn's
intention to return to the old ground of getting Malay
support and competing with tJlvlNO. With the failure of the
IMP, Tan Cheng Lock's proposals to "superimpose" a non-
communal policy failed to become reality.
The Decline of The Militant Communism
Towards the end of 1951, the effects	 of the
Goverment counter-insurgency and the military and police
offensive were felt by the Communist guerrillas. The MCP
was alarmed by the high casualties suffered by the
guerrillas in fighting against the government forces. At
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the same time its popularity and influence amongst the
people was in decline. On 1 October the MCP Central
Committee issued a new directive which reflected a
rethinking of its policy. 133
 The directive admitted
mistakes in the past and the need to change the focus
of its campaign. It reminded members that their primary
duty was to expand and consolidate the organization of
the masses, which was to take precedence over the purely
military objective of destroying the enemy. 134
 They
realized that indiscriminate acts of destruction and
sabotage were alienating the people who had before been
prepared to support them. The new Directive instructed
members to win over the masses by: ending the seizing of
identity and ration cards; ending the burning of new
villages and coolie lines; ending attacks on public
utilities; refraining from derailing civilian trains; and
ending the throwing of grenades or hurting the masses
during the shooting of "running dogs." The directives
reminded them that acts of sabotage and destruction in
the rubber estates, tin mines, and factories should be
stopped. These acts in the past caused resentment
against the guerrillas as the workers lost their
employment. But certain people, considered as
reactionaries and traitors (such as the Kuomintan g and
the MCA members) , and also government forces, were still
targets for Communist attacks. But it reminded members
not to kill members of the Malay political parties such
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as UlvINO and the IMP. This was because the MCP wanted to
avoid resentment from the Malay community.
At the time Templer took over the post of High
Commissioner and Director of Operations, the Communists
had already begun to retreat into the deep jungle, partly
as a result of the efforts of his predessor. However,
Templer made greater efforts and achieved a greater
success in the campaign against the Communists. During
his two years rule, two-thirds of the guerrilla forces
were eliminated. Later on, MacGillivray and Bourne,
continued to attack and curb the guerrillas. From 1951 to
1955,the strength of the guerrillas was reduced
dramatically from 8,000 to less than 5,000.135 Chin Peng
and the MCP were forced to retreat, and found a new base
in Southern Thailand. Terrorist activity was reduced
until the government forces had difficulty in finding
them. 136
 At certain times the High Commissioner was
worried that ". . . Communist terrorism should cease
altogether in Ma1ayat ]- 37
 and this situation was more
dangerous to the British position. In these
circumstances, in the opinion of the High Commissioner,
"it would be difficult if not impossible to resist, the
establishment of Chinese Consuls and for the recognition
of a lawful Communist Party, through which agencies
Communist penetration of the political life of the
country would be stepped up."138
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Towards the end of 1954, it appeared that the
Communists' armed struggle against the British government
would end in failure. As a consequence the MCP begun to
consider adopting a moderate line in its struggle
against the colonial government. In August 1954, a
Malayan delegate to the Council of World Democratic Youth
in Peking gave a hint that the Campaigners for Malayan
liberation were willing to undertake peace talks to bring
the Malayan war to an end if the basic rights of
national independence and self-determination of the
Malayan people were maintained)- 39 The MCP looked to the
Geneva Conference on Indo-China as an example that
"disputes can be solved justly by peaceful means' 4 ° and
a colonial war could also be solved successfully by the
same means if there was "respect for national
independence, and the democratic and territorial
integrity of the oppressed nations."The MCP argued that
the British should follow the steps taken by France for
the solution of the Indo-China problem. 1- 43-
Conclusion
The government's vigorous campaign to build a
united Malayan nation and the introduction of elections
had achieved considerable success in the political life
of Malaya. It changed the attitude of the Malays towards
the non-Malays--particularly the Chinese-- and encouraged
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the development and the growth of a moderate interracial
political movement such as the tJMNO-MCA Alliance. It
also brought about the decline of militant Communism. In
these circumstance, moderate political leaders were
confident and expected that the ultimate aim of self-
government and independence could be reached at a faster
pace.
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CHAPTER VIII
The Road To Independence 1955
By 1955 it was evident that Britain and the
colonial government in Malaya were facing a delicate
situation. Both the tJMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance and the MCP
had one goal in common to obtain independence for Malaya
as soon as possible. Because of this the Alliance
appeared willing to negotiate with the MCP in order to
bring the Emergency to an end . There was, therefore, the
probability of a merger between the moderate and militant
political movements in order to achieve independence.
The British finally chose to withdraw and transfer the
power to the moderate tJMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance.
Part I
The Constitutional Crisis And The British-Alliance
Confront at ion
By early 1953 it became clear that the fight
against the Communists had improved and Templer, the
High Commissioner, decided to initiate steps towards
Malayan self-government. A committee was set up to
prepare ways and means for Federal elections. This
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Election Committee consisted of 46 members, most of whom
were supporters of Dato Onn and the National Conference
group. 1 There were only seven tJMNO-MCA representatives.
In the meantime the Alliance mounted a campaign
to draw support from the people for their cause of
getting independence for the country. 2 The Alliance made
an attempt to bring together all political organizations
and interest groups to discuss future constitutional
developments in Malaya. For these purposes the Alliance
organized a Malayan National Convention and invited
fifteen organizations to attend. It held three meetings
of the National Convention, on 23 August and 11 October
of 1953 and 14 February, 1954. Only four organizations,
other than the Alliance, participated in the National
Convention: the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party(PMIP or PAS),
Peninsular Malays tJnion(PMU), the Kelantan Malay
tinion(KMU) and the Pan-Malayan Labour Party(PMLP). The
Convention, which was largely dominated by the Alliance,
passed a number of resolutions which amongst other things
called for an elected majority in the Federal
Legislative Council and an election for Federal Council
not later than November 1954.
In January 1954, the Election Committee produced
its findings which showed that were some disagreements
among its members. The vital questions were whether
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there should be or should not be an elected majority and
also on the number of elected majority component. The
Majority report recommended that there should be 48
nominated and 44 elected members for the re-constituted
Council. This meant a majority of the members of this
committee favoured a delay in political progress towards
an independent Malaya. The majority report also
recommended that civil servants should not be allowed to
stand for election. The minority report, which
reflected the Alliance view recommended GO elected and 40
nominated members for the Federal Council. The Alliance
proposed a large majority of elected members as it
expected to win in the forthcoming election and form the
first elected government. The minority report also
recommended that civil servants should be allow to stand
in the election; large members of tJMNO were, in fact,
government servants.
The report was submitted to the High Commissioner
and the Conference of Malay Rulers which had the right of
veto on any change in constitutional matters. The
Conference made an attempt to bridge the gap between the
majority and minority recommendations. Later a White
Paper was published proposing a small elected majority
for the Federal Council. It proposed a Council of 98 with
46 nominated and 52 elected members. The Alliance refused
to accept such a small elected majority.	 Instead it
demanded a three-fifths elected majority. It decided to
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send a delegation of its three representatives--Tunku
Abdul Rahman, Dato Razak and T.H. Tan-- to discuss the
matter with the Secretary of State for the Colonies in
London. The Alliance also petitioned the Sultans, but for
the time being did not seek an interview with them.
MacGillivray, the Deputy High Commissioner sent
two telegrams to the Secretary of State on 2 April
regarding the Alliance request to send a delegation to
see him. 3 The colonial officials felt that it would be a
mistake to accede to the Alliance request as the High
Commissioner had already reached full agreement on all
constitutional proposals except minor ones. According to
MacKintosh, he did not think that "the Alliance could
fail to recognise that the Secretary of State was being
disingenuous if he were to receive a delegation in
circumstances in which it was obvious that nothing that
they had to say would have any effect." 4 But afterwards
the colonial officials changed their mind after Lord
Ogmore, who was sympathetic to the Alliance's cause,
persuaded the Secretary of State to receive the Alliance
delegation. Newsam suggested to Martin that the
Secretary of State might agree to see them as a matter of
courtesy. 5 But he should not discuss constitutional
matters. Martin agreed and told Sir Thomas Lloyd, that
he thought it would " be a mistake for the Secretary of
State not to 'show willing' to the extent of receiving
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the leading visitors on a purely personal and informal
basis.
In the end Tunku Abdul Rahman and his colleagues
were received by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, and they also met Lord Ogmore and other Labour
members of Parliament who had a particular interest in
Malayan problems. In the meantime Templer informed the
Secretary of State that it seemed that the Alliance was
intent on resigning from the Federal and States Executive
councils, also from all local government councils. 7 In
his opinion, this would undoubtedly be a dangerous move
and would have a most unsettling effect on the political
situation and might even gave rise to disturbances. He
gave a suggestion to the Secretary of State that he
should tell the Alliance "that resignation from a council
at this stage would be an irresponsible act which might
even have an unfavourable effect on the conduct of the
Emergency." 8 He also informed the Secretary of State that
H. S. Lee suggested that a "royal commission" should be
appointed and Tunku Abdul Rahman might accept this even
if it meant a delay of elections for six months. Lee
also told Templer that the Alliance felt that they might
lose the elections unless they fulfilled their promise to
resign.
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During the meeting between the Secretary of State
for the Colonies and the Alliance leaders, the main
arguments of the Alliance were as follows:
a. That so small a elected majority was
unacceptable to the mass of the people, who
demanded at least three-fifths. Alliance
leaders could not resist them on this because
if they did they would be thrown over and
replaced by extremists. For so few seats the
people would not think it worth-while
supporting elections, and the vast expense of
fighting them would be a waste of money for
political parties.
b. No party could hope to win more than seventy
per cent. of seats. On present figures that
would mean an unworkably small majority and
the winning party could therefore have no hope
of governing with confidence. They would be in
an impossible position if they always had to
rely for a majority upon substantial help from
non-elected elements in Council.
c. Morever, the Opposition would have too few
seats to function effectively and debates
would thus lack reality.. . .
The Secretary of State was not impressed and was
not prepared to vary the constitutional proposals agreed
between the-High Commissioner and the Rulers. He pointed
out to the Alliance that "it was no sort of leadership
tamely to obey all the demands of your followers." 10 He
assured the Alliance that the majority party which would
form the government would automatically enjoy the
additional support of the three 'ex-officio' and two
other official members of Council and also would be
likely to get the support from among the other non-
elected members. He rejected the demands for increasing
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size of the elected majority as it would throw back the
whole agreement which had so far been reached into " the
melting pot." He persuaded the Alliance to accept the
proposals,	 and take part in the elections, and
discover whether the fears they expressed about the
agreement were sound or not.
The Secretary of State told Templer that the
Alliance delegation had not made any suggestions on the
appointment of a royal commission and also did not
mention their threats of mass resignation. He had the
impression of the Alliance delegation, that they were as
"three worried little men and on the evidence of their
attitude when with me I should doubt whether they will in
fact press their opposition to the present proposals by
the extreme measures which they have threatened." 11 He
added that,"I am quite determined not to budge at all
from our position but I think that it might ease the
situation greatly if we could open to the alliance some
emergency exit from the position in which they have put
themselves, and I am anxious if possible to find some
such expedient. ,, 12
The Alliance mission to London was an almost
total failure. After the delegation returned to Malaya,
they again renewed their criticism of the constitutional
proposals and demanded the following:
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a. That Government servants should be eligible
for election to Council....
b. That there should be a simple majority vote in
all constituencies.
c. That franchise should be granted to certain
other groups beside federal citizens..
d. That Nominated Members of the Legislative
Council should be eligible for Ministerial
Office.
e. That the elections should be held this year
[in 1954] .
f. That at least three-fifths of the Members of
the Legislative Council should be
elected.
Templer agreed to meet certain demands in full as in
(a), (b) and (d) •14 He rejected (c) as he was convinced
that in order to build a united Malayan nation it was
essential to confine the privilege of voting to its
citizens.On (e) he pointed out it was not possible to
hold the election in 1954 as it needed time to prepare
it. He rejected (f) but added that Nominated Members
might be expected to include some who were members of
the victorious party. Thus the winning party could form
the effective government by the support from its own
nominated members together with the elected members.
Tunku Abdul Rahman was still not satisfied with
the assurances of support from the High Commissioner and
the Secretary of State for the Colonies . On 25 May 1954,
he said that the small majority of six was insufficient
to enable the victorious party to have a working majority
in the Council to form a stable government)- 5 The party
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in power would be subject to the whims and fancies of
nominated members and amongst them there were those who
were opposed to real democratic progress. According to
the Tunku no responsible party could willingly form a
government in these circumstances.
On 25 May 1954, the Tunku, H. S. Lee, Ismail and
Leong Yew Koh presented a resolution adopted by the
Alliance to General Templer. They read as follows:
That the White Paper to introduce
national elections in the Federation of
Malaya is not acceptable to the
Alliance and, therefore, the Alliance
strongly opposes its implementation by
the Federation Government. In order to
get an unbiased assessment of the
country's progress towards self-
Government, the Alliance requests that
a special independent commission,
consisting entirely of members from
outside Malaya, be sent immediately to
the Federation with the concurrence of
Her Majesty and Their Highnesses to
report on constitutional reforms in the
Federation. The Alliance believes the
appointment of such a commission will
have the support of all who believe in
democracy. Fully realising its
reponsibilities towards the people and
the country, the Alliance will continue
to give its fullest co-operation to the
Government in all respects,
particularly with a view to bringing
the emergency to an early end, if this
request is acceeded to. On the other
hand, if the authorities insist on
implementation of the White Paper, the
Alliance with great regret will have no
choice but to withdraw all its members
from participation in the Government.-6
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Templer told the Alliance members that it was his firm
intention to go ahead with consideration of the bill in
the Executive Council and to publish it at once so as to
make it possible to introduce it to the Legislative
Council on 23 June. However, he agreed to the Alliance's
proposal for the appointment of a commission. He told
the Secretary of State that tithe request for a commission
to undertake a complete review of the Federation
Agreement would appear a reasonable one to many people as
there were unacceptable parts in the Agreement which are
clearly in need of change.ttl7 In his opinion, the
rejection of this request would therefore be ill-received
by many and would strengthen the position of the
Alliance. But it was likely that the Malay Rulers and the
Negara Party (or Party Megara) would bitterly oppose
this proposal. However, Templer felt this proposal should
be put before the Rulers.
On 2 June 1954, MacGillivray, who had taken over
from Gerald Templer as the High Commissioner of Malaya,
told the Secretary of State that they should go ahead
with the elections on the basis already agreed. 18 In his
opinion, not tt to do so would would be interpreted to
mean that we accepted that there was substance in the
Alliance's contention that the arrangements proposed are
unworkable and would encourage the Alliance in their
present intransigent attitude and lead them on to demand
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further concessions; and we would undoubtedly run into
difficulties at the same time with the Rulers and the
party Negara.1t19
MacGillivray anticipated that the Alliance
members would carry out their plan of resignation and
boycott, as without this it was difficult for them to
maintain face. But in doing so they risked dissension in
their ranks, both in UMNO and the MCA, and possibly
even a break-up of the Alliance. In his opinion,it might
be best if the Alliance were to break-up and later re-
form without the extreme UMNO. MacGillivray pointed
out that the three UMNO Menteri Besar might not be
prepared to resign. As the presidents of their State
councils, they must support the bill so as not to be
regarded as disloyal to the Rulers' Conference. He hoped
the Alliance would recognise the weakness in their
position once they realized the government proposed to
stand firm and pursue its plan.20
The Secretary of State agreed with MacGillivray
and told Tunku Abdul Rahman that he saw no reason to
postpone the programme designed to give effect to the
proposals already decided upon for the introduction of
elections to the Federal Legislative Council. He
considered that those proposals seem to be in themselves
throughly sound. In his opinion, any attempt to go back
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upon them would cause confusion .Thus, he hoped the Tunku
would co-operate in making a success of them. 21 However
this persuasion had no effect with the Tunku and other
Alliance leaders. The MCA General Committee decided to
support the earlier decision of tJMNO to withdraw its
representatives from participation in councils of the
government at various levels. 22
 At a joint meeting of
UMNO and MCA officials on 13 June 1954, they released a
statement to the press as follows
As a result of the refusal of the
Secretary of State for the Colonies to
accede to an Alliance request for the
White Paper on Federal Elections to be
set aside and for the appointment
immediately of a Special Independent
Commission	 to	 inquire	 into
Constitutional	 Reforms	 in	 the
Federation, the UMNO-MCA Alliance,
announces with regret its decision to
withdraw all unofficial members of UMNO
and MCA from active participation in
the government in the Federation.
The	 decision	 entails	 the
resignation of the two Members
(Ilmjnisterstl) of the Federation,
unofficial members of UIVINO or MCA from
the Federal Executive and Legislative
Councils and other government bodies.
In the Alliance view, the White Paper
proposals are unsatisfactory and connot
be accepted in spite of the assurance
of the Secretary of State for the
Colonies that if these proposals cannot
work satisfactorily, immediate remedial
steps will be taken.
The Alliance did not ask for a
Royal Commmission. The Alliance asked
for a Special Independent Commission.
The Alliance is prepared to agree to
postponing the election while a Special
Independent Commission is appointed to
go into constitutional reforms. The
White Paper proposals are not
democratic enough. 23
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As a consequence, on 18 June three Alliance
Members of the Executive Council, H.S. Lee (Transport)
Ismail (Natural Resources) and Rahman resigned. Twelve
of the nineteen members of the Alliance in the Federal
Council also resigned not including the Mentri Besar. H.
S. Lee issued a strong warning to other MCA members to do
likewise. 24 On the 21 June H. 5. Lee told the
representatives of Chinese public organisations and
guilds in the States of Selangor as follows:
Any M.C.A. members who disagrees with
the General Committee but insists on
remaining as members of the Government
Councils should first of all resign as
members of the M.C.A. A person serving
in the Goverment Councils must in
honour bound, consider how he became a
member of such Councils. Any person who
professes to be member of the M.C.A.
and yet does not accept the unanimous
decision of the General Committee of
the M.C.A., the highest body in the
organisation, deserves treatment of
public contempt because it is always
open to him to tender his resignation
to the M.C.A. if he should prefer to be
a stooge.25
Lee also warned those who might fill the vacancies in the
various councils as replacements for Alliance members.
He said that in a democratic state persons responsible
for misdeeds would have to answer to the people
eventually. 2G
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However, the Alliance's action was not effective
as their representatives in various Federal, States and
Settlements and other government bodies were outnumbered
by the supporters of Dato Onn and other official members.
MacGillivray told the Secretary of State that the
"great majority of councils will have no difficulty in
assembling a quorum to hold meeting and carry on with
transaction of business." 27
 But in some councils such as
Kuala Lumpur, where Alliance elected Members had an
outright majority, some change had to be made. However,
he felt at that moment, that there was no necessity to
take immediate action. According to him, the Alliance's
actions would harm more the interest of the Chinese, as
Chinese members were almost without exception members of
the MCA and it would be left tivjrtually without
representation in constitutional bodies in the country at
large. ,,28
MacGillivray pointed out that it seemed the
Alliance was in favour of contesting the elections, in
order to demonstrate popular support in the country for
their party and those associated with them. Accordingly,
the government probably would have faced great difficulty
as the successful Alliance candidates would have absented
themselves from the councils to which they had been
elected. Thus the Alliance might obstruct the transaction
of business in the councils.29
/
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Towards the end of June 1954 the Alliance
struggle appeared almost certain to end in failure. On
23 June 1954 MacGillivray told the Secretary of State
that "the rulers and Party
 Negara and their supporters
are strongly of the opinion that a firm stand is
necessary if the Alliance is to be made to see reason,
and that any further concessions can only lead to further
demands." 3 ° He also informed him that only eight of the
seventeen Chinese in the Legislative Council had
resigned, some of them most reluctantly. According to
him, they took this action as a result of a "deplorable"
campaign amounting to intimidation by H.S.Lee with all
the power of the Guilds and Associated Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and Chinese Chamber of Mines behind him. The
other nine Chinese, most of them members of the MCA,
remained in their seats in the Council. But all of them
were not in the Council as nominees of the MCA.31
On 24 June 1954, the Federation of Malaya
Agreement (Amendment) Bill was passed in the Legislative
Council without division. 32 59 members (excluding the
speaker) were present. But the sixteen Alliance Members
who had resigned, were as expected, absent. This
amendment provided for a Legislature in which 52 out of
98 members would be elected. Thus, the elected members
would be in the majority. It was decided that the first
Federal Election would take place in July 1955. For the
/
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Alliance this was their first major defeat in the
struggle with Dato Onn and his supporters and the
British government. At this stage the Alliance did not
realize that they had made a big mistake in not seeking
support from the Malay Rulers whose consent was necessary
for any change to the constitution. Instead of persuading
the Malay Rulers, the Alliance irritated them by asking
the British government to use "formal advice" to force
them to give consent to any change to the constitution.33
The Alliance seemed to realize their mistake and
adopted a new strategy to win the support from the Malay
rulers. On 2 July 1954, they held a procession of 2000
people in Johore Baharu to publicise their demands and
present a petition to the Sultan. 34 They made a request
for the appointment of a special independent commission
"to inquire into, and make recommendations for,
constitutional reforms in the Federation of Malaya." 35
 In
their opinion, a commission with members from outside
Malaya would. be "free from prejudices and other local
influence." 36 The Alliance pointed out the majority
report of the Election Commission recommended an elected
minority in the future Federal Legislative Council. They
hoped the Sultans would prevent "this ridiculous
recommendation in the Report from being adopted."37
Initially the Sultans and their advisers strongly
resisted the Alliance proposal for a commission from
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outside Malaya to examine the constitution for the
future of Malaya. 38
 The reason was that the advisers for
the Sultans were associated with Dato Onn of the MNC,
which was an opponent of the Alliance. The High
Commisssioner himself was in difficulties as the Sultans'
attitude was one of 'no concessions' to the Alliance. He
feared that if he applied strong pressure he might
prejudice his own position with the Sultans and their
supporters, and "certainly would not get anywhere." The
Sultans themselves argued that they would be on dangerous
ground to depart from the advice tendered by their
advisers, many of whom were among those who had signed
the majority report of the Election Committee. Likewise
Dato Onn pressed the High Commissioner not to suggest
any other amendments to the Bill which gave an advantage
to the Alliance. 39 However, the High Commissioner himself
favoured an early agreement on the constitutional issue.
In his opinion:
There were dangers in a continuation of
the present impasse. Disorders might
arise from it and clearly the position
gave all sorts of opportunities for
skullduggery and for penetration on the
part of the Communists.4°
As the present writer has indicated elsewhere the former
High Commissioner agreed with the Alliance's view
regarding the need for a commission to review the
constitution. But the Colonial Office was not in favour
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of a commission from outside Malaya which was being
suggested by the Alliance "... if it is possible to reach
agreement on an appointment of an entirely local
commission. . . to form a suitable body for this
purpose. ,4l
On 15 July 1954 , MacGillivray was able to
persuade the Conference of Rulers that some parts of the
Federation Agreement should be reviewed at an early date,
particularly having regard to the introduction of
elections to the various legislatures. 42 But the Rulers
were not satisfied that a commission drawn from outside
Malaya would provide the most satisfactory body for
conducting such a review. But the Alliance leaders still
strongly pressed for a commission from outside Malaya, as
they feared a local body might be controlled by the
'reactionaries' of the Part y Negara and they would be
in a minority. 43 However, MacGillivray opined that the
Alliance might agree if he proposed " that a fundamental
review of the Federation Agreement should be conducted in
such a manner that it enjoyed popular support and
therefore the Legislative Council should have a say in
the manner and composition of the body but only when the
elected element had been added to it." 44 To persuade the
Alliance to accept this, the High Commissioner also
planned to propose to the Rulers the appointment of a
Working Party which would comprise half Federal and half
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State representatives with a strong Alliance element.
This body's "main task would be to consider the financial
relationship between the Federal government and the
States and other matters including an amendment to
regularize the position of the Mentri Besar and State
Secretaries." 45
 These actions would help to the moderate
tJMNO leader who" appeared to be trying to get out of
the boycott but was under pressure from his left wing."46
According to MacGillivray, "tJMNO was seeking a possible
excuse to go back on the agreement" and he " had had to
urge the Rulers and others to re-appoint all those who
had resigned their position."47
In early August, the Alliance strategy of
persuading the Malay rulers to support their demands
started to have an effect. The Sultan of Johore invited
the Sultans for a meeting in Johore Baharu on 22 and 23
August to discuss the Alliance demand for an outside
commission. 48 It was reported that he might have come out
in support of .tJMNO "with the idea of capturing a
prominent position for Johore vis-a-vis other States" and
also that he was very pleased "by the general behaviour
towards him of members of tJMNO during procession last
month." 49 This change of attitude of the Sultans was
apparent at the Conference of the Rulers on 21 October
1954. The Rulers and Menteri Besar most closely in touch
with TJIVINO reached an agreement on certain constitutional
matters. 5 ° It was agreed that a. purely exploratory
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committee should be appointed "to examine the provisions
of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948, other than
Part Xl," which "... required amendment for the purpose
of ensuring that they meet with the needs and aspirations
of the people. . . "- The proposed committee would be
comprised of one representative for each State and
Settlement, and eleven Federal representatives appointed
by the High Commissioner. Dato Abdul Razak, the vice
chairman of the TJMNO and the Secretary of Pahang would
sit on the committee. The High Commissioner hoped .. .the
presence of ]Jato Abdul Razak on the Committee should
satisfy tJ.M.N.O."52
This concession, together with the assurance of
the High Commissioner that he would consult the
victorious party regarding the filling of the five of the
seven reserved Nominated Members seats for the Federal
Council, was a good excuse for the Alliance to call off
the boycott. This could be seen by the people as a
victory for the Alliance and enhanced its image as a
strong force in the battle for self-government and
independence for Malaya. Accordingly the boycott was
called off in early July.
After the end of the boycott the UMNO-MCA
Alliance concentrated their efforts on winning the
forthcoming States and Federal elections with the final
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objective of getting immediate independence. British
officials were still undecided when the process of
decolonization should reached its final stage. In March
1955 Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, made it
clear to the Malayan people that there were obstacles
that stood in the way along the road to self-
government. 53
 The main obstacle was the Emergency. lie
pointed out to the people what they should do in order to
achieve self-government. He said:
First suppress terrorism, next put the
people on their guard against Communist
infiltration and subversion then help
to secure them against these dangers,
develop a stable economy and
administration, establish a durable
accord between the races and provide a
secure system of defence. These are the
hard necessities regulating the pace at
which we can go forward to realise
our hope of a happy prosperous self-
governing united Malayan nation within
the Commonwealth.54
In the Federal Elections in July 1955, the
Alliance put up candidates for all seats with 35 from
tJNNO, 15 MCA and two from MIC. The main issues in the
Alliance manifesto were to achieve independence within
four years and to bring the Emergency to an end by
offering a general amnesty. The main contender was the
Party Negara which contested 33 seats. This party also
aimed to get independence but a year later than the
Alliance target. Unlike the Alliance the Party Negara
under the leadership of Dato Onn adopted a strong pro-
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Malay stance as an attempt to win the support of the
Malays which formed 85 per cent of the electorate in this
election. However, the Alliance achieved a landslide
victory by capturing 51 of the 52 seats. Another one was
won by the Islamic Party (PMIP) . The Alliance's great
victory had proved the gap between Chinese and Malays
already had closed to a very great extent. According to
K. J. Ratnam, .there was little definite evidence to
suggest communal voting . .." at this election. He added
that, if "communal voting had in fact been widespread,
Party Negara might have stood some chance of beating the
Alliance since tJ.M.N.O.'s communal appeal might very well
have been diminished as a result of its partnership with
the M.C.A and M.I.C." 55
 Thus the Alliance was able to
clear one of the obstacles on the road to full self-
government and independence as this election had
indicated the various races were united.
But one obstacle remained; the Emergency or the
shooting war against the Communist guerrillas. The
British had always argued this as a reason to delay the
granting of independence for Malaya. Thus the Alliance
government, under Tunku Abdul Rahman and other MCA
leaders were eager to bring the Emergency to an end. One
of their efforts was to "negotiate" with the MCP, which
led to the meeting of Baling, in Kedah.
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Part II
Baling Talks
When the MCP launched a peace offensive, the
Alliance was preparing to contest the first Federal
Election which was to be held in July. The Alliance
leaders, including Tunku Abdul Rahman, felt that the
terrorists should be offered an amnesty with view to
encourage them to surrender. On 21 January, Tan Cheng
Lock announced that he was willing to go into the jungle
and discuss a general amnesty with the terrorists with a
view to ending the Emergency. The Alliance renewed its
proposals for amnesty in the Election manifesto which was
published in May.56
In June the Alliance leaders received a letter,
dated 1 May from the MCP, announcing that the aim of
the MRLA was to achieve a peaceful, democratic and
independent Malaya. 57
 According to the MCP, to achieve
this it was necessary to bring the war to an end,
! abo1ish the Emergency Regulations, hold national
elections in a peaceful and democratic atmosphere so
that all political parties, organisations,and individuals
who genuinely strove for peace could hold a round table
conference to reach a unanimous agreement in conformity
with actual conditions in Malaya. 58
 The MCP pointed out
that that they were willing to meet the government's
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representatives to negotiate for peace. But the
government rejected the offer for negotiation. It was
pointed out that if the MCP wished to end the Emergency
they could take advantage of the generous terms of
amnesty. The Alliance leadership, while expressing their
willingness to meet with Chin Peng , did not take the
matter seriously.
In letters dated 12 and 29 September, the MCP
continued to offer to negotiate with the government. In a
letter, received by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Chief
Minister of the Federal government, from the MCP Central
Committee, negotiations were proposed to "achieve a cease
fire and to solve the questions of repealing the
Emergency regulations and of achieving independence by
peaceful means." 59 The MCP considered the measures
proposed in the "General Amnesty" Proclamation were not
reasonable and practical. It proposed that "immediate
negotiations be conducted directly between the two
parties engaged in the fighting, in order that a total
cease fire can be achieved as soon as possible and that
the questions of repealing the emergency regulations, the
achievement of independence by peaceful means and other
problems relating to this can be satisfactorily
solved." 60 The MCP appreciated the peace efforts taken
by Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tan Cheng Lock and their desire
to meet Chin Peng, the Secretary General of the MCP. Thus
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the MCP agreed to send its representatives to the tJMNO-
MCA-MIC Alliance headquarters "... to discuss with the
representatives of the Alliance constructive and
practical details for a meeting to be held between Tunku
Abdul Rahman and Sir Tan Cheng Lock with Comrade Chin
Peng. ,6l
In response to the MCP's new approach Tunku
Abdul Rahman and also the prominent members of the MCA
had begun to support the idea of negotiations in order to
end the Emergency. But the High Commissioner and other
British officials agreed only to allow the Tunku to meet
the MCP'sleaders to clarify the terms of the amnesty.
Thus on 30 September the government released a statement
saying:
The Chief Minister is ready to meet
Chin Peng to clarify to him the recent
declaration of amnesty. Sir Cheng Lock
Tan will be with him at the meeting
There will be no preliminary meeting
with any representatives or anybody
else. 62
On 1 October, at the meeting of the Federation
and Singapore ministers held in Singapore, the Tunku said
he would like David Marshall to come with him. But
Marshall said the MCP had invited Malayan ministers only.
He agreed to accompany Tunku if the Communists invited
him to attend, and in view of Singapore's common interest
in the problem. 63
 On 17 October 1955 a meeting was held
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at government House in Singapore House, attended by the
Tunku, Marshall, MacGillivray, and R. H. Scott, the
British Commissioner-General, to discuss the issue of
the amnesty. 64 Marshall expressed the gravest possible
concern about the outcome of a meeting with Chin Peng. He
considered that it would develop into negotiations,
during which demands would be made by Chin Peng and
concessions in some form would be inevitable. He was
certain that the MCP would ask the Tunku to release all
persons who surrendered after the briefest possible
screenings, to release all detainees, and to repeal the
Emergency Regulations. He pressed for a clarification of
policy in the face of these grave possibilities if there
were any negotiations with the MCP. The Tunku regarded
negotiations with the MCP as inevitable as this was his
political commitment. During the meeting on the
following day , the Tunku expressed his opinion that
Chin Peng would be likely to ask for:
1. Recognition of the Malayan Communist Party.
2. An assurance that those surrendering will not
be deported.
3. An assurance that those surrenderring will be
allowed to play a part in the political life
of the country and will not be detained for
more than a short period.
4. The release of present detainees, and
5. The repeal of the Emergency Regulations.66
Tunku Abdul Rahman said he would reject straightway any
recognition of the MCP but he must be able to discuss
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other matters raised by Chin Peng. 67
 But he pointed out
that he recognised that he would not have the authority
to agree to anything at the meeting. He would refer any
points raised in the discussion with Chin Peng to the
High Commissioner. MacGillivray pointed out to the
Tunku that the proposed "meeting with Chin Peng was
agreed on the understanding that it was for the purpose
of clarification of the terms of the amnesty and that
there would be no negotiation." 68
 But the Tunku strongly
opposed this condition as there was growing public
opinion in favour of negotiation and that he could not
"go to the meeting if he were authorised merely to
explain the terms of the amnesty." 69
 Furthermore the MCP
would be able to brand him as a "Colonial stooge" if it
appeared that he was acting entirely on the instructions
of the British government during the forthcoming meeting.
The Tunku's terms for the meeting really put the
High Commissioner in a great dilemma. 7 ° If he disagreed
there was a real danger that the Alliance would use
their "secret weapon" of resignation from the Councils at
all levels and represent to the public that the British
refused to allow the Tunku to meet and talk with Chin
Peng. The Alliance then could suggest that the British
did not want to bring the Emergency to an end and
deliberately wished to keep it alive in order to deny
independence to Malaya. If this was to happen, there
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would be a strong anti-British campaign by UMNO and the
prosecution of the Emergency would be made more difficult
and there would be a possibility that morale among the
police and in the Malay Regiment would be lost. On the
other hand if he allowed the Tunku to talk with the MCP
on his terms and bring back a report, he might not be
able to agree to the points raised in the proposed
meeting. Then the Tunku would resign and suggest to the
public that he could have brought the Emergency to an end
on terms acceptable • to the public but that the British
had frustrated a reasonable solution. The greater risk
for the British lay in the possibility that Chin Peng
would ask for an assurance that independence would be
granted to Malaya by a stipulated date. In the High
Commissioner's opinion, the Tunku would certainly
support this demand.
The High Commissioner also pointed out that the
Alliance and the Communists were both striving for the
independence of Malaya. It was likely that this would
become one of the subjects for discussion, and "if
discussed, the Chief Minister may emerge from the meeting
feeling that he has a closer identity of view with the
Communists. . .than he has with the British" 71 on this
particular issue. The status of Chin Peng would
inevitably be enhanced, and in fact his position was
already improved by the publicity of the proposed talks.
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On the other hand the status of British officials in the
government would be reduced.
The Colonial Policy Committee took an enormous
interest in the proposed talks between the Tunku and Chin
Peng. One of its leading members, Lord Reading, came to
Malaya and Singapore and held a series of meetings with
top government officials, including MacDonald (whose post
was change to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in
India in 1955) •72 They made attempts to dissuade the
Tunku from his intention of having discussions with Chin
Peng at his forthcoming meeting. The reason was that the
Tunku had insisted that he would not go to meet Chin Peng
merely to clarify the terms of the amnesty. He might
make concessions to the MCP which were not in the
interests of the British. According to Lord Reading, the
Tunku made it quite plain that he had every intention of
using every means in his power to bring the Emergency to
an end as he had pledged himself in the election campaign
to do so. 73 In his opinion, if he failed, he would at
once become discredited. On the other hand, success would
have a chance of creating a united nation. The Tunku also
pointed out that a military solution was no longer
possible as the Communists had established themselves on
the Siamese border. According to him the only way was to
negotiate with Chin Peng. But it was useless for the
Tunku to meet Chin Peng if he was not in a position to
make reasonable concessions. According to the Tunku he
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must have the discretion to make a more favourable offer,
if the course of negotiations required it. Thus he must
have a reasonably free hand in order to gain his
objective. It was pointed out to him that if the
Communist forces were set free, they could turn to covert
subversion. But the Tunku held the belief that once
the Communists accepted terms, they would be anxious to
re-establish themselves and show themselves as good
citizens for some years to come.
Lord Reading thought that it was useless to
argue with the Tunku as he was evidently "a very vain
man and it might be that personal vanity was an element
in the policy that he was pursuing." 74 But he also
realized that the Tunku's attitudes could be explained
by his desire to clear the ground of obstacles to the
achievement of independence in the very near future.
According to Lord Reading , the British government should
consider - two courses of action. First to "refuse
authority to go beyond the published terms of the amnesty
and thereby risk the prospect of the talks never taking
place or breaking down at a very early stage, with all
the consequences of a charge of imperialistic motives,
or failure to move with the spirit of the times into a
world of coexistence. . . Another course of action was
to allow "some further measure of latitude in spite of
all the difficulties of specifying the nature and extent
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of the concessions which may be offered and all the
dangers of the Tunku deliberately exceeding his authority
and coming to terms which, however, acceptable to large
sections of local opinion, Her Majesty's Government could
not possibly ratify.
On 25 October, MacGillivray suggested another
course of action: to strengthen "Rahman for this meeting
is not . . . now regarded as a necessary condition precedent
to grant of self-government to the Federation." 77
 Tunku
Abdul Rahman and other Alliance leaders were determined
to achieve very early self-government as they believed
that if they would not be able to deliver it they would
be submerged by extremists, such as the Youth wing of.the
UMNO. In MacGillivray's opinion, an insistence "upon
ending the shooting war as a prior condition to the
granting of self-government has ceased to pay dividends
and if it is maintained it will prove a positive
incitement to irresponsibility on the part of Rahman when
he meets Chin Peng." 78 Thus he advised the Secretary of
State to make a statement that "the shooting war need no
longer be regarded as an obstacle on the road to self-
goverment, although H.M.G. intend to go on providing
military assistance until militant Communism in Malaya
has been defeated." 79 He also needed to point out that he
had been able to agree with the Rulers and Alliance
Ministers that talks should be held in London early next
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year, to discuss the future of Malaya. MacGillivray
hoped this statement might "have the greatest possible
effect upon Rahman before he meets Chin Peng."8°
The Secretary of State for the Colonies
instructed the High Commissioner to make every effort to
persuade the Tunku to confine himself at the proposed
meeting to clarification of the terms of the amnesty.81
He asked him to make it clear to the Tunku that he was
not allowed to go to the meeting as "a plenipotentiary
with power to agree to anything on behalf of the
Government." 82 HMG fully reserved the right to reject
proposals going beyond the amnesty terms and in any
case were not prepared to agree to concessions,
particularly ones that would involve recognition of the
MCP or that would result in the release of hard core
Communists.
The Secretary of State agreed with MacGillivray's
proposals to strengthen Tunku Abdul Rahman by explaining
the HMG 's attitude towards self-government, the proposed
January talks, and the establishment of a commission to
review the constitution. The government would consider
the recommendations of such a commission, except in the
case of anything that would affect the ability of the
Federation government to keep the internal security
position under control. He also agreed with the
suggestion that British government ". . . no longer regard
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further progress on the road to self_government.1t83
The Secretary of State asked MacGillivray to
inform the Tunku about this in his briefing for the
proposed meeting with Chin Peng. He pointed out that he
was not ready to make a public statement in Parliament on
the terms that were being suggested by MacGillivray.84
He feared the proposed statement, made in Parliament,
would be misunderstood in Britain. 85 On the other hand he
agreed to send a personal message that might help
strengthen the Tunku before the meeting.
As intructed by the Secretary of State,
MacGillivray and other British officials made efforts to
persuade the Tunku to confine himself to clarification of
the terms of amnesty. 86 It was pointed out that
discussions on matters such as the repeal of the
Emergency Regulations, would amount to an acknowledgment
that Chin Peng had a strong voice in policy making,
and would raise the meeting to the level of negotiations
on equal terms. But these reasons did not change Tunku
Abdul Rahman's attitudes. During the meeting of the
Executive Council the Malayan ministers were not
impressed by the letter from the Secretary of State for
the Colonies regarding the proposed London talks and
self-government. Dr. Ismail pointed out that the Alliance
and the people generally attached a great deal of
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importance to ending the Emergency at the earliest
possible moment. 87 This sense of urgency was increased by
the fact that the British government had made the ending
of the Emergency a condition of granting of self-
government. MacGillivray held the view that Tunku Abdul
Rahman planned to use the fact that ... [he] could reach
a settlement with Chin Peng on terms which had a large
measure of public support here, although unacceptable to
Her Majesty's Government, in order to advance his demands
for early selfgovernmentu1,BS in the proposed London
talks. Thus, MacGillivray renewed his suggestion to the
Secretary of State on 15 November 1955, to provide a
clear statement by HMG that the Emergency at this
present level tidid not stand in the way of self-
government.t B9
 In his opinion this kind of statement
would have a very good political effect and would
certainly weaken public support for negotiations. He
suggested the wording as follows:
H.M.G. join with all in this country in
the hope that the Emergency will now be
brought to a speedy end in such a way
that it will be clear to all that the
Communists have completely failed in
their declared aim of overthrowing the
Government. If, however, the Malayan
Communist Party continue to reject the
generous amnesty terms declared nearly
three months ago and the Emergency
should therefore continue, H.M.G. will
not regard the Emergency as an obstacle
to the Federation's advance towards
self- government and independence.
H.M.G. will, however, wish to be
assured at the forthcoming talks in
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London that adequate arrangements will
be made and maintained by the
Federation Government with assistance
from H.M.G. as may be needed to keep
the internal security position under
control and to meet the threat of
Communist aggression and subversion.90
MacGillivray himself made this statement at the
Legislative Council meeting just before the Baling
talks.
On the eve of the talks the MCP issued a
statement and manifesto for the press for propaganda
purposes. In one of the texts of the statement, the MCP
pointed out that:
There are some people who do not like
peace talks and who are unwilling to
reach a reasonable agreement. There are
a few influential warmongers and
militant people who are unwilling to
accept the lessons brought by eight
years of war. They dream of using
military force and food restriction
measures to force members of the
liberation army to go down on their
knees. There also believe in spreading
rumours but they cannot shake the firm
determination of the liberation army.
Their words and deeds are obstacles in
the way of achieving peace and reaching
a reasonable agreement. With the
unflincing and unfailing efforts of all
patriotic parties and the masses
victory will go to the Malayan people
who are fighting for peace, democracy
and independence.91
On 19 November 1955 Tunku Abdul Rahman came
under pressure from the High Commissioner to take
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advantage of the MCP's action to modify his terms on the
proposed talks from Itnegotiation!t to a discussion of
amnesty. 92
 MacGillivray pointed out to the Tunku that the
Chin Peng statement 'i.. .amounted to an outright rejection
of the amnesty terms and the renewal of a proposal to
negotiate as equals. . . The Tunku, who seemed in a
state of confusion, issued a statement to the press. 94 He
said that he had instructed Too Joo Hing, the Alliance
representative, to tell Chen Tian, the MCP's
representative, that the MCP had indulged in propaganda
tactics by issuing statements to the press. 95
 For this
reason he was not going to negotiate, but to clarify the
terms of amnesty to the Communists. He said that:
I will not meet Chin Peng or anyone
else. I am not going to negotiate with
or treat Chin Peng as my equal, I am
going to explain the amnesty. I will
consider it. I represent the Malayan
Government and we have all the
resources to fight and beat the
Communists. I want peace and I want to
end this emergency. I will end the
emergency in any case, but I don't want
any more bloodshed if I can help it.96
Tan Cheng Lock also supported the decision of the
government not to recognise the MCP. 97 He added that it
would be difficult for the Government to alter the
terms of amnesty, and that Government must retain the
right to detain elements which might constitute a danger
to the country." 98
 Any further assurance from the British
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that the Emergency was no longer considered as an
obstacle for granting self-government and independence
for Malaya would stiffen the Tunku's resolve not to
negotiate with the MCP. In actual fact this measure
induced the Tunku to confine his discussion to the terms
of amnesty.
In the meantime, on 17 October 1955, a
preliminary meeting was held at Klian Intan, North Perak,
between I. Wylie, Deputy Commissioner of Police and Too
Joo Hing, Assistant Minister of Education, as	 the
representatives of the Malayan Goverment, with a
representative of the MCP to make arrangements for the
proposed meeting between the Tunku and Chin Peng. It was
followed by another meeting on 19 November where three
points were raised by Chen Tian, the MCP's
representative: a guarantee from General Bourne, the
Director of Operations and the Tunku concerning the
security of Chin Peng and his men, the supply of food,
and the place of the meeting between the Tunku and Chin
Peng. 99 The Tunku agreed to these demands and gave the
option to Chin Peng of fixing a meeting place.
The meeting began on 28 December at Baling, a
small town in Kedah. On the government side were Tunku
Abdul Rahrnan, the Chief Minister and the President of the
LTMNO, Tan Cheng Lock, the President of the MCA and David
Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore. The MCP were
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represented by Chin Peng, the General Secretary of the
MCP, Chen Tian, the head of the MCP's Central Propaganda
Department and Abdul Rashid Maidin, a Malay Communist.
The Tunku opened the meeting by thanking the MCP for
coming)°° He said he came to explain the amnesty terms
and these were for the discussions and consideration of
the MCP. The Tunku also explained the political changes
that had taken place in Malaya and the role of the
Alliance in ending colonialism. It was pointed out that
the tJMNO Assembly had passed a very clear resolution to
the effect that independence should be given by 31
August 1957. He also mentioned the High Commissioner's
announcement in the Legislative Council that self-
government would be given to Malaya despite the
Emergency. He looked forward to the forthcoming talks on
1 January with the British government in London on this
matter. He was confident the proposed talks would produce
results and would be successful.
The Tunku pointed out that if the Communists
accepted the amnesty, everyone would be pardoned. David
Marshall said that he realized there were some genuine
nationalists in the MCP, and asked them to come " back to
the healthy stream of constitutional progress" with their
fellow citizens. 10 ' He added that both the Federation
and Singapore had suffered as a result of the campaign of
hate and violence. He said this should be ended and all
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the good men should join together in the formation of a
democratic nation.
As expected Chin Peng raised the question of
recognition of the MCP and the attitudes of the
government representatives towards this issue. According
to Chin Peng, if the MCP was recognised and its members
were not subject to detention and investigation, they
could throw down their arms at once. As the present
writer has indicated elsewhere, the Tunku would not
accept any proposals for the recognition of the MCP. His
position was unchanged. According to Anthony Short, for
the Tunku, recognising the strength and support of
Communism in Malaya, it would be impossible to control
the MCP if it were to come out of the jungle and be
allowed to organise as a bona fide political party. 02
The Tunku made it plain to Chin Peng that: "to ask us to
recognise you as a Party, so that you can disperse
throughout the country to organise your communist
activities, naturally you must understand that the people
of this country would not accept that." 103 He pointed out
that the people in this country regarded Communist
activities as something entirely foreign to the Malayan
way of life and the MCP belonged to an outside power and
owed allegiance to China. But when Chin Peng asked
whether, if the MCP were confined to Federal citizens, it
could be recognised, The Tunku did not gave a clear
answer. He said the point was that they had to prove
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their loyalty to the country first. However, during the
fourth or the last session held on 29 December, he said,
we "told you in no uncertain terms that we would not
agree to recognition of the Communist Party."104
Chin Peng told the meeting that the members of
the MCP would not like to be detained or investigated
when they came out from the jungle. 105
 He argued that if
they were subject to detention and investigation, this
would imply that they had surrendered. The Tunku
explained that the period of detention would be only as
long as it was necessary to hold investigations. He
stressed that: "correctly speaking, it is not detention
at all." 106 According to the Tunku, an investigation
should be held to ascertain whether the members of the
MCP were loyal or not. If the MCP did not like the term
"investigation", according to the Tunku, than they could
refer to it as an "inquiry." On the question of the MCP's
members who wish to go to China or an other country, the
Tunku said they would be pleased to help them go. In his
opinion, it would not be necessary to hold an
investigation about those people. But he needed to know
the total number of those who wished to go. Chin Peng
was reluctant to give an answer to this. But he could
not accept the terms of the amnesty as proposed by the
government.
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It appeared that the only issue that had been
agreed by both sides during the meeting was on
independence. Chin Peng said
The present government, although it is
popularly elected, still is not an
independent government.... Under such
circumstances, therefore, when we bring
out our suggestions we have got to have
regard to this situation. If these
popularly elected governments of the
Federation.. . and. . . Singapore have self-
determination in matters concerning
security and national defence, then all
problems could be solved easily. As
soon as these two governments have
self- determination in internal
security and national defence matters,
then we can stop the war
immediately. 107
Both the Tunku and David Marshall grabbed at this
proposition from the MCP. The Tunku asked:"Is that a
promise?" 108 He added that when he came back from England
(after the forthcoming London talks) that would be the
thing that he would bring back with him. Chin Peng
replied, if that were to be the case, "we can stop our
hostilities and disband our armed units." 09
 Meanwhile
David Marshall made a note as follow:
As soon as the Federation obtains
control of internal security and local
armed forces we [the MCPI will end
hostilities, lay down our arms and
disband our forces11°
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He gave the note to Chen Tian and asked: "Would you
initial that because I want to issue it to the press."111
Chen Tian accepted it with an amendment: "that is not
equal to the fact that we accept the terms of the
Amnesty. ,,112
As the present writer has indicated elsewhere,
the British government feared that both the Alliance
leaders and the MCP leaders would come to agree on the
question of independence for Malaya. This in fact
actually happened. But the impact was not that great, as
the British government had already decided to discuss
that matter at the forthcoming London talks in January.
Nevertheless, it strengthened the hand of Tunku at the
proposed talks. Thus the Baling meeting which came to an
end on 29 December can be considered as a success for the
Alliance in the struggle for independence. It had
enhanced the status and improved the position of its
leadership amongst the people in this country and in
Asia.
After the Baling Talks, Tunku Abdul Rahman,
headed the "rornbongan merdeka" or Independence delegation
to hold talks with the Secretary of State for the
Colonies on Malaya's future constitution as an
independent country. An agreement was reached on 8
February, which granted Malaya full self-government
preparatory to independence within the Commonwealth.113
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But during the interim period Britain would retain final
control on external defence and foreign relation.
British Government had appointed a Commonwealth
Commission, which also known as the Reid Commision to
make recommendations on the future constitution of an
independent Malaya. 114 This Commission consisted of Lord
Reid as the Chairman, Sir Ivor Jennings from the united
Kingdom, Sir William McKell from Australia, Mr. Justice
Abdul Hamid from Pakistan, and Chief Justice B. Malik
from India.
The Commission began its work by visiting Malaya
in May 1956. It invited the people in this country to
submit their views on constitutional issues. The arrival
of Lord Reid had aroused public interest and sharpened
the racial feelings as Malays and Chinese and other
communities fight for constitutional advantages in the
forthcoming sovereign nation.115
The Alliance which intended to submit a united
memorandum to the Commission was under pressure from its
component: The tJMNO which represented the Malay, the MCA
which represented the Chinese and the MIC, which
represented the Indian community. The Chinese Chambers of
Commerce, various Chinese guilds and associations
strongly demanded citizenship based on the principle of
lus soli and equal rights of all the people in Malaya. On
the other side the Malays strongly opposed it. 116
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However, the component parties in the Alliance decided to
reconcile and compromise on these issues. On the
citizenship issue, the Alliance accepted the delayed jj
soil principle. This meant that everone born on or after
the independence day would be a Malayan citizen.
According to Heng Pek Koon, the acceptance of jus soli
principle "mark a momentous watershed in the history of
Chinese political development in Malaya". 117 Shed added
that: "It gave citizenship and franchise to nearly half
the Chinese population, thus enabling the community as a
whole to play an effective role in the political life of
the country."118
The Alliance recognised and proposed that the
Malay special privileges should be continued for a
substantial period. The Alliance suggested Islam as the
official religion and Malay as national and official
language.
The Reid Commission received 131 memoranda from
various organisations and individuals. The Commission
adopted almost all the Alliance proposals and published
its Report in February, 1957. The Report was submited to
a local Working Committee which consisted the High
Commissioner as the Chairman, four representatives of the
Alliance, four representatives of the Malay Sultans and
two British officials. After the Working Committee had
/
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agreed upon its recommendations a delegation from Malaya
went to London to hold talks with the Secretary of state
for the Colonies on the final details of the draft which
was adopted as the Constitution for an independent
Malaya. On 31 August 1957 the process of decolonization
reached its final stage and Malaya was born as a nation.
Conclusion
The British government handed over its power in
Malaya to the moderate Malay-Chinese Alliance government,
in response to the development of Malay and Malayan
nationalism. The British did not wish to curb the
aspirations of moderate groups as it might turn them to
the fold of the militants and communists. The combined
force of these might became too formidable or too great
for the colonial power to resist. Events in Indonesia and
Indo-China provided some good examples of this. Before
nationalism reached to a climax, the British government
decided to end its rule in Malaya. According to A.J.
Stockwell, constitutional "concessions in Malaya would...
bring two benefits: they would not only keep the moderate
Malayan leaders in the forefront of local events but also
win Britain friends and credibilty in independent
Asia. . . thereby doing something to counter the lure of
China." 119
 This made it possible for Britain to maintain
a good relationship with its former colony and "ensure
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Britain's strategic interests.t2O In fact it was
possible for Britain to make a defence agreement with
the Malayan government and tie this country to the anti-
Communist Western	 block. Thus Britain was 	 able to
safeguard its investments and commercial interests in
this region.
Granting independence would also solve the
Chinese problem in the long term. With the previous and
continuing efforts of British government and changing
circumstances,	 the Chinese political outlook and
orientation had changed. Malayan-centred Chinese
politics had replaced China-flavoured Chinese nationalism
and Communism as a stronger force in Chinese politics in
Malaya. Under the new Constitution almost all the
Chinese would become Malayan citizens or Ma Hua and
would be integrated into the political life of this new
independent country. It has been argued that they still
had the potential to become a ItFifth Column." But they
also could become good and loyal citizens.
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Conclusion
Between 1942 and 1955 British policy towards the
Chinese community changed dramatically. It represented a
shift from the negative and antagonistic attitude towards
Chinese politics as seen before the Second World War to
one of recognition that they had to adopt a more positive,
accort9dating and, when necessary, conciliatory approach to
Chinese political activities. The change took place in
four phases: first, the pre-war period with the so-called
"pro-Malaya policy;" second, the 1942 -1947 period with
the new liberal Chinese policy and the Malayan Union
scheme; third, the period of early Federal policy which
reflected almost a revival of pre-war policy and finally,
the "Malayanization of the Chinese" policy aiming at
building a united Malayan nation. Simultaneously with this
stage, British finally committed itself to early
decolonisation.
Previously Chinese political activities were
looked upon as a threat that had to be drastically curbed.
However, after 1942, the altered relationship between the
British and the Chinese, brought about by their close co-
operation during the war, together with the threat of
renewed Fifth Column infiltration among the Chinese,
forced Britain to review its relations with the Chinese in
Malaya. The result was a liberalisation of attitudes,
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beginning in 1942, which involved the granting of greater
political freedom by lifting the ban on the Kuomintan g and
the MCP and the guarantee of a political stake in the
country through the Malayan Union proposals.
Ideological differences which prevented the MCP
and the British working in harmony, and the opposition of
the Malays to the Malayan Union plan, ushered in the
second phase of British- Chinese relations in 1946.
Ignoring the Chinese by treating most of them as aliens
and denying them adequate political rights in Malaya on
the one hand, and fearing that the Malays would be
alienated and driven to take a more radical stance
politically on the other, the British reverted to the
relatively more safe pre-war pro-Malay policy. 	 Thus the
Federation of Malaya proposals were adopted.
However, the British soon realised that a policy
which did not adequately cater to the Chinese was no
longer possible.	 Neither was it good policy, in view of
the increase in Chinese political consciousness, and the
communist offensive which led to the declaration of a
state of Emergency. Consequently, steps were taken which
collectively worked towards the "Malayanisation" of the
Chinese-- an important ingredient in the formula for a
peaceful transfer of power from the British to the people
of Malaya.
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From the perspective of the Chinese, the years
between 1942 and 1955 brought momentous changes in Chinese
political outlooks and activities. The pre-war years
had seen two directions in Chinese politics: namely, that
which was focused on China, which was regarded by the
British as dangerous and destabilising; and the
conservative minority Peranakan Chinese politics which was
locally oriented and unthreatening, but which was seen as
peripheral in the political scheme of things in that
period.
The outbreak of the Second World War for the
first time not only placed Chinese politics at centre
stage through the resistance movement, but also
concentrated them locally. The policy change initiated
by the British after 1942 of giving political freedom to
the Chinese as a reward for their co-operation against the
Japanese gave more scope for action to the radical
elements within the Chinese community. This contrasted
sharply with majority of the Chinese community which
appeared to be politically quiescent.
The Malayan tJnion plan was announced against the
background of the increasingly bold actions and excesses
of the MCP and the seeming inaction of the rest of the
Chinese on the one hand, and the strong opposition of the
Malays on the other.	 This forced the British to rethink
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their strategy for Malaya's political development. The
result was the Federation of Malaya plan which, as in the
pre-war days, once again fvoured the Malays and
disadvantaged the Chinese.
The Federation of Malaya proposal galvanised the
non-communist Chinese into action, but also provided the
MCP with an excuse to take the offensive.	 It was a new
phase in Chinese political development and one that
demanded a response from the British. 	 The result was the
Malayanisation of the Chinese, a strategy of winning their
hearts and minds away from the possible alure of the MCP,
and directing their political energies towards achieving
aspirations which were more Malaya-centered, by the
promise of citizenship and a political stake in the
country after independence.
Thus it may be seen that the relations between
British policy and Chinese politics were shaped by the
actions and rponses of both sides. Between 1942 and
1946 the initiative towards a more liberal attitude
towards Chinese politics was largely taken by the British
without any prompting or much pressure from the Chinese.
The abandonment of the Malayan Union proposal and the
implementation of the Federation of Malaya Constitution,
while largely a response to strong Malay reactions, was
made much easier by the lack of reaction from the majority
of the Chinese and the increased radicalism of the MCP.
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The British could still initiate a policy which affected
the Chinese without giving weight to Chinese opinion.
However, the introduction of the Malayanisation of the
Chinese policy was undoubtedly a British response to the
political activities of the Chinese which went beyond an
act of temporary accomodation. It was a policy adopted
to safeguard the security of the British position in
Malaya and to enable the transfer of soveignty to take
place peacefully.
APPENDIX A
The Problems of the London Funds of the Malay Sultans
War created new demands and new problems which
were unprecedented in the history of colonial Malaya.
After the Japanese invaded Malaya, the British government
and the Colonial Office faced a new problem of indirect
rule in which they would not be able to advise the Malay
Sultans with regard to matters relating to Malaya. During
the Japanese occupation, it was inevitable for the
British government to resort to unconstitutional
practices in dealing with Malayan problems. This showed
itself, for instance, in the dealings with the various
funds of the four Federated Malay States, the five
Unfederated Malay states, the Straits Settlements and
other non-government bodies which were held in trust
under the control of the Crown Agents in London.1
These funds, excluding those which belonged to
the government of the Straits Settlements, did not belong
to the British government. H.M.G. did not possess any
authority (except for local government in Malaya) to
dispose of or use the funds. However, the British
government, at first by mistake, and then deliberately,
continued to use the funds; they in so doing committed an
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action that was illegal, irregular and unconstitutional
according to the constitution of the Malay States and the
Straits Settlements.
By using the funds the British government
realized that they could be faced with legal proceedings
being taken against them. In this event, great
embarrassment would be caused to certain members of the
British cabinet, the Colonial Office staff and especially
the staff of the Crown Agents. To enable them to solve
this problem without much publicity, or being exposed to
the public, or facing a big claim of compensation in the
courts, the British government needed to secure
sovereignty over the Malay States by depriving the Malay
Sultans of their sovereignty. Other steps to be taken
were the formulation of a new financial policy and
legislation by an Order in Council.
The Colonial Office faced the Malayan fund
problem immediately after Viscount Cranborne replaced
Lord Moyne as Secretary of State for the Colonies and
Harold Macmillan became the Under Secretary of State for
the Colonies. 2 Both of them had to face the immediate
task of mobilizing all resources of the Colonial Empire,
manpower and materials, for the purposes of war. One of
the most important sources was from various funds from
Malaya which were held under trust in the hand of the
Crown Agents in London.
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The Crown Agents held cash and securities
belonging to various governments,government bodies and
also non-government bodies. The amount was between
j 50,000,000 and± 60,000,000. A sum of -30,0OO,000 was
earmarked for a particular purpose, e.g. Sinking Funds,
Post Office Saving Accounts, etc. The remainder consisted
of surplus funds, and other ,
 accounts such as Railway
Renewal Funds which did not belong to the government. The
nature of the funds was as complex as the political
system of pre-war Malaya which was divided into the
Straits Settlements, the four FMS and the five tJFMS. As
the Straits Settlements was a Crown Colony the funds
belonged to the H. M. G. However, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies or H. M. G did not possess any authority
regarding these funds, except through the Governor of the
Straits Settlements, or the local government. The funds
of the Malay States did not belong to H.M.G. Neither
the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor the Governor
of the Straits Settlements possessed any authority to
release or to dispose these funds. It should be noted
that the Malay States were administered by the British
government based on treaties with the Malay Sultans.
However, the Malay Sultans were recognized as independent
sovereigns.
The Colonial Office considered it necessary to
draw money from those trust funds to meet the residual
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obligations of the Malay States and the Straits
Settlements for payment of salaries and pensions to
serving and retired government servants, debts
outstanding, the payment of interest on loans, the
payment of salaries to the credit of government officers
in Malaya, including any necessary allotments to the
dependants of men who served in the local military forces
and had been reported as casualties or presumed to be
prisoners of war and others. The Colonial Office also
felt obliged to make payments, on humanitarian grounds,
for the maintenance of persons evacuated from Malaya,
where they themselves were without other means of
support. As the present writer will indicate, the
Colonial Office also used the funds for the payment of
salaries to the staff of the Civil Affairs of the Malayan
Planning Unit and for the rehabilitation of Malaya. The
present writer also will indicate that the Colonial
Office intended to use all the funds.
Macmillan, under the directive of Viscount
Cranborne, asked the Crown Agents to make certain
payments, from the Malay State funds, which were under
trust. Both of them were lacking in knowledge of Malayan
affairs, and did not realise that they were forcing the
Crown Agents to commit a "criminal 0 breach of trust by
making payments from the funds. Edward Gent, the head of
the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office and Sir
Sidney Abrahams, the assistant Legal Adviser of the
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Colonial Office, also pressured the Crown Agents to make
payments based on this directive. The Crown Agents were
perturbed by their actions and one of them, H.C.
Thornton, wrote a letter to Harold Macmillan on March
1942. According to him:
It appears that we may, for an
indefinite period, be asked to make
certain payments on authority which
may, strictly speaking, have no legal
force; and we feel doubt as to the
propriety of dealing in this manner
with funds which were lodged with us as
agents holding a position of trust.3
From the Crown Agents' point of view, their legal
position was that they were responsible in law to their
principals (the Malay rulers) for the funds which they
held on their behalf. Payments made by the Crown Agents,
solely on the authority of the Secretary of State, might
lay them open to the possibility of legal proceedings,
not only from Malaya but from any holder of Federated
Malay States stock. In their opinion, it seemed possible
that a holder of the stock might hear that grants of a
nature not permissible in normal conditions had been made
from Malayan funds, and that he might take legal action
to prevent such payments on the ground that they
endangered the security of his holding. In addition,
there may be a valid claim against the assets of the
Federated Malay States wherever these assets may be held;
a claim could be made, and such a claim might amount to a
431
very large sum. In that event, in the opinion of the
Crown Agents, there could be legal proceedings against
them, and the Secretary of State's directive of 7 March
1942 would not be admissible in defence.4
The Crown Agents appreciated the difficulties of
the present situation, involving legal and constitutional
questions on which they were not qualified to express an
expert opinion. They had not wanted to emphasise, unduly,
legal points arising from their position as agents and
trustees. They agreed that existing conditions might
well justify, even in the eyes of the law, actions which
in normal times would be irregular. However they felt
the Secretary of State's directive would put them in a
position of uncertainty. As they were asked to apply the
funds in their hands for purposes which it could not
safely be assumed would be approved by the Rulers of the
Malay States, their legal position should first be
carefully examined by the Secretary of State and his
legal advisers, and possibly also the law officers of
the Crown.5
Gent and other Colonial officers agreed that the
legal position of the Crown Agents was not in doubt, but
the nature of problem facing the Colonial Office at that
stage was not legal but political, and the protection to
be given, if necessary, to the Crown Agents, could only
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be secured by political measures. 6
 In the case of the
colonial government (Straits Settlements) where His
Majesty had jurisdiction, the Colonial Office was
preparing to regularize the Secretary of State's
authority regarding the using of Straits Settlements
funds by Order in Council. 7 In his reply to Thornton's
letter, Gent informed him that arrangements were in hand
for validating the authority of powers of the Governor of
the Straits Settlements to dispose, at his discretion, of
the funds of the Colonial Government which were held in
London.8
In the case of the Malayan funds, a similar
course of action could not be taken during that time.
This was because the Malay States possessed sovereign
status, and so it was not possible for the British
government to legislate for them. The British regarded
their treaties with the Malay States as being 'still in
force', and hoped to rely on them when they were again in
contact with the Governments concerned, to secure
post-f acto approval of any payment which they may have
authorised the Crown Agents to make from State funds in
their hands.9
Meanwhile the Secretary of State himself, held
the opinion that it would probably be better to show Mr.
Thornton's letter and possibly the Colonial Office draft
reply to the law officers, before replying to the Crown
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Agent. He also asked Harold Macmillan to give his own
view of the Malayan fund problem. Macmillan agreed that
it would be wise to refer the matter to the law officers
and also to consult the Treasury, which was also agreed
by the Secretary of State)-° But Gent and Sir Kenneth
Poyser, the Legal Adviser of the Colonial Office and
former Chief Justice of F.M.S., did not wish to have
the law officers' view on the Malayan fund question at
this stage because, they argued, no legal point arose.11
In their view, the law officer would merely say that, as
lawyers, they had no advice to give. They, including
Harold Macmillan, agreed that they must make a decision
on policy, and they told the Secretary of State that his
action in asking the Crown Agents to make payment under
the Secretary of State's direction was "an act of tyranny
of your [Secretary of State'sl part, but it is one with
which the Treasury concur." 12
 He urged the Secretary of
State to take action because:
"If we win the war you will put it
right by F.M.S. legislation. If we lose
the war, neither you nor I care."13
Then on 23 April 1942, Viscount Cranborne
directed the Colonial Office's staff, among them, Gent,
Sir Sidney Abrahams, Sir K. Poyser and Harold Macmillan,
to make a decision or plan in order to protect the Crown
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Agents against any possible legal proceeding being
threatened against them) 4 They all agreed that
(a) . . . it is the intention that the actions
of the Secretary of State in approving
the use of these funds for purposes
which he may decide to be necessary
should be validated by indemnification
enactments by the legislatures of the
[Malay] States concerned as soon as
this course becomes practicable.
(b) The position of the Crown Agents as
trustees of certain Malayan funds
and subject in normal circumstances
to the instruction of the Malayan
Governments has been carefully
considered and is fully appreciated.
They will however, recognise that the
Secretary	 of State has	 a
esponsibility to discharge to
Parliament and he would not conceive it
to be politically praticable, [even if
it were on any grounds justifiable],
to refrain from taking decisions
regarding the use of Malay States funds
in this country in satisfaction of what
he may judge to .. . accord . . . with the
obligations and interests of the State
Governments.
Cc) The Constitutional distinction between
the Colony of the Straits Settlements
and the Malay States under His
Majesty's Protection would not in the
Secretary of State's view justify a
difference being made in practice in
the employment of their respective
funds in the discharge of similiar
obligations, and he is fully prepared
to exercise his responsibility in the
present abnormal situation no less in
the one case than in the other.
(d) . . . In the event of legal proceedings
being threatened from whatever source
to challenge the propriety of any
decisions of the Secretary of State or
of any action which the Crown Agents
may have taken in compliance with those
decisions, the Secretary of State would
of course adopt every means, political
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and other, whether in Malaya or this
country, to protect the Crown Agents
[and also Secretary of State and
Colonial officers themselves] and if
necessary to indemnify them. . . [from
any penal consequence?]... [which they
may have incurred...] •15
This draft letter concerning the decision to be
taken by the Colonial Office to protect the Crown Agents
regarding the use of Malay States funds in their hands
was sent to the Treasury (G. L. Syers) on 23 April 1943.
Sir K. Poyser also sent a letter of 29 April 1943 under
cover of a personal letter to Donald Somervell, the
Attorney General, in order to seek his personal view
regarding the course of action to be taken by the
Colonial Office regarding the use of Malayan funds in the
Crown Agents' hand. 16 1n his opinion, K. Poyser said:
[that] . . . in the case of Malay States,
however where His Majesty has no
jurisdiction a similar course [to
transfer to the power Malay Sultans to
the Secretary of State] is not
practicable. It is the view of the
State that these treaties still remain
in force and he relies on them to
secure any action which he may take to
authorize, the disposal be validated by
indemnification which the Governments
concerned will be advised to enact as
soon as their territories are freed
enemy occupation and he has therefore
conveyed these views to the Crown
Agents for the Colonies in the attached
letter. 17
From the Attorney General's point of view, the
Malayan funds issue raised some rather difficult legal
436
questions which needed to be considered further. 18	He
asked Sir K. Poyser to seek	 (Board of Trade)'s view,
whether responsibility for the Malayan funds fell under
the "Trading With the Enemy" Act, by reason of the
Japanese occupation of the territory. The Attorney
himself was not clear as to the exact position of the
Crown Agents or the funds, but he agreed that from the
political and common sense point of view there seemed to
him to be strong grounds for the procedure suggested by
the Colonial Office, that the Crown Agents should seek
and act on instructions from the Crown, the Crown taking
full responsibility for those instructions and
undertaking if necessary to indemnify the Agents. But he
could not decide whether, if some question was raised in
the courts, this procedure would be legally in order, and
he thought this was not altogether an easy question to
answer. 19
On the Attorney General's suggestion, K. Poyser
wrote a letter to Sir Thomas Barnes of the Board of Trade
to refer to the Malayan fund problem in connection with
the Trading with the Enemy Act. 2 ° In his letter, Poyser
stated the Colonial Office decision not to refer the
matters formally to the law officers but to the Attorney
General personally, and at the Attorney General's
suggestion he was writing to Thomas Barnes himself. He
asked Barnes' opinion regarding the problems faced by the
Colonial Office and the Crown Agents. In his own opinion,
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Poyser said that they could not invoke the doctrine of
"agent of necessity" with regard to the actions that had
been already taken by the Colonial Office and the Crown
Agents to make payments, e.g. to the dependents of the
men in the local military forces who had been taken
prisoner, and allowances to relatives of the Rulers who
left Malaya before the Japanese occupation.21
According to Barnes, the states or sovereigns were not at
war with His Majesty and were not to be regarded as
enemies, although the sovereigns considered as
individuals were resident in territory occupied by the
enemy. 22 That meant that neither the Malay States nor
the Sultans were enemies under the meaning of the Enemy
Act. In Barnes's, opinion, "the funds held on behalf of
the Government of the Malay States would therefore only
be attracted by these provisions [in the Enemy Act] if
they were properly belonging to or held or managed 	 on
behalf of enemy subjects."23
In another letter of 22 May 1942, in reply to Sir
K. Poyser, the Attorney General did not object to the
Secretary of State's action in dealing with the Malayan
funds in a manner which, in his view, accorded with the
obligations and interests of the state governments.24
In his opinion, so far as any subsequent validation by a
legal enactment was required, the Secretary of State was
satisfied that this would be forthcoming and,
	 indeed,
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over a large part of the area he would probably be in a
position to secure this result as they would be matters
on which the ruler agreed to accept the advice of His
Majesty's Government. In regard to the Crown Agents, he
agreed that if any ruler desired to complain about any
action they had taken, his complaint in law would be
against the Crown and not against them. And he also
agreed with the steps taken by the Colonial Office to
give assurance to the Crown Agents that they would
be protected and, if necessary, indemnified. On the
questions of legal proceedings by a bondholder or some
other person, he agreed that those would be most
unlikely, provided that any funds earmarked for the
services of the loans were kept intact for that purpose.
In conclusion, he saw no objection to the course
which was being taken by the Colonial Office, and in his
opinion, though there may be certain obscurities in
the legal position, no difficulty was likely to
arise: tt if it does arise it would be much better to
wait and consider it when, if ever, it discloses
itself. 25
Meanwhile, Sir K. Poyser himself, with the
assistance of Gent and Robert Wray, drafted the Straits
Settlements (Temporary Provision) Order in Council for
1943 in March 1942.26 This draft Order in Council could
be seen as a precedent for the future draft Order in
Council for Malayan Union which would protect the Crown
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Agent, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the
Colonial Office staff, from any legal proceedings
regarding the payments made from the Malay States funds.
In order to validate the Secretary of State's authority,
he was made the principal of the funds which were in the
hand of Crown and was able to exercise the function of
governor. Phrase 3, article 1 of the draft Order in
Council stated that:
Without prejudice to anything done
thereunder by, or in relation to, the
Governor (or) the Governor in Council
(or any other officer) or authority or
otherwise, all the functions •of the
Governor in Council (or any officer or
the the Government of the colony) under
the enactments mentioned in the second
schedule to this order shall, save as
otherwise expressly provided in this
order, be exercisable by the Secretary
of State and all references to the
Governor (or) the Governor in Council
(or such other officer or authority as
aforesaid) shall, save as aforesaid, be
construed as including reference to the
Secretary of State. 2,
And phrase 3 article 2 stated:
Where such functions include to make,
amend and revoke any legislative
instrument, and any such instrument is
amended by this order, it shall be
lawful for the Secretary of State:
a) to amend or revoke such
instrument as amended by this
order;
b) to provide that any
legislative instrument made
by him shall be deemed to
have had effect as from a
date not earlier than the
16th day of February, 1942.28
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The draft Order in Council, transferring powers
possessed by the governor of the Straits Settlements to
the Secretary of State, was sent to the Crown Agents
and seemed to satisfy them. 29 On the question of the
Malay States fund problem, Gent told the Crown Agents
on the telephone that he proposed to secure
validating authority for operating the various funds,
and	 that this would have to take the form of
legislation. 30
There was not much choice left for the Colonial
Office other than to introduce such legislation for the
Malay States, taking or transferring the power of the
Malay Sultans and putting the Malay States under the
jurisdiction of His Majesty's Government. It was not
possible to introduce such legislation in the Legislative
Council which would then be open to discussion, because
it involved 'gentlemen's honour' and would invite various
claims from as far away as India and Australia.
In November 1942, Viscount Cranborne left the
Colonial Office in Downing Street to take a new
appointment as Lord Privy Seal. It was an awkward
coincidence that the Straits Settlements (Temporary
Provision) Order in Council was due to be passed in 1943.
As the Lord Privy Seal, he continued to play an important
role in the formulation of British colonial policy.
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Harold Macmillan also left the Colonial Office
after Colonel Stanley took over the post of Secretary of
State for the Colonies at Westminster. Hence the Malayan
fund problem became a burden for the new Secretary of
State for the Colonies. But it was reasonable to expect
that he could be sure of getting support from the
Secretary of State for the Dominions when Viscount
Cranborne took over that post and joined Col. Stanley at
Downing Street. Both of them could also rely on another
Cabinet member, Attorney General Somervell, who had given
his support in regard to the Malayan fund problem.
The Colonial Office had begun to formulate a new
constitution for ,post-war Malaya in March 1943. At the
same time they continued to take steps to solve the
Malayan fund problem. On 4 March, Gent, J. J. Paskin and
W. L. Monson held a discussion with Sir K. Poyser
regarding the future constitution for Malaya. According
to Sir K. Poyser, it would be possible for the HMG to
"enter into some . . . form of Agreement which would give
[HMGI some jurisdiction" in the Malay States after HMG
reconquered and occupied all those states.31
The Colonial Office also began to discuss
financial matters with the Treasury and the War Office.
They seemed to agree with the Colonial Office, to cover-
up the Malayan fund problem. For instance, on the 11 May
442
1943, the representatives of the Treasury, the War Office
and the Colonial Office reached an agreement that
"...'for the purpose of expenditure upon Malayan needs it
would be unnecessary to preserve any precise' distinction
between Malayan Fund as represented by current
information collected under the Military Administration
and Malayan Funds as represented by Malayan balances in
London." 32 The War Office was not willing to provide any
expenditure necessary for the rehabilitation of Malaya
and the Treasury was empty. The money that was available
was from the Malayan fund. So in a meeting at the
Colonial Office on 18 December 1943, the Colonial Office
decided that: Itin the case of expenditure necessary for
rehabilitation, where it was clear that the War Office
intended to take no action, action could be taken by the
Colonial Office pledging if necessary, funds at their
disposal. 33
The meeting also agreed that the reference to
the funds should be given in the name of His Majesty's
Government. By this action, the Colonial Office could
cover up any evidence from the records that referred to
the using of the Malayan funds. It would be difficult for
anyone to detect any irregularities.
Another step was taken to solve the Malayan fund
problem, when the Colonial Office began to formulate
their financial policy towards Malaya on 11 November
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1943. The Colonial Office decided that the assets and
liabilities of the Federated Malay States and other Malay
States and non-government bodies were to be transferred
to the central government. This decision was taken when
Turnbull, the Financial Adviser for the future Civil
government of Malaya, was absent from the meeting on 23
March 1944 and 5 June 1944. Turnbull was puzzled by
this action. He said that:
I do not understand why ... it should
be necessary [for the Central
Government] to absorb the assets and
liabilities of State Authorities other
than the Governments or of other local
authorities .
The logical reason was that not all the funds
from Malaya which were held in trust by the Crown Agents
belonged to the government. To solve this problem, it
would be necessary for the future central government of
Malaya to absorb the assets and liabilities of non-
government bodies.
With the elimination of the sovereignty of the
Malay Sultans and the transfer of all the assets and
liabilities of Malaya to His Majesty's Government under
the Malayan Union35
 Scheme, Britain became the principal
of the various Malayan funds in London. Finally, the
Colonial Office solved the problem by introducing
legislation under the Malayan Union Ordinance No.1/46 -
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The Idemnity and Validating Ordinance, 1946, by Order in
Council 36
The object of the Indemnity and Validating
Ordinance which came into force on the 1 April 1946,
tt was to bar legal proceedings in respect of certain
payments made and acts, done or under authority of the
Secretary of State for the Colonies or the Crown Agents,
during the war period.. . . U 37
After these steps were taken, a legal opinion was
sought from Cyril Radcliffe and John Foster to assess
whether the question of the London funds of the Malay
Sultans, particularly those which belonged to Johore,
had been solved. both solicitors gave their opinion on 14
May 1946 . 38 According to them,"it seems clear that
under... [section 92(1) of the Malayan t3nion Order in
Council 1946 S. R. & 	 0. No.463] . . .the funds held by
Crown Agents	 in London have become His Majesty's
property. " They added that,' t if the validity of the
purported transfer of the Funds in London of the
Government of Johore were to be tested in the English
courts, the main question for decision, would be the
validity or otherwise of the Order in Council No.463, in
so far as it affected the Malay States, and in this case
the State of Johore." They pointed out that regarding
this matter, the Government of Johore could raise two
questions as follows:
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"Firstly, does His Majesty have the
necessary jurisdiction in the State of
Johore? The second question is or is
not valid, but as a practical matter,
since the Secretary of State's decision
is conclusive, the answer depends on
whether the the Secretary of State is
willing to give the court a decision
that His Majesty does in fact have such
jurisdiction. 40
It had been argued that if the agreement between and His
Majesty's Government and the State of Johore was valid
the steps that had been taken by the Colonial Office
solved the problem of the fund. Both of them came to the
conclusion that, "there is no form of proceeding in the
English courts by which the Malay States could test the
agreements with Sir Harold Macmichael", as, the
"agreements are State documents between two sovereign
entities quasi international in character, not intended
to create legal relationships, and could not be the
subject of direct litigation in the English courts."41
It appears that one of the reasons why the
British Government introduced the Malayan tjnion was to
cover up and solve the question of the London funds of
the Malay Sultans. J. Allen who raised the question, "why
did... [the Malayan union] fail (and fail so quickly)?"42
failed himself to see that the Malayan Union actually
achieved one of its immediate aims.
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It should be noted that it was extremely probable
that the decision taken by the Colonial Office to
eliminate the sovereignty of the Malay sultans was partly
the result of the question of the London funds of the
Malay Sultans. Only after the decision had been taken did
the Colonial Office start to formulate a directive on
Chinese policy. During the formulation of Chinese policy,
the Colonial Office no longer needed to consider the
attitude of the Malay Sultans and the Malays towards the
Chinese community. In other words the Colonial Office was
in a more flexible position to decide on a new policy
towards the Chinese community.
447
Notes
1. H. C .Thornton to Harold MacMillan, the Under
Secretary of State of the Colonies, 16 March 1942,
in CO 273/670/50763.
2. The executives at the Colonial Office did not always
follow their legal advisers' advice. In 1949, Sir
Sidney Abrahams commenting on some executives,
said," It was difficult to convince or persuade
eager and energetic executive that a policy they
believe to be wise and just is the reverse, since it
is the business of executives to execute..." He
added, to some "enthusiastic executives, it is
easier to get	 into a mess than to get out of
it.' Sir S. Abrahams was an assistant legal
adviser at the Colonial Office when Macmillan joined
the Colonial Office as the Under Secretary of State
for the Colonies. "Macmillan" according to Nigel
Fisher, "knew nothing about the colonies or how they
were governed...." See Sidney Abrahams,"The Role of
the Attorney General" in Corona, No.5, June 1949,
HMSO, p. 21. See also, Nigel Fisher, Harold
Macmillan, Weidenfeld andNicolson, London, 1982, p.
83 and Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, Macmillan
& Co Ltd., 1967, p. 163.
3. Thornton to the Under Secretary of State for the
Colonies 16 March 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Minutes by Gent, 7 March 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
7. Gent to Thornton ,7 March 1942 in CO 273/670/50763.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Harold MacMilan to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies 17 April 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
448
14. Minutes by	 K. W. Blaxter, 23 April 1942, in CO
273/670/50763.
15. Ibid.
16. Sir K. Poyser wrote to Donald Somervell, the
Attorney General, 29 April 1942, in CO
273/670/50763.
17. Ibj.
18. Donald Somervell reply to K. Poyser, 1 May 1942 in
CO 273/670/50763.
19. Ibid.
20. K. Poyser to Sir Thomas Barnes, 7 May 1942, in CO
273/670/50763.
21. Ibid.
22. Sir Thomas Barnes reply to K. Poyser, 13 May 1942,
in CO 273/670/50763.
23. Ibid.
24. Donald Somervell	 to K. Poyser, 22	 May 1942,
in CO 273/670/50763.
25. Ibid.
26. Draft of the proposed Straits Settlements (Temporary
Provision) Order in Council,1943, in CO
273/670/50760.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Thornton to Gent, 6 May 1942, in CO 273/670/50763.
30. Ibid.
31. Albert Lau Khong Hwa, "The Politics of Union and
Citizenship: The Evolution of British
Constitutional Policy Towards Malaya and Singapore,
1942-1948", Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of
London, 1986, p. 63. See also, CO 825/35 /55104/1.
32. "Rehabilitation of Industry, Malaya." Record of
meeting at the Colonial Office, 8 December, 1943, in
CO 865/25
33. Ibid. , see also CO 865/25/55104/6 (c)
449
34. R .E. Turnbull was the fo:
British Honduras. He was
Adviser for the future
However, he did not play
formulation of financial
government of Malaya. R.
July 1944, see CO 865/24.
:mer Colonial Secretary of
appointed as the Financial
government of Malaya.
any important role in the
policy for the proposed
. Turnbull to Wodeman, 24
35. All assets (except the personal residences or
estates of any Sultan, or any building or lands
which are used for the purpose of Islamic religion
or properties pertaining to the endowment of Islamic
religious institutions)of the Government of the
Federated Malay States and of any Malay State be
transferred to the Government of the Malayan Union.
See,	 Great	 Britain,	 Malayan	 Union	 and
Singapore, Summary of	 Proposed Constitutional
Arrangements, London, 1946, p. 7.
36. Malayan Union, Annual Report on the Malayan Union
for 1946, April to December ,Government Printer,
Kuala Lumpur, 1947, pp.90-91.
37. Ibid.
38. See, "Joint opinion regarding whether there is power
to vest in His Majesty the funds of the Government
of Johore which were held by the Crown Agents for
the Colonies in London" 	 (by C. Radcliffe and
J. Foster), 14	 May 1946, in	 "Joint Opinion"
MSS.Ind. Ocn. S.1O5, (Rhodes House Library, Oxford).
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. James de
University
p.vi.
V. Allen, The Malavan Union, Yale
Southeast Asian studies, Yale, 1967,
Bibliograpliy
UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUTVIENTS AND PRIVATE PAPERS
The Public Record Office, Kew (England)
Colonial Office
CO 273
CO 275
CO 537
CO 717
CO 825
CO 875
CO 865
CO 1022
CO 1030
Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence,
1836- 1946.
Straits Settlements, Sessional Papers.
Eastern Colonies, Original Correspondence
(Straits Settlements and Malay States)
Federated	 Malay	 States,	 Original
Correspondence, 1920-1951.
Eastern, Original Correspondence.
Public Relation and Information, Original
Correspondence.
Far	 Eastern	 Recontruction,	 Original
Correspondence.
South East Asian Department, Original
Correspondence 1950-1956.
Eastern, Original Correspondence, 1950-1956.
Foreign Office
FO 371	 General Correspondence (Malaya)
Cabinet Office
CAB 98
	
War Cabinet Miscellaneous Committees.
CAB 101	 Cabinet Historical Section, Official War
Histories.
451
War Office
WO 172	 Lord Louis Mountbat.ten's Diary.
WO 203	 Civil Affairs, SEAC Headquartes.
WO •220	 Civil Affairs.
Rhodes House, Oxford (England)
Blythe, W.L., "Papers as Colonial Secretary, Singapore,
including Reports on Chinese Affairs, 1946 by Victor
Purcell", MSS. md. Ocn. S. 116.
Dalley,J.D., "Malayan Security Service, Political
Intelligence' Journal, MSS. md. Ocn. 5. 25.
Humphrey ,A.H.," Communism and Chinese Schools", MSS.
Pac. S. 115.
Radcliffe, C.,and Foster, John, "Joint Opinion of
Counsel[sic]", MSS. md. Ocn. S.l05.
"Ralph Hone Papeis",MSS . Brit. Ernp. 5. 407 (1).
Webb, G.W.," The Chinese in Malaya, memorandum as Acting
Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Singapore, 1948", MSS.
md. Ocn. S.255.
The National Army Museum (London)
"Major Lloyd Owen Papers", Ac. N. 8301.
"General Gerald Templer Papers", Acc. N. 7410.
Department of Palaeography and Diplomatic, t3niversity of
Durham (England)
"Malcolm MacDonald Papers"
452
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Library (Singapore)
"Tan Cheng Lock Papers"
The National Archives and Department of Oral History
(Singapore)
EMA/CA	 British Military Administration/Chinese
Affairs, Headquarters, Singapore Division.
CSO	 Ministry of Social Affairs Files.
Arkib Negara (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)
BMA/ADM	 British Military Administration Files
MU	 Malayan Union Files
PR	 Information Department Files.
JPM/SCA	 Secretariat of Chinese Affairs Files.
UMNO/SG	 UMNO. Files.
"Tan Cheng Lock Papers" ,SP13.
"Hugh Pagden's Papers", SP7.
The University of Malaya Library (Malaysia)
"Koleksi Ibrahim Yakob" [Ibrahim Yakob Collections] File
No. MSS 176 (8)
Private Collections (Malaysia)
"Humphrey Ball's Papers"
"H. S. Lee Papers"
453
PUBLISHED SOURCES
Official Record
Colonial Office (London) ,British De pendencies in the Far
East, 11945-1949, Cmd.7709, HMSO, 1949.
-________ , The Colonial Emp ire 1939-1947, Cmd.
7167, HMSO, 1947.
___________ Malayan Union and Singapore,Summary of
Proposed Constitutional Arran gements, His Majesty
Stationery Office London,1946.
________________ Federation of Malaya, Summary of Revised
Constitutional Proposals, CMD. 7171, HMSO, 1947.
Federation of Malaya, Societies in the Federation of
Malaya, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1949.
________________ Address By His Excellency the High
Commissioner, Department of Public Relations, Kuala
Lumpur, 1949.
Annual Re port ( 1948-1954), Kuala
Lumpur.
Annual Report of the Labour
Department(for 1947- 1949), by R.G.]J. Houghton,
Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
____________________ Annual Report on the Trade Unions
Registry (for the 1948-1949) , b y J.B.Prentis,
Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
_________________ Chinese Schools and the Education of
Chinese	 Malayans, The Report of a mission invited
by the Federation	 Government to Study the Problem
of the Education of Chinese in	 Malaya (Fenn-wu
Report) , Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1951.
__________________ Minutes of the Meetings of the
Legislative Council, 1948-1956.
-	 - -___ , Report of the Committee on Malay
Education (Barnes Report), Kuala Lumpur, 1951.
________________ Report of the Education Committee
1956 (Razak Report), Government Printer, Kuala
Lumpur, 1956.
454
____ _____________ Re port of the Education Review
Committee 1960 (Rahman Talib Report), Government
Printer, Kuala Lumpur 1960.
Report of the Malaya Census 1921,
Kuala Lumpur.
_______-____________ ,
	 Special	 Committee	 on	 the
Imp lementation of the 	 Educational policy;
Statement on the Report of the Special	 Committee,
Government printers, Kuala Lumpur, 1954.
__________________ Ordinances and Acts, 1950-1951.
Great Britain,Harisard, 391 HC Deb 5, Column 48,
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons.
_____________ Statutory Rules and Orders 1946
Haisbury 's	 Statutes of England, Second Edition,
Vol.6., Butterworth & Co.(Publishers) Ltd, London,
1948, p.543-7].
Report on the British Military Administration of Malaya,
September 1945 to March 1946 by Maj or-General Ralph
Hone, Kuala Lumpur, 1947.
Report on a Mission to Malaya, October 1945-January 1946,
by Sir Harold MacMichael, HMSO, London, 1946.
Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff B y Supreme Allied
Commander South- East Asia 1943-1945, HMSO, London,
1951.
Singapore Advisory Council Proceedings, 1946.
Straits Settlements,Proceedings of the Legislative
Council of the Straits Settlements (PLCSS), 1920,
Government Printing Office, Singapore, 1922.
Malayan Union, Annual Report on the Malayan Union for
1946, April to December, Government Printer, Kuala
Lumpur, 1947.
______________ Proceeding of the Advisory Council of
the Malayan Union, 1946-1948, Kuala Lumpur, 1948.
____________________ Federal Ordinances and State and
Settlement Enactments Passed During the Year 1948.
Straits Settlements, Straits Settlements Blue Book for
the 1881 1 1891 and 1991] , Government Printing
Office, Singapore, 1882-1911.
455
Newspapers
The Malaysian Message, 1894-1895.
Kabar t3chapan Baru, 1926-1931.
Kabar Slalu, January- May 1924.
Bintang Pranakan, 1930-1931.
Bintang
 Timor, July 1894- July l895
The Malacca Guardian, 1930-1940.
The Straits Echo, 1932.
The Straits Budget, 1950- 1953.
The Straits Times, 1930- 1950.
The Straits Chinese Herald, January - May 1894.
BOOKS
Abdullah, Firdaus,Radical Malay Politics: Its Origins and
Early Development, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala
Lumpur, 1985.
Adam, Ramlah, Dato' Onn Ja'afar, Gateway Publishing
House, Kuala Lumpur, 1987.
Akash, Yoji, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation
Movement, 1937-1941, Lawrence University of Kansas,
1970.
Ampalavanar, Rajeswary,The Indian Minorit y And Political
Change in Malaya, Oxford University Press, Kuala
Lumpur, 1981.
Amyot, J.,The Chinese and National Integration in
Southeast Asia, Institute of Asian Studies, Faculty
of social science, Bangkok, 1972.
Alexander, G.,Invincible China: The Overseas Chinese and
the Politics of Southeast Asia, Macmillan, New York,
1974.
Allen, James de V., The Malayan Union, Southeast Asia
456
Studies, New Haven 1967.
Asmad(Ab. Samad bin Ahmad), Dokumentasi Seminar Selarah
Melaka, Malacca State Government, 1983.
Bastin, J. and R.W. Winks (ed.),Mala ysia: Selected
Historical Reading, Oxford University Press, Kuala
Lumpur, 1966.
Brimmell, H., Communism in South East Asia, A Political
Analysis, Oxford University Press, London, 1959.
___________________ A Short History of Malayan communist
Party, Singapore, 1956.
Blythe, Winfred,The Impact of Chinese Secret Socities: A
Historical Study, Oxford University Press, 1969.
Carison, Sevine, Malaysia: Search for National Unity and
Economic Growth, Sage Publications, Beverly Hill,
California, 1973.
Chan, Heng Chee and Hans-Dieter Evers,Nation Building and
National Identity in Southeast Asia, University of
Singapore Press, Singapore, 1972.
Chang, Queeny, Memoirs of a Nonya, Eastern Universities
Press Sdn. Bhd., Singapore, 1981.
Chapman, F. Spence,The Jun gle is Neutral,Chatto & Windus,
London, 1954.
Chandos, Viscount (0. Lyttelton), Memoirs of Lord
Chandos, Bodley Head, London, 1962.
Carino, Theresa Chong, China and the Overseas Chinese in
Southeast Asia, New Day Publishers, Quezon City,
1985.
Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Mala ya: Resistance and
Social	 Conflict during and After the Japanese
Occupation, 1941-1946,	 Singapore University
Press, Singapore, first ed. 1983.
_________________ The Masked Comrades: A Study of the
Communist United Front in Malaya, 1945-1948,
Times Books International, Singapore, 1979.
Chelliah, D.D.,A History of the Education Policy of the
Straits Settlements with Recommendation for A New
System Based on Vernaculars, The Government Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1960.
Ch'en, J. & N. J. Tarling (ed.),Studies in the Social
457
History of	 China and South-East Asia, Cambridge
Universities Press, Cambridge, 1970.
Chen, Ta, Emigrant Communities in South China, Institute
of Pacific relations, New York, 1940.
Chew, Daniel, Chinese Pioners on the Sarawak Frontier
1841-1941, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1990.
Chi,Madeleine ,China Di p lomacy 1914-1918, East Asian
Research Center, Havard University, Cambridge
(Mass.), 1970.
Chia, Felix,Ala Sayang ! A Social History of Babas and
Nyonyas,	 Eastern University Press Sdn. Bhd.,
Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
__________________ 
The Babas,Times Books International,
Singapore, 1980.
Chung-Gi Kwei, The Kuomintang -Communist Struggle in
China, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970.
Chin, John M., The Sarawak Chinese, Oxford University
Press, Petaling Jaya, 1981.
Clammer, J. R.,Maintenance and Chan ge Among the Straits
Chinese	 Community of Malaysia and Singapore,
Occasional Paper no.54,	 1979, Institute of
Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore.
____________________ Straits Chinese Society , University
Singapore Press, Singapore, 1980.
Cloake, John,Templer Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field
Marshall Sir Gerald Templer, Harrap, London, 1985.
Clutterbuck, R., Riot and Revolution in Sin gapore and
Malaya, 1945-1963, Faber and Faber Limited, London,
1973.
___________________ The Long Long War; the Emergency in
Malaya, 1948-1960, Cassell, London, 2nd Edition,
1967.
Coppel, A. Charles,Indonesian Chinese in Crisis, Oxford
University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
Cruickshank, C.,SOE in the Far East, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1983.
Dawson, Thomas, R.P.,Tan Siew Sin, the Man From
Malacca,Donald Moore, Singapore, 1969.
Donnison, F.S.V., British Militar y Administration in the
458
Far East, HMSO, London, 1956.
Emerson, Rupert,Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect
Rule, tJnivesity of Malaya Press, Singapore(3rd imp),
1969.
Evers, Hans-Dieter(ed.),Modernilatiofl in South-East Asia,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Oxford
University Press, Kuala Lumpur ,reprinted 1975,
Fairbank, J.K.,(ed.),The Cambridge History of China, vol.
12, (Republican China 1912-1949, p.l), Cambridge
University Press, New York, 1983.
Fifield, Russell, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-
1958, Archon Books, 1968.
Fisher, Nigel, Harold Macmillan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London, 1982.
Fried, Morton H. (ed.) , Collo guiem on Overseas Chinese,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958.
Funston, Neil J.,Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of
United	 Malay National Organization • and Party
Islam, Heinemann, Kuala	 Luinpur, 1980.
Gopalan, P.V., Coronation Souvenir of the Settlement of
Malacca, Commercial Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1937.
Gordon, K. Benard,The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast
Asia, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New
JERSEY, 1966.
Gosling, L. A. Peter & Linda Y. C. Lim,The Chinese in
Southeast Asia, (Volume 2 Identity, Culture &
Politics), Maruzen Asia, Singapore, 1983.
Hanrahan, Gene Z., The Communist Stru ggle in Malaya.
University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur 1971.
Hassan, M.A., and Rahman, N.Hassan Shuhaimi Nik Abdul
Rahman(ed.)The Ei ght Conference International
Association of Historians of Asia, Selected
Papers, Department of History, National University of
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1988.
Hassan, Riaz, Interethnic Marriage in Singapore: A Study
in Interethnic Relations, Occasional Paper No. 21, May
1974, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore.
Heng, Pek Khoon, Chinese Politics in Mala ysia A History
459
of the	 Malaysian Chinese Association, Oxford
University Press, 1988.
Ho, Ruth, Rainbow Round My Shoulder, Eastern Universities
Press Sdn. Bhd., Singapore, 1975.
Hua, Wu Yin, Class and Communalism in Malaysia, Politics
in a Dependent Capitalist State, Zed Books Ltd,
London, 1983.
Hubbard, G.E., British Far Eastern Policy, Institute of
Pacific	 Relations, New York, 1943.
Jayasuria, J.E., Dynamics of Nation-building in Malaysia,
Associated Educational Publishers, Colombo, 1983.
Johan, Khasnor,The Emer gence of the Modern Malay
Administrative Elite, Oxford University Press,
Singapore, 1984.
Khong, Kim Hoong, Merdeka! British Rule and the Struggle
for Independence in Malaya, 1945-57, INSAN, Kuala
Lumpur, 1984.
Khoo, Kay Kim et al. (ed.), Kene garaan 25 Tahun, Satu
Perspektif Sejarah (25 Years of Nationhood, A
Historical Perspective) Persatuan Muzium Malaysia,
Kuala Lumpur,, 1982.
Komer, R. W., The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect:
Organization of	 a Succesful Counter-insurgency
Effort, A Report Prepared for Advanced Research
Projects Agency, The Rand Corporation, Santa
Monica, 1972.
Lau, Albert,	 The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948,
Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1991.
Lee, Poh Ping, Chinese Societ y in Nineteenth Century
Singapore, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur,
1978.
Leo, Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic
Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press,
Singapore, 1985.
Lim, Joo-Hock and S. Vani (ed.),Armed Communist Movements
in Southeast Asia, Gomer Publishing Company
Limited, Hampshire, 1984.
Lim, Pui Huen, P.,Tan Chen g Lock Papers A Descriptive
List, A New	 and Enlarged Edition, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1989.
Lim, Victor,Biographies of Prominent Chinese in
460
Singapore, Nan Kok Publication Co., Singapore, 1983.
Macmillan, Harold, The Blast of War, Macmillan & Co Ltd.,
1967.
Mahmood, Ibrahim, Selarah Perluan gan Bangsa Melayu
(History of	 The Struggle of The Malay Race),
Penerbitan Pustaka Antara, Kuala	 Lumpur, 1981.
Masrom, Baharudin Ali,Politik Mela yu Abad 21(Malay
Politics in The 21st Century) , 'ID' Enterprise, Kuala
Lumpur, 1989.
Mauzy, D.K., Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in
Malaysia, Marican & Sons (M) Sdn. Bhd., Kuala Lumpur,
1983.
Means, Gordon P., Mala ysian Politics, University of
London Press, London, 1970.
McKie, Ronald, Malaysia in Focus, Angus and Robertson
Ltd., Sydney, 1963.
McLane, C.B., Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An
Exploration of Eastern Polic y under Lenin and
Stalin, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966.
McVey, Ruth T., The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1965.
Middlebrook, S.M., Ya p Ah Loy , 1837-1885, M.B.R.A.S.
Reprints, Kuala Lumpur, Republished in June 1983.
Miller, H., Menace in Malaya, Harrap, London, 1955.
Mustajab, Mohd Sarim(ed.), Akhbar Dan Ma j alah: Selarah
Dan	 Perkembangan (Newspapers and Magazines: Its
Development and	 History), The Department of
History, National University, 1985.
Newell, W.H. (ed.), Ja pan in Asia, Singapore University
Press, Singapore, 1981.
Nyce, Ray, Chinese New Villa ges in Malaya, A Community
Study, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute,
Singapore, 1973. qi
O'Ballance, Edgar.,Malaya: The Communist Insur gent War,
1948-60, Archon Books, Hamdan, Connecticut, 1956.
Onghokham, Rakyat Dan Negara (Peoples and Nation), Penerbit
Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1983.
Ongkili, James, P., Nation-buildin g in Malaysia 1946-
461
1974, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1985.
Onraet, R., Singapore- A Police Background, Dorothy Crisp,
London, 1947.
00, Yu Hock, Ethnic Chameleon: Multiracial Politics in
Malaysia, Pelanduk Publications( Malaysia) Sdn Bhd,
Petaling Jaya, 1990.
Osborne, Milton,Region of Revolt; Focus on Southeast
Asia, Pergamon Press (Australia), Adelaide, 1970.
Parmer,	 J.	 Norman,Colonial	 Labour	 Policy	 and
Administration in	 Malaya. A History of Labour in
the Rubber Plantation Industry in	 Malaya, c.l910-
1941, New York, 1960.
Purcell, Victor, Malaya, Communist or Free?, Victor
• Gollancz Ltd, London, 1954.
___________________ The Chinese in Malaya, Oxford
University Press, London, 1948.
___________	
The Revolution in Southeast Asia,
Thames and Hudson, London, 1962.
Pye, Lucian W., Guerrilla Communism in Mala ya, Princeton,
U.S.A., 1956.,
Rahman, Tunku Abdul (Putra al-Haj), Looking Back, Pustaka
Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1977.
____________________ Political Awakenin g , Pelanduk
Publications, Petaling Jaya, 1987.
Ratnam, K, J., Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur,
1967, reprinted.
Roff, W.R., The Ori gins of Malay Nationalism, University
of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967.
Rose, Saul, Britain and South-East Asia,Chattos & Windus,
London, 1962.
Ross, John D.D., The Ori gin of The Chinese People,
Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya, reprinted in
1990.
Ryan, N.J.,The Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore,
Oxford	 University Press, Kuala Lumpur, eighth
impression, 1978.
Sandhu, K. Singh, and Wheatly, P. (ed.) , Melaka: 	 The
462
Transformation	 of a Malayan Capital c.1400-1980,2
Vols., Oxford University
	 Press, Kuala Lumpur,
1983.
Sarasin, Viraphol,The Role of China in Southeast Asia in
Regional Security Developments and Stability in
Southeast Asia,
	 Papers presented at International
Conference, organized by The Institute of
Southeast Asia Studies (Singapore) and International
Institute for Strategic Studies (U.K.),Singapore,
1980.
Scott-Ross, Alice, Tun
	 Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, a
Personal Profile
	 by His Daughter, Published by
Alice Scott-Ross, Singapore, 1990.
Sharpley, Cecil H., Great Delusion, the Autobiography of
an ex-Cornmunist Leader, William Heinemann Ltd.
London, 1952.
Shieh, Milton J.T., The Kuomintan g : Selected Historical
Documents,	 1894-1969, Asia in the Modern World,
No.7, Center of Asian
	 Studies, St. John's
University.
Short, Anthony,The Communist Insurrection in Mala ya,1948-
1960, Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1975.
Shu, Yun-t'siao and Chua Ser-koon, eds., Mala yan Chinese
Resistance to Ja pan 1932-1945- Selected Source
Materials,	 Cultural and Historical Publishing
House Pte Ltd., Singapore,
	 1984.
Sidhu, M.S.,& G.W.Jones, Population Dynamics in a Plural
Society: Peninsula Malaysia, tThICB Publication, Kuala
Lumpur, 1981.
Sidhu, Jagjit Singh, Administration in the Federated
Malay
 States 1896-1920, Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1980.
Simandjuntak, B., Malayan Federalism, Oxford University
Press, 1969.
Singko, Ly, Hanoi, Peking and the Overseas Chinese, Asian
Writers Publishing House, Singapore, 1978.
Skinner, G. William, Chinese Society in Thailand: An
Analytical History, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, New York, 1957.
Smith R.B. and A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and The
Transfer of Power in Asia, School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London, 1988.
463
Song, Ong Slang, One Hundred Years of the Chinese in
Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1967,
(reprinted).
Soplee, Mohamed Noordin, From Malayan Union to Singapore
Separation, Penerbit Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur,
1974.
Stenson, M., Repression and Revolt: The Origins of the
1948	 Communist Insurrection in Mala ya and
Singapore, Ohio University Centre for
International Studies,Southeast Asia Program, 1969,
Athens, Ohio.
_____________ The 1948 Communist Revolt in Malaya:
A Note	 on Historical sources and Interpretation
Occasional Paper No.9, 	 Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore, 1971.
Stockwell, A.J., British Policy and Mala y Politics during
the	 Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948,
Malaysian Branch of Royal	 Asiatic Society,
Monograph No.8, Kuala Lumpur, 1979.
Strauch, Judith, Chinese Village Politics in the
Malaysian State,	 Havard University Press,
Cambrigde, Massachusetts, 1981.
Stubbs, Richard,Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare
The	 Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Oxford
University Press, Singapore,	 1989.
Tan, Chee Beng, The Baba of Melaka, Culture and Identity
of a Chinese Peranakan Community in Malaysia,
Pelanduk Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1988.
Tan, Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems From A Chinese Point of
View, Tannsco, 1947.
Tan Cheng Lock Papers: A Desriptive List, compiled by the
Library	 Staff, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Singapore.
Thayer, Philip W., Southeast Asia in the Comin g World,
The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1953.
Thio, Chan Bee, Extraordinary Adventure of an Ordinary
Man, Governor Books, London, 1977.
Thio, Eunice, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-
1910, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969.
Thomson, V. And Richard Adloff,Minority Problems in
464
Southeast	 Asia, Russell & Russell, New York,
reissued 1970.
Thornton, Richard C.,China, the Struggle for Power, 1917-
1972, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973.
Tilman, R.O., Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya,
Cambridge University Press, London, 1964.
Trager, Frank N., Marxism in Southeast Asia, Stamford
University Press, London, 1960.
Tregonning, K.G., A History of Modern Malaya, Eastern
University Press Ltd., Singapore, 1964.
Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Societ y , Oxford
University Press, 1971.
Wa'ng, Gungwu(ed.), Malaysia A Survey , Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1964.
__________________-, A Short History of the Nanyang
Chinese, Donald Moore, Singapore, 1959.
Wu, Teh Yao, Roots of Chinese Culture, Federal
Publications, Singapore, 1980.
Yeap, Joo-Kim, The Patriach, Times Printers, Singapore,
1975.
Yen,Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911
Revolution, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur,
1976.
Yen, Ching-hwang (Dr.), The Role of the Overseas Chinese
in The 1911 Revolution, Southeast Asian Studies
Programme, Nanyang University, Singapore, 1978.
Yeo, Kim Wah, The Politics of Decentralization,1920-l929
Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1973.
__________________ Political Development in Singapore,
1945-55, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1973.
Yeo,Siew Siang, Tan Cheng Lock, the Straits Legislator
and Chinese Leader, Pelanduk Publications, Kuala
Lumpur, 1990.
Yong, C.F., Tan Kah Kee, the Making of an Overseas
Chinese Legend, Oxford University Press, Singapore,
1987.
& R.B. McKenna., The Kuomintang
465
Movement in British	 Malaya 1912-1949, Singapore
Uuniversity Press, Singapore, 1990.
Zacher, Mark W., and R.Stephen Mime, Conflict and
Stability in Southeast Asia, Anchor Books, New York,
1974.
ARTICLES IN JOURNALS AND CHAPTERS IN BOOKS
Abrahams, Sidney, "The Role of The Attorney General"
Corona, no.5,June 1949, HMSO.
Akashi, Yoji, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan
Chinese 1941-1945," Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies(JSEAS), Vol.1, No.2, 	 Sept 1970.
__________-________ , "Bureaucracy and the Japanese
Military	 Administration, With Specific Reference
to Malaya" in Newell, 	 W.H. (ed.), Japan in Asia,
Singapore University Press, Singapore, 	 1981.
Anuar, Nik Mahmud Nik, "Tunku Abdul Rahman-Chin Peng
Amnesty	 Talks and British Response", inJEBAT, No.
18, 1990, Journal	 of the Department of History,
National University of Malaysia.
________________	 "Malayan -Thai Police Border
Agreement, September 1, 1949",	 in SARJANA,
Jilid(Vol.) 5, 1989, Journal of 	 the Faculty of
Art and Social Science, University of Malaya.
Beaglehole, J.H.," Malay Participation in Commerce and
Industry:	 the Role of RIDA and MARA", Journal of
Commonwealth Political	 Studies, Vol. VII, 1969,
Leicester University Press.
Cheah, Boon Kheng, "The Social Impact of the Japanese
Occupation	 of Malaya (1942-1945)", Alfred Mc Coy
(ed.) Southeast Asia	 Under Japanese Occupation,
Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980.
__________________ "Malayan Chinese and the Citizenship
Issue", Review of Indonesian and Mala yan Affairs,
Vol. 12, No.2, December 1978.
Clammer, John, "Chinese Ethnicity and Political Culture
in Singapore" in Gosling, L.A.Peter & Linda Y.C.
Lim,The Chinese in Southeast Asia, (Volume 2
Identity, Culture & Politics), Maruzen 	 Asia,
Singapore, 1983.
Finkeistein, Lawrence S., "Prospects for Self-Government
466
in	 Malaya", Far Eastern Survey, Vol.XX1, No.2,
January 30, 1952,	 American Institute of Pacific
Relations.
Freedman, M., "The Growth of a Plural Society in Malaya",
in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, No.2, June 1960.
Gamba, Charles, and Aziz , tJngku A.,"RIDA and Malayan
Economic Development", Far Eastern Surve y, 10
October 1951.
Gamba, Charles, "Chinese Associations in Singapore,
JMBRAS, Vol. XXXIX, December 1966.
Haron, Nadzan, "Early Chinese in California: Some Aspects
of Their Immigration and Settlement, 1847-
1860",inJEBAT, Bil(Vol.) 11, 1981/82, the Department
of History, National University of Malaysia.
Ja'afar, Kamaruddin, "The Politics of Merdeka", in
Malaysia in History, Vol.XX,No.11, December 1977.
Jeshurun, Chandran, "Post-war Politics in Melaka"
K.S.Sandhu	 and Wheatley P., Melaka,the
Transformation of a Malay Capital	 c.1400-1980,
Oxford University Press, 1983.
Kennedy, R., "MaJ,aya: Colony Without Plan", Far Eastern
Survey, 15 August 1945.
Lim, San Kok, "Some Aspects of the Malayan Chinese
Association 1949-1969",Journal of the South Seas
Society, Vol.26, No.2, 1971.
McGee, T.G., "The Malayan Election of 1959: A Study in
Electoral Geography", in Journal of Tropical
Geography, Vol. XVI, October 1962.
Morrison, Ian, "Aspects of the Racial Problem in Malaya",
Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXII, No.3, September 1949.
Parmer, Norman J., "Constitutional Change in Malaya's
Plural	 Society", Far Eastern Survey, Vo. XXVI,
No. 1, October 1957,	 American Institute of
Pacific Relatios.
P'ng, Poh Seng, "The Straits Chinese in Singapore: A Case
Study of Local Identity and Social Cultural
Accomodation", Journal of Southeast Asian History,
Vol.2, No. 1, 1961.
___-______________ , "The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-
1941", Journal of Southeast Asian Histor y, vol.2,
No.1, March, 1961,
467
Purcell, Victor,"A Malayan Union: The Proposed New
Constitution", in Pacific Affairs, Vol.19, No.1,
March 1946.
______________ "Britain's Future in South East
Asian", in
	 Malaya, Vol.1, No.2, February 1952.
Smith, R.B.,"China and Southeast Asia: The Revolutionery
Perpective", 1951, inJournal of Southeast Asian
Studies, Vol.XIX, No.1, March 1988.
Sopiee, M.N., "The Penang Secession Movement, 1948-51",
in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,., Vol.1V,
No.1, March 1973.
Soh, Eng Lim,"Tan Cheng Lock: His Leadership of the
Malayan Chinese", Journal of Southeast Asian
History, Vol.1, No.1, March 1960.
Stockwell, A.J.,
	 "British Imperial Policy and
Decolonization in Malaya, 1942-52",The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. XIII, No. 1,
October, 1984.
____________________ "The Approach to a Possible Transfer
of Powers' Series on Malaysia and Singapore", in
R. B. Smith and A. J. Stockwell, British Polic y and
the Transfer of Power in Asia, Documentary
Perspectives School of Oriental and African studies,
University of London, 1988.
Stubbs, Richard,"The United Malays National Organization,
the	 Malayan chinese Association, and the Early
Years of the Malayan
	 Emergency, 1948-1955",in
JSEAS, Vol.X, No.1, March 1979.
Tadin, Ishak, "Data Onn and the Malay Nationalism, 1946-
1951," Journal of Southeast Asian Histor y, Vol.1,
No.1, 1960.
Tan Chee-Beng, "Acculturation and the Chinese in Melaka:
The Expression of Baba Identity Today", in
Gosling, L. A. Peter & Linda Y. C. Lim, The Chinese
in Southeast Asia, (Volume 2 Identity,
	 Culture&
Politics), Maruzen Asia, Singapore, 1983.
Tan, Cheng Lock (Dato), "The Chinese and Malayan Unity"
The Straits Times Annual for 1953, Singapore.
Tan, Liok Ee, "Tan Cheng Lock and the Chinese Education
Issue in Malaya", in Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies,, Vol. XIX, No. 1, March 1988.
Tjoa, Hock Guan, "The Social and Political Ideas of Tun
468
Datuk Sir	 Tan Cheng Lock",in Sandhu K.S., and
Wheatley, P.,Melaka: The Transformation of A Malay
Capital c.1400-1980, Oxford University
	 Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
Tilman, R.O., "Policy Formulation, in Wang Gungwu (ed.),
Malaysia,
 A Survey, Donald Moore Books, 1964,
Singapore.
Tinker, Irene, "Malayan Election",Western Political
Quarterly, Vol.9, 1954.
Tregonning,	 K.G.,	 "Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan
Nationalist", Journal
	 of Southeast Asian Studies,
Vol. 10, No. 1, March ,1979
Turnbull, C.M.," British Planning for Post-war Malaya",
Journal of
	 Southeast Asian Studies, VOl.V,
No. 2, September 1974.
______________ "The Impact of Events in China in The
1920s on
	 British Policy in Malaya and The Straits
Settlements", in Hassan,
	 M.A. and Rahman,
N.	 H.	 S.	 N.	 A.(ed.),	 The	 Ei ght	 Conference:
International Association of Historians of Asia,
Selected Papers,. The Department of History, national
University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1988.
Wahid, Zainal Abidin Abdul, "Semangat Perjuangan
Melayu" (The Spirit of Malay Struggles), in JEBAT,
Vol.7/8, 1978/79.
Yen, Chin Hwang, "Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore
and	 Malaya". in Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies, Vol. VII, No.1
	 March 1976, F.E.B.
International, Ltd.
Yong, C.F.,and McKenna, R.B., "The Kuomintang Movement in
Malaya and Singapore", Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies, Vol. XII, No.1, March 1981.
UNPUBLISHED THESES, SEMINAR PAPERS, RESEARCH PAPERS
AND OTHERS
Ahmad, Siti Hajar, Isu Hak kerakyatan Atau Kewarnegaraan
Dalam Politik Tanah Melayu, 1946-1957, (Citizenship
Issues in	 Malayan Politics ) , B.A. academic
exercise, National University of Malaysia, 1989/90.
Akashi Yoji (Prof.), "Loi Teck Secretary General of the
469
Malayan Communist Party: Portrait of a Professional
Double Agent", The Eighth Conference International
Association of Historians Kuala Lumpur, 25th-29th
August 1980.
B.B.C.2,"SOE-Arms and the Dragon : Examines the Special
Executives's Oriental Mission to Arm the Communist
Guerillas in Malaya during World War Two, 31
August 1987,7.35p.m.
Chan, Heng Chee,"The Malayan Chinese Association, M.A.
Thesis, University of Singapore, 1965.
Cheah, Boon Kheng, "The Malayan Democratic Union, 1945-
1948, M.A Thesis, University of Malaya, 1974.
Christie, C.J.,"The Problem of China in British Foreign
Policy,1917-1921", Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Cambridge, 1971.
Gaus, Md. Salleh bin Md., Politik Melavu Pulau Pinancr
(Malay Politics in Penang), Dewan Bahasa dan
Pustaka, Kuala Lurnpur.
Haas, R.H.,"The Malayan Chinese Association 1958-1959,
Analysis	 of Differing Conceptions of the Malayan
Chinese Role In	 Independent Malaya", M.A. Thesis,
Northern Illinois University, 1967.
Heng, Pek Khoon, "The Development of the Malayan Chinese
Association", Ph.D. Thesis ,LSOAS, 1984.
Ismail, Mohamed, Keaadan Social Orang-oranc Melayu
Sebelum Perang	Di Melaka (Social Conditions of the
Malays Before the War), B.A. 	 academic excercise,
National University of Malaysia, 1973.
Khoo, Kay Kim, "The Beginning of Political Extremism in
Malaya, 1915-1935", Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Malaya, 1973.
Khor, Eng Hee, "The Public Life of Dr.Lim Boon Keng,"
B.A. Academic Exercise, University of Malaya,
Singapore, 1958.
Lau, Khong Hwa Albert, "The Politics of Union and
Citizenship: The Evolution of British Constitutional
Policy Towards Malaya and Singapore, 1942-1948,"
Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1986.
Lee, Ting Hui, "The Communist Open United Front in
Singapore, 1954- 1966", Ph.D. Thesis, National
University of Singapore, 1983.
Leo, Tin Boon, "Force 136: The Malayan Episode" B.A.
470
academic	 exercise, National University of
Singapore, 1986.
Leong, Stephen, "Sources, Agencies and Manifestation of
Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, l937194l",
Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1976.
Lim, Phaik See, Gerakan Pemisahan Di Pulau Pinan g Tahun
1948-51	 (Penang Secession Movement in the
Years;1948-5l), B.A.academic 	 exercise, National
University of Malaysia, 1983/84.
Ooi, Diana, "Chinese Speaking English in Penang ,1900-
l940",M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1967.
Oong, Hak Ching, Pengka-j ian beberapa Aspek Masyarakat
China	 Peranakan di Negeri-ne geri Selat, 1900-1940
(A Study Of Straits 	 Chinese Society in the Straits
settlements, 1900-1940), M.A. Thesis,	 National
University of Malaysia, 1981.
"Project no.13 Richard Broome", Oral History Interviews,
The Oral History Department, Singapore, 1986
Sopiee, N. M.(ed.),"The Battle for Malayan Union, a
Historical Sourcebook", Kuala Lumpur, 1970.
(microfilm)
________________,(ed.), "The Communities Liaison
Committee and	 Communal Relations in Malaya, A
Historical Sourcebobk", Kuala 	 Lumpur, 1970
(microfilm)
Stockwell, A.J., "British Imperial Strategy and
Decolonization in Malaya", ASEAS tJK/SEALG
Conference, Hull, 24-26 March 1986.
Sue, Yer Ng, "The Malayan Communist Party and Overseas
Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941", M.A.
Thesis, The University of Hull,198l.
Tan, Chee Beng, "Baba and Nyonya: A study of Ethnic
Identity of the Chinese Peranakan in Malacca,"
Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1979
Tan, Kim Neo (Rosie)," The Straits Chinese Way of life",
A Research Paper for the Department of Social
Studies, University of Malaya (Singapore), 1958.
Tan, T.H. (ed.) ,	 "Merdeka Convention":	 Papers and
Documents, London, 1957.
Ting, Chew Peh, "The Chinese In Peninsular Malaysia: A
Study of	 Race Relations in a Plural Society
Country", Ph.D. Thesis,	 University of Warwick,
1976.
